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This study aims to contribute to the understanding of the emerging profession of 
Security Risk Intelligence Analysis in the private sector by exploring the individual and 
collective professional identity of practitioners who identify and analyse threats and 
risks to the security of personnel, key assets and operations of an organisation or 
business in the private sector. The study used a mixed-method approach for the 
empirical research of how practitioners across different organisational contexts and 
national boundaries construct and maintain their professional identity in their quest for 
meaningful work.  
Security risk intelligence analysts in the private sector share the same individual 
professional identity, forming the collective professional identity's blueprint. There were 
some elements of difference, but none of them impacted the overall results that 
emerged during the study. Their professional identity is centred on their expert 
knowledge and ability to perform complex intellectual tasks in providing forewarning 
and insight into threats to the organisation or client's well-being and sustainability. They 
have a strong individual professional identity that reflects high levels of job satisfaction, 
pride and autonomy in their profession who thrive on connecting on a professional, 
functional level with stakeholders. Their main professional challenge related to the 
relative lack of understanding of their role in the private sector by various stakeholders 
in and outside the organisation.  
Lastly, proposals are made on how the profession as a collective and individual security 
risk intelligence analysts can increase their professional identity and their concomitant 
impact on the security risk management field and the security sector. 
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The growing diversity of threats, ranging from physical, criminal, political to cyber 
threats, impact all aspects of the well-being of countries, communities, the public and 
businesses.  The latter, and specifically those organisations that established their own 
internal security risk or intelligence functions to manage these threats better, or provide 
these services to other companies in the last 20 years, is the broad context of this study. 
Zimmerman (2011) explains how businesses felt the need to act to understand better 
and manage the “coalsescing, new riskscape”: 
Historic shifts in the geo-strategic environment and the attendant 
fragmentation of previously monolithic security risks into numerous, 
interdependent challenges, a change in perspective with regard to the 
added value of threat and risk analysis for internationally active 
businesses has, indeed, become a prerequisite for successful operations. 
As is true for almost everything regarding security issues, knowledge—
particularly informational and intelligence superiority—plays a decisive 
role. 
This threat and risk analysis and the resultant security knowledge or intelligence—and 
specifically the practitioners that execute this function—is the focus of this study. Due 
to the lack of a standardised job title for those performing this function, this study used 
the term “security risk intelligence analyst” (henceforth SRIA).  
This study aims to shed some light on the socio-professional profile and expertise of the 
SRIA  in the private sector across the globe by exploring both their individual and 
collective professional identities. More specifically, the research explored how these 
practitioners perceive their professional roles, overcome challenges they face, 
strengthen their motivation to remain in this specific career, and express their collective 
‘belonging’ to an emerging, atypical profession.  
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Security risk intelligence analysis is an “emerging” profession. It emerged from the 
changes mentioned above in society and specifically the need for businesses to better 
understand and manage security threats. This created a new labour market for 
individuals who have either done this function before in government and law 
enforcement or newcomers drawn by the novel application of knowledge, skills and 
technology in the business environment.  
Knowledge of intelligence analysts in the government sector has grown in the last few 
years, focusing on their professionalisation and the field of intelligence studies being 
accepted as a sub-discipline of security studies (Corvaja, Jeraj & Borghoff, 2016). 
However, very little is known of these practitioners in the private sector. They have not 
yet been studied, and very little is known about their function and professional identity, 
other than they “proactively identify, assess and communicate risks facing the 
company’s personnel, facilities, information assets and operations, sometimes locally, 
but more often also on an international level” (Bode, 2016).  
The study of Professional Identity is important because it explains the direction of the 
development and establishment of a profession and the factors that help shape it (Levin-
Rozalis & Shochot-Reich, 2009). Although there is no agreed definition of professional 
identity among scholars, this study will define individual professional identity—“Who 
am I as a Security Risk Intelligence Analyst?”—to mean that self-conception or self-
image based on skills, abilities, experiences and identification with a profession. 
Collective professional identity refers to a sense of unity among the professionals, 
possessing personal responsibility to the profession, conducting oneself ethically and 
morally, and experiencing feelings of pride for the profession (Alves & Gazzola, 2011). 
This collective professional identity–“Who are we as Security Risk Intelligence 
Analysts?”—means the shared or collective self-identification and framing with others 
in a specific profession.   
A poorly developed or defined professional identity could harm the individual’s search 
for meaningfulness, his job satisfaction, individual behaviour, functional duties, 
professional development, as well as services rendered to, and his relationship with 
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clients (Caza & Creary, 2016). In a security context, a poorly developed or identified 
professional identity could not only inhibit individual professional growth but could also 
have disastrous consequences when emerging threats are not detected, thereby causing 
real and reputational damage to the company or harm to employees, customers or the 
general public. Although this sociological construct has been well researched in the 
disciplines of education, organisational development, social work, and healthcare, none 
has been done in the whole of the intelligence analysis domain. There was no focus on 
analysts, as previous research only focused on the professionalism of operational 
personnel in private military companies (Franke & Von Boemcken, 2009; Schaub & 
Franke, 2009). 
Using a pragmatist paradigm, this “profiling” of SRIA in the private sector will help 
understand how professional identity is created in new and emerging professions, 
especially where practitioners engage in divergent and multiple professional activities. 
For the first time, this study will give them a voice to tell how they perceive their 
professional roles, overcome challenges they face, strengthen their motivation to 
remain in this specific career, and express their collective ‘belonging’ to an emerging, 
atypical profession. 
1.2 Research aims 
In this ambiguous context, this study aims to understand the professional identity of 
SRIA’s in the private sector. It will have a dual purpose: to explore 1) individual 
professional identity (their self-description in relation to performing an occupational 
role) and 2) the collective professional identity (the shared narrative with others who 
perform the same occupational role) by determining how the profession is perceived 
and constructed by those working within it.  
The following two primary research questions will guide the study: 
1. What is the individual SRIA’s professional identity?  
2. Is there a shared or collective professional identity among SRIA across 
organisational contexts and national boundaries, and if so, how does it 
manifest? 
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To achieve a better understanding of the lived experience of SRIA in the private sector, 
the following secondary research questions will illuminate our understanding of this 
emerging profession and its professional identity: 
1. What is the self-perceived role, function and uniqueness of SRIA in the 
private sector? 
2. How do intelligence analysts conceptualise or define their professional 
identity, and how do they perceive the profession? 
3. What experiences and conditions does SRIA perceive as contributing to or 
strengthening their professional identities?   
4. What experiences and conditions does SRIA perceive as hindering their 
professional identity?  How do they renegotiate elements of their 
professional identity to overcome these challenges?  
5. How do SRIA believe others perceive them?  
6. What are their professional values and beliefs? 
This study will use sociology theories, including social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 
1989) and self-categorisation theory (Turner & Reynolds, 2012) on both an individual 
and group level to understand SRIA’ affinity with their profession better.  The data will 
be collected through two instruments, a web survey and semi-structured interviews. 
The survey placement in an international context will provide a valuable opportunity to 
collect, analyse and compare the perceptions and opinions of a completely under-
researched group of practitioners on these matters. The multi-national sample will 
enable useful comparisons across national and organisational settings and ascertain 
whether professional identities transcend national and organisational contexts. The in-
depth interviews with several security risk intelligence analysts will give a window on 
their lived experience in this profession. 
The research results should be useful to practitioners themselves who will critically 
reflect on the essence or current state of their profession and its future.  The study 
identifies the factors that help shape this emerging profession and provides 
practitioners with a platform to create self-awareness and articulate their strengths and 
potential contribution to the broader security and intelligence disciplines. Decision-
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  13 April  2021 
makers in both the private and public sector would find it useful to understand the 
potential benefits of intelligence led-security and how practitioners view the value they 
bring to the security and intelligence industry. Educators and professional development 
specialists could use the findings to develop new intelligence and security risk curricula 
while training programmes could be improved to make them more effective and fit-for-
purpose. Human resources consultants should be able to use the results to improve their 
job profiles and improve career development initiatives to strengthen analysts’ 
professionalism. Professional organisations would also be able to evaluate the most 
appropriate ways to strengthen the collective identity of SRIA.  
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 will review the literature relevant to the professional identity of SRIA, drawing 
on several social identity theories to understand the professional identity construct, the 
context of the current private security risk industry and the function of these 
practitioners in this emerging professional field.  The review will conclude with a 
summary and outline the aims and rationale of the present study.  
Chapter 3 will present the interpretivist epistemology and exploratory pragmatic mixed 
method that was used in the study.  An exploratory web survey was used to explore how 
the profession is perceived and constructed by those practising within the field. 
Sequential to this data collection, qualitative interviews aimed to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the lived professional experience of nine participants from four different 
countries and organisational contexts using the principles and methodology of 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA).  
Chapters 4 and 5 will present the results of the web survey and IPA study in their 
entirety. Each chapter will include an abstract, introduction and rationale for the choice 
of method, a detailed account of the recruitment, data collection, management and 
analysis procedures, results, discussion and conclusion.  
Chapter 6 will summarise and integrate the findings of the empirical studies presented 
in this thesis. This general discussion will also include implications from this work for 
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security risk intelligence analysis practice, provide directions for future research and 
draw conclusions from the work. 
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Chapter 2 
 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this review is to explore the existing literature on concepts, models and 
theories that relate to the professional identity of SRIA in the private sector. This chapter 
will first discuss the search strategy used for the study before moving on to the various 
disciplines that relate to the research topic. These disciplines or study areas are 
sociology and psychological sociology, private security, intelligence analysis and 
organisational studies (to a lesser degree).  The review will conclude with a summary 
and outline the aims and rationale of the study.  
2.2 Literature search strategy 
The researcher found Ashforth’s (2016) comment that “identity and identification are 
root constructs that bridge levels of analysis, levels of self, and multiple disciplines, they 
continue to generate a dizzying array of exciting and important research avenues” to be 
true when an inductive approach to the literature search strategy was followed since 
there is no existing literature on the specific research topic. The inductive approach's 
purpose was to explore the four different subject areas and then find the nexus between 
them to answer the research questions. 
This exhaustive coverage approach (Randolph, 2009) made the literature research 
process laborious and lengthy. At the height of the collection phase, about 1500 
different sources in the database were reduced to a third of that for the literature review 
and 170 sources for use in the methodology and subsequent chapters of the thesis. The 
search strategy focused mainly on the Portsmouth University Library’s Discovery 
Service, which is a portal from where over 100 databases can be accessed, EBooks, 
British Library Ethos services, while Google Scholar, Google Books and ProQuest offered 
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a starting point to define the parameters of the literature search strategy. Mendeley 
was used as a reference and repository tool, which was invaluable throughout the study.   
The relevancy criteria of literature evolved as the research process progressed. It 
became apparent that professional identity studies in traditional professions like 
medicine, psychology and teaching were useful in understanding the phenomena but 
did not address the challenges and nature of emerging professions like intelligence 
analysis. Most of the existing literature dealt with typical challenges faced by these 
traditional professions, which have legalised standards, procedures and certifications 
while enjoying the legitimacy of public service and recognition by the authorities, which 
is not the case with intelligence analysts.  
The search strategy (Appendix A) was redirected to emerging or “new” professions to 
compare whether the construct, as manifested in the traditional professions, applies to 
intelligence analysis. This opened up new avenues in the literature, especially in 
organisational studies, where the study's international perspective linked with the 
literature on professionalism and identity management in global consulting or 
knowledge-intensive companies. In addition to the search strategy below, key authors 
and subject matter experts who served as references in original articles were identified 
and their work analysed to get a holistic picture of the different viewpoints on the 
dimensions this study address.  
The richness and diversity of scholarship in the different fields are evident in the fact 
that only five “main authors” (those with more than three articles in the list of the 
relevant sources) in the security field, three in the field of sociology of professions, and 
six in the field of professional identity were identified.  Those aspects of intelligence and 
intelligence analysis relevant to this study offered no “main” authors but about 80 
individual authors, while the total of authors whose work was used in the literature 
review amount to 736 authors of whom at least a third co-authored. Of course, only 
those authors whose work are cited are included in the bibliography. 
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2.3 The security risk intelligence analysis context 
2.3.1 Intelligence analysis in context  
Although intelligence has a very long history dating back from Biblical times when Moses 
sent a reconnaissance team to Canaan and Sun Tzu wrote his seminal The Art of War in 
the 6th century B.C., there is no evidence that intelligence analysis as a separate role 
existed before the first analysts were appointed in 1942 in the US Office of Strategic 
Services (Duvenage, 2010). Previously, the intelligence operative or his client in the 
military or diplomatic service evaluated and interpreted the raw information 
themselves. Civilian government intelligence was only established at the height of World 
War II, and until recently, had the monopoly over intelligence functions. However, many 
other institutions, companies and other actors now “practice” intelligence, often to 
protect overlapping spheres of influence or interests—whether it is their own,  the 
community in which they operate or broader national interests.     
This radical “expansion” of intelligence (Petersen and Tjalve, 2018) has been forged 
since the early 2000s as a reaction to prevent and manage the myriad complex and 
unknown threats that did not discriminate between government targets and those of 
companies or the general public. The role and function of intelligence analysts are multi-
pronged. In the first context, it is to provide the decision-maker with situational 
awareness. The analyst should provide context through description, explanation, and 
interpretation to understand developments that will then inform their judgements 
(Bielska & Pallaris, 2017). Secondly, analysts should provide foreknowledge by 
anticipating future developments and alerting stakeholders to the potential impacts. 
Intelligence analysis is uniquely geared to assist in this uncertainty management as it 
seeks to identify strong and weak signals that could be cues for future events and trends. 
Intelligence analysts, whether they serve in the government or private sector, and 
whether they analyse terrorists, criminals, foreign governments and armies, business 
competitors or pressure groups, share the same core professional function. The 
cognitive processes, knowledge dynamics and methodologies of knowledge creation 
and sharing are the same in both the government and private sector domains.   
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2.3.2 Security risk intelligence analysis in the private sector 
This thesis focuses on those intelligence analysts who work for specialist political risk 
vendors and corporate security departments. It does not include private security and 
intelligence contractors who perform intelligence work for government agencies. 
Typically, the intelligence function will be situated in the corporate security department 
as the latter is responsible for identifying and effective mitigation and management of 
all events that could threaten the corporation's sustainability (Manojlovic, 2014). The 
security department is strategically linked to the corporate risk management system 
through its placement in the broader “operational risks” category of the organisation-
wide risk management framework. When optimally utilised, the security risk intelligence 
function serves as an early warning system (Pate-Cornell, 2015) that detect signals of 
emergent threats and feeds them into the risk management system where the risks are 
appropriately analysed, weighed and managed according to the corporation’s risk 
assessment methodology and risk appetite. Dvojmoč (2019) stated that security risk 
intelligence is an “unavoidable and necessary tool” for a company’s risk management 
and its objectives to achieve competitiveness and security in its global business. 
In practice, the security intelligence analysis function will execute the main activities of 
monitoring, assessing, analysing, reporting and liaising with different stakeholders on 
any or all of the following areas: 
• Political stability and security situations of areas or countries where the 
company has interests or employees; 
• Travel risk security that could require additional protective protocols for 
employees and executives; 
• Profiling of persons or groups of interest that might pose a threat to company 
employees, executives, Board members, facilities and processes; 
• Due diligence and background checks on possible insider threats, potential 
employees, major suppliers or contractors, mergers and acquisitions; 
• Investigations or investigation support of criminal or security incidents in the 
company; 
• Reputational risk and negative media monitoring;  
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• Crime patterns and activity analysis around company premises to determine 
risk in terms of duty of care responsibilities; 
• Corporate espionage and sabotage activities by competitors or nation-state 
actors; 
• Detection and prevention of cyber intrusions and attacks against the company 
• Intellectual property right infringements and crimes 
• Supply chain resilience 
• Insider threats and integrity management  
For purposes of this study, the term SRIA will encompass those with job titles of security 
risk or threat analyst, crime analyst, crime intelligence analyst, research specialist, 
political risk analyst, cyber threat analyst and the like, who all share the above mandate 
and work in the private sector. 
2.3.3 An emerging profession 
Security risk intelligence analysis is regarded as one of the new, knowledge-based 
occupations that appeared to have side-stepped the traditionalist professional model 
due to changes in society that required the private sector to have a similar threat 
intelligence function than governments had. Consequently, this study classifies it as a 
profession as the criteria have been relaxed to insist that the occupation is mostly skills-
based and often education-based. “Profession” is often used as an adjective rather than 
a noun (Ibarra, 1999). Being a professional now describes how individuals carry out their 
work with knowledge and skill rather than the specific kind of work they do.  
Furthermore, as an emerging profession, intelligence analysis has no strict rules, 
standards, legal governance structure, mandatory professional membership, official 
credentials, and an established body of knowledge and does not necessarily serve the 
public good as traditional professions like medicine and law. Furthermore, intelligence 
analysts are also part of the “knowledge worker” cadre that now constitute about half 
of the world’s workforce (Brown, 2019).  Knowledge workers are usually highly qualified, 
and their work is characterised by creativity, problem-solving, networking and task 
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  20 April  2021 
complexity while they espouse specific, rare and abstruse knowledge that they apply in 
the work context (Costas & Kärreman, 2016).  
Despite rigorous research on analytical methods and techniques, there has been no 
research on intelligence analysts' professional identity in either the government or 
private sectors. In the only ethnological study into the lived experience of intelligence 
analysts in the CIA, Johnston (2005) commented on how analysts in the CIA would 
explain what it is they do. By extension, they believed this who they are. However, social 
psychology provides valuable theories to put a study on security risk intelligence 
analysts' professional identity on a solid foundation that can serve as the basis for 
further research. The main reason why the focus is only on these professionals in the 
private sector is that access to intelligence analysts in the government and law 
enforcement environment would have been nearly impossible to achieve.  
2.4 The Professional Identity construct 
2.4.1 Social psychology theories underpinning the professional identity construct 
Individuals’ professional identity is rooted in their psychological make-up, specifically 
their individual and social identities within a work context.  The identity construct has 
been studied since people asked the question “Who am I?” and explained the individual 
dimension of identity by referencing personal attributes like values, characteristics, 
roles, ideas and their interpretation of experiences.   
Also, the individual lives in a social context that impacts his identity—the identity is 
socially constructed. The social psychology discipline traces the roots of identity theory 
to GH Mead, who asserted in the 1930’s that “society shapes self, shapes social 
behaviour” (Stryker & Burke, 2000). This societal aspect means that the personal identity 
is socially constructed and informed by one's relations with others – what they think of 
one, what one thinks of them, how one thinks of oneself and what one thinks others 
think one is. Inevitably, the understanding of a person’s concept of self culminates into 
multiple personal identities that interpret the interaction with other individuals or 
groups and chooses which identity to “activate” depending on various factors, including 
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salience and status—the social dimension of identity (Cardoso, Batista, & Graça, 2014).  
Booysen (2018) explains the complexities of identity, defining it as                                 
“multifaceted and multiple, consisting of fixed, fluid, shifting and 
temporary; independent and interdependent, enhancing and conflicting; 
complimentary and contradictory identities, differing in prominence and 
salience based on contextual fluctuations and regulation. Many of our 
actions are driven by the struggle to defend, maintain, enhance and 
produce congruence in our identities.”  
Four inter-related and sometimes overlapping social psychology theories or conceptual 
frameworks, namely role identity theory (RIT), social identity theory (SIT), self-
categorisation theory (SCT) and the collective identity theory (CIT), offer insights into 
the dimensions of the Professional Identity construct used in this study. While 
interacting with the social environment, the individual reconstructs his identity by 
adopting roles (RIT) that enable him to manage situations within the social context and 
rationally categorise or align himself (SCT) with or separate from a specific group in a 
specific context (SIT). The Collective Identity theory further places the individual where 
he shares the same sense of belonging with others.  The following section provides a 
brief interpretation of the four theories as they relate to this study. 
i) Role identity theory (RIT) 
People play different roles in life, often simultaneously. The Role Identity theory (RIT) 
asserts that identities are internalised role expectations (Stryker & Burke, 2000)  
attached to positions occupied in networks of relationships. RIT focuses on the 
individual’s need to manage the diversity among the multiple roles (and corresponding 
expectations) that an individual holds (Roberts & Creary, 2013).  
The prominence or prioritisation of a role identity depends on whether one gets support 
from others for that identity, the extent to which one is committed to that identity and 
whether one receives rewards from that role identity (Stets & Burke, 2000). The greater 
the commitment and salience to a particular identity, the more likely the individual will 
be motivated to bring his self-concept in line with the role expected of him. Contrary, 
when the individual is not committed to a role identity or have problems verifying his 
role identity due to a lack of or negative social structure feedback, the individual will 
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extract him from that social structure, often leading to the disintegration of the social 
structure (Stets & Burke, 2003).  
For purposes of this study, it is assumed that the role identity of a security risk 
intelligence analyst is but one of the many role identities that a person would have, 
albeit perhaps the main work-related role. The prominence of the identity amongst the 
analyst’s other roles would depend on whether the role is supported or accepted by 
others (including the organisation, co-workers and personal social structures, the 
analyst’s commitment to (or passion for) the role and the physical or emotional rewards 
the role offers. The conventional dimension of the security risk intelligence analyst's role 
expectation would be found in the organisational job description or the role profile, 
including the tasks and responsibilities, minimum qualifications, experience, and skills 
the person fulfilling the role is expected to have. Each organisation’s social structure 
would have different role expectations depending on the nature, purpose and roles 
within the organisation—the analyst for a pharmaceutical company might have a 
different job description or title than the one working for a private security consultancy, 
although the role outcomes of all SRIA would ideally be more or less similar (see 
Appendix B for job advertisements). The idiosyncratic dimension of the analyst’ 
professional role identity would be those personal traits, expertise and experience each 
analyst would bring to the role. The latter then also explains the difference in role 
execution of people who have the same job description/role in an organisation.  
There has not been much research on how people define new roles in the absence of 
“conventional” expectations, especially in the postmodernist age, where the world of 
work is changing dramatically. Like security risk intelligence analysis, new professions 
are continuously emerging while some traditional vocations have become extinct 
(Bersin, 2017). To a large extent, emerging professions “build the plane while flying” as 
they might only have a broad sense of what roles they could play in an organisation, and 
are therefore filling gaps as they emerge, or creating new opportunities that open up as 
the world of work evolves. 
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  23 April  2021 
ii)  Social identity theory (SIT)                                  
Social identity theory (SIT) defines an individual identity as ‘that part of the individual’s 
self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group 
together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’ 
(Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). The two leading proponents of the SIT, Tajfel and 
Turner (2004), propose that individuals look for a positive sense of self and compare 
their group with other groups based on various categories and tend to create a 
favourable distinction for their group—who we are and who we are not. Tajfel and 
Turner’s work focused mostly on stereotyping and discrimination in the sociology field. 
Group categories that people belong to can include company, occupation, gender, 
nationality, ethnicity and age (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), amongst others.  
SIT examines how people understand and position themselves and others in terms of 
social group categories (i.e. in-group/out-group) and how one’s identity stems from the 
adherence and membership to social groups, such as organisational- and occupational 
sub-collectives (Aangenendt, 2015). Social identity and group membership is thus part 
of a person’s sense of “‘who they are” (Haslam, 2004) and fulfil the individual’s needs 
for self-enhancement, belongingness and differentiation (Roberts & Creary, 2013). 
Identification with a group is a psychological process and requires no social interaction 
with others in the group (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Brooks, Riemenschneider, Hardgrave, 
& O’Leary-Kelly, 2011), implying that identification can even arise in the absence of 
interpersonal relations, similarity or interaction and still have a powerful impact on 
emotions and behaviour of the individual.  
Professional identity is one of the multiple social identities an individual holds, and the 
SIT theory deduces that people can feel themselves part of, and behave as part of this 
professional identity, whether they have actual contact with the social group or not. In 
organisational terms, social identification enables the individual to associate himself and 
feel loyal (or disloyal) to an organisation or corporate culture (Ashforth & Mael, 1989),  
or in this study’s case, a profession/occupation such as security risk intelligence analysis.  
The process through which this happens is found in Turner’s related self-categorisation 
theory.  
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iii)  Self-categorisation or self-identification theory 
Self-identification theory (SIT) or related self-categorisation theory (SCT) aims to 
“understand, explain and predict how people come to think, feel and act as a 
psychological group and, importantly, the circumstances when this will occur and its 
consequences” (Turner & Reynolds, 2012). The act or process of self-identification is first 
and foremost cognitive where one is aware of membership, evaluative where one makes 
value connotations to that membership and affective, where one invests emotionally in 
that awareness and evaluation of membership (Tajfel, 1982). 
Ashforth, Harrison and Corley’s (2008) continuum of identification (Figure 1) explains 
that the cognitive and affective aspects of identification are the core attributes of 
identification where the person defines himself as something or someone because it is 
important to him and he feels good about it. As the formulation of identity broadens, 
the content of the identity, or the enduring attributes that constitute identities—in this 
study, what it means to be “A” or a security risk intelligence analyst—is revealed. These 
attributes include values, goals, beliefs, traits and knowledge, skills and abilities. The 
dotted ring between the core and the identity content depicts the fact that identities do 
not necessarily include all of the content attributes because they might be emergent, 
Figure 1: Continuum of professional Identification of the Security Risk Intelligence Analyst: 
based on Ashforth, Harrison and Corley (2008) 
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unclear or tacit when identifying with a role or collective; one would not necessarily 
accept some of the content attributes. Behaviour related to the identity is the furthest 
from the core of identity, depicting that behaviour is a probabilistic outcome of 
identification and not a necessary component. Although behaviour is supportive of the 
identity most of the time, situational constraints might weaken the link with the core 
and content of the identity. In this study’s context, a person might self-identify as a 
security risk intelligence analyst in the sense that he might value the importance of the 
role and feel good about the impact he has on a company, but he does not necessarily 
espouse some values or does not necessarily have the competency to do certain types 
of analytical techniques associated with the role. Furthermore, a manager who insists 
on ‘doctoring intelligence’ to suit a client’s expectations might induce the analyst to omit 
certain information, thereby acting against her ethical principles. 
Identification or categorisation is the fundamental basis of our social interaction with 
other people, with psychological and demographic variables (Haslam, 2004) playing a 
decisive role in seeing ourselves vis-a-vis others. Most problems in society and 
organisations stem from the friction of fault lines between how we perceive ourselves 
against others and with whom we self-categorise depending on our interests or 
priorities. One first has to place oneself or categorise oneself, either deliberately or 
unconsciously, in terms of a specific grouping before one can feel proud to be a member 
of the social group. One would execute the process of self-categorisation based on an 
array of social stimuli, which one sorts into a basic level of categories based on the 
similarity or dissimilarity and then puts oneself into the most similar category (Ashmore, 
Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004).  
The basis of the categorisation depends on the individual’s perception of certain 
properties of the stimuli, the situation and the different goals and motives of the 
individual in the situation. Self-categorisation is also a dynamic process as the individual 
defines himself in different ways in different situations (Turner & Reynolds, 2012)  
depending on how he makes sense of the stimuli. Therefore, self-categorisation is 
flexible and can change because of the dynamic interaction between the self, context, 
and others. 
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People could be hesitant to self-categorise where group boundaries are ambiguous and 
porous.  They might feel they are not fitting the prototype group members, or consider 
themselves marginal group members or that their membership will not be regarded 
positively (Ashmore et al., 2004). Self-categorisation also implies that when an individual 
identifies with and conforms to norms associated with the social group, his idiosyncratic 
views become socially organised and consensual. In this process, individual views are 
coordinated and transformed into the group’s shared values, beliefs and behaviour 
(Haslam, 2004). Turner and Reynolds (2012) assert that self-categorisation and social 
comparison affect personal identity and that social identity processes can even impact 
cognitive performance, personality, and well-being.  
SCT is a useful theory for this study as it explains the analyst’s willingness to identify with 
and self-categorise as a member of the security risk intelligence analyst social group. 
The socialisation of the personal viewpoints to become the group’s viewpoint and 
normative behaviour also explains collective identity. As social groups' formation is 
dynamic and fluid, one might not even be aware of the existence or the emergence of a 
social group until one is confronted with a new situation, information or stimuli that 
opens up the opportunity to self-identify.  In some instances, participants in this study 
only started to self-categorise as security risk intelligence analysts when the study was 
advertised with the requirements of participation set out the “typical” security risk 
intelligence analyst targeted for inclusion. 
iii)   Collective identity theory 
Ashmore et al. (2004, p.81) incorporated all three previous theories in their collective 
identity constructs in which they define collective identity theory as “one that is shared 
with a group of others who have (or are believed to have) some characteristic(s) in 
common.” The prerequisite here is self-categorisation of the individual—individuals in 
the social group must acknowledge their belongingness to that group before collective 
identity could emerge. Collective identity implies the individuals’ belief in categorical 
membership and a set of cognitive beliefs associated with that collective, including 
stereotype traits, ideology, values, and emotional connotations. They specifically 
identified seven individual-level elements of collective identity:  
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1. Self-categorisation wherein the individual places himself in a social group due 
to his perceived similarity in one way or the other with the group; 
2. Evaluation refers to the positive or negative attitude the individual will have 
towards the social group he identifies with; 
3. The degree of importance of group membership to the individual’s overall 
self-concept; 
4. The affective sense of belonging or attachment and sense of 
interdependence with the social group; 
5. The degree to which the individual is socially embedded with a particular 
collective identity; 
6. The extent of behavioural involvement with the social group and  
7. The content and meaning the collective identity provides to the individual in 
terms of how the individual associates self-descriptive characteristics with 
the group, the group’s ideology and group narrative or history.  
2.4.2 Defining Professional Identity 
The world of work encompasses all levels of identities—individual identity, group 
identity, professional identity, interest group identity, hierarchical group identity and 
the organisational identity as well as the individuals’ self-categorisation with all of these 
identities (Aangenendt, Kuijpers, & Sanders, 2012; Beech, Macintosh, & Mcinnes, 2008) . 
This section provides an overview of the construct of professional identity, explaining 
what it is, why it is essential, and its different dimensions. 
Most definitions of Professional Identity concur that there are two critical aspects to the 
professional identity construct: one intrapersonal or idiosyncratic and the other 
interpersonal or social (Caza & Creary, 2016; Cowin, Johnson, Wilson, & Borgese, 2013; 
Ibarra, 1999; Nuttman-Shwartz, 2017; Tsakissiris, 2015). The idiosyncratic dimension 
relates to the image the individual has of his attributes, values, motives, experiences, 
type of education, training, and skills to “do a job”. The social dimension relates to a 
group of people, individually and collectively, sharing the same image or approach to a 
particular type of work.  
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For the purpose of this study, professional identity is defined as that social identity that 
is focused on an individual’s sense of self about their occupation, work or professional 
life (Fraser-Arnott, 2019) that creates a psychological attachment between the 
individual and a particular profession consisting of other individuals sharing the same 
identity (Tsakissiris, 2015).    
It is necessary to clarify another construct that will be used in this study—organisational 
identity—which implies the individual’s perception of oneness with, or belongingness 
to, an organisation where he defines himself in terms of the organisation of which he is 
a member (Mael & Ashforth, 1992). As this study’s main focus is on the individual’s sense 
of belongingness to the profession, it only mentions organisational identity in a cursory 
manner when the participants explicitly link this sense of attachment to their employing 
organisation with their individual professional identity. Organisational identity should 
not be confused with organisational commitment or corporate identity, which refers to 
the branding and marketing of corporate images and reputations. Ashforth, Harrison 
and Corley (2008) stated that organisational identity is another way people define 
themselves and make sense of, and navigate their place in the world.  
Identifying with an organisation also fulfils the need to associate with abstract, larger 
entities and the individual’s need to enhance his interests in this larger association. As 
with professional identification, organisational identification rests on the premise that 
the individual can associate himself with the values that the organisation presents, 
leading to employee satisfaction, engagement and meaningful work. There is a definite 
correlation between organisational identity and other organisational behaviours, 
including leadership, perceptions of justice and corporate citizenship. 
2.4.3 The elements of Professional Identity 
The professional identity construct has four main elements or characteristics. 
i)   It is multifaceted 
The first is that it is multifaceted, as an employee fulfils various roles for which they have 
different identities at any given time or situation, with different personal characteristics, 
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  29 April  2021 
personality and character attached to that identity (Aangenendt, Neelen, Willemse, & 
Laven, 2018). Professional identity is a unique, complex construction of multiple 
identities with different strengths that the individual perceives himself in the context of 
his work.  
ii)  It is dynamic and ever-changing 
Professional identities are also dynamic and ever-changing, especially in the complexity-
driven world of work and social interaction in the post-modern age. Individuals’ 
identities can adapt and develop over time and can become more or less important to 
the individual (Aangenendt et al., 2018) depending on personal motivation for self-
categorisation (which includes self-enhancement, the need to feel a sense of belonging, 
self-affirmation etc.), life changes and conflicts with other identities that are negotiated 
continuously to maintain equilibrium. In the same way, professional identity is an 
ongoing internal process of interpretation and re-interpretation or sense-making of 
experiences (Beijaard, Meijer, & Verloop, 2004; Fraser-Arnott, 2017) or external factors 
like personal life changes, career phase, organisational interventions, developments like 
leadership support or the lack thereof and one’s own professional development strategy 
(Aangenendt et al., 2018).  Both the individual and the collective professional identity 
need to be able to adapt to the change in the environment to remain relevant.  
iii)  It has individual agency 
Individuals are active authors of their identity scripts (Bévort & Suddaby, 2016) and 
affirm the self-categorisation theory that individuals actively and cognitively interpret 
and act to improve their self-image and self-efficacy in their work context. A person’s 
professional identity is thus central to his sense of agency, developed through 
interactions at work and is therefore both a product and an agent of systems and 
structures in the workplace (Briggs, 2007).   
iv)   It is shared with others 
Based on social identity theory, professional identity is the values, beliefs and practices 
held in common with others who work in similar environments or perform similar tasks. 
The interaction and identification with similar others impact one’s identity throughout 
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one’s career in a continuous feedback loop of socialisation, sense-making and 
experiences (Fraser-Arnott, 2019). 
2.4.4 Antecedents to professional identity 
In their research on the factors impacting the professional identification of IT 
professionals, Brooks et al. (2011) found that four factors impact a person’s professional 
identity, namely 1) his need for professional identification, 2) the perceived similarity to 
others in the same profession, 3) the individual’s perceptions of the profession and 4) 
the public’s perception of the profession. The “need to identify” relates directly to role 
identity theory and self-categorisation theory, where the individual attached himself to 
a group based on his personal needs or motivations. The “similarity” construct 
reinforces the sense of sharing similar beliefs, attitudes or purpose discussed above in 
the relevant theories–the higher the sense of similarity, the higher work satisfaction and 
positive evaluation of the profession. In their research, the “personal perception” of the 
profession, both when initial contact was made with the profession and during their 
career, was the strongest construct impacting an individual’s professional identity. The 
fourth factor, public perception of a profession, only plays an indirect role in professional 
identification, which they found not to be determinant of the strength or the intensity 
of the individual’s professional identity. 
2.4.5 The value of understanding professional identity 
In organisational studies, it has been found advantageous to study how professional 
identities are constructed, the interaction between the different identities and how it 
influences the effectiveness of individuals, groups and the organisation to deliver 
services and products to stakeholders, clients and the broader community. Through the 
construction and maintenance of a professional identity, individuals derive meaning and 
purpose for themselves in serving and contributing to society, while a strong 
professional identity is associated with more satisfied employees and higher quality of 
work (Caza & Creary, 2016). The internalisation of professional roles, norms and values 
also impact employees’ attitude towards work, and ultimately their self-esteem and 
psychological well-being (Alvesson, 2011).  
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A strong collective professional identity contributes to a shared frame of reference, 
better communication among the professionals, optimal multidisciplinary collaboration 
and more efficient organisational outcomes (Molleman & Rink, 2015). On the other 
hand, when employees lack a collective professional identity, they will struggle to 
convince society of their value and legitimacy (Thomas, 2016).   
The literature on ‘professional identity’ covers diverse fields, including counselling and 
clinical psychology (Alves & Gazzola, 2011; Burns & Cruikshanks, 2017; Fisher, 2017; 
Mellin, Hunt, & Nichols, 2011), social work (Weiss-Gal & Welbourne, 2008), education 
(Brott & Myers, 1999; Cranitch, 2017; Rewolinski, 2014), the broader medical 
professions (Brandis, Fitzgerald, Mcphail, & Fisher, 2016; Elvey, Hassell, & Hall, 2013; 
Kumpusalo et al., 1994; Molleman & Rink, 2013), journalism (Aldridge & Evetts, 2003; 
Ferrucci & Vos, 2017; Grubenmann & Meckel, 2014; Li & Chitty, 2017), information 
technology (Brooks et al., 2011; Smith, 2016) and library and information sciences 
(Fraser-Arnott, 2017; Goertzen, 2018; Hicks, 2016).  In recent years, newer professions’ 
identity has been studied, including that of personal coaches (Gray, Saunders, Curnow, 
& Farrant, 2015), sign language interpreters (Harwood, 2017), evaluators (Ball, 
Biesheuvel, Hamilton-Baillie, & Olonisakin, 2007; Jacob & Boisvert, 2010; Levin-Rozalis 
& Shochot-Reich, 2009), women engineers (Plett, Hawkinson, Vanantwerp, Wilson, & 
Bruxvoort, 2011), archaeologists (Shaeffer, 2016), women military interrogators 
(Dorough-Lewis, 2017) and even massage therapists (Sullivan, 2012) and chefs (Rehn, 
2012).   
2.4.6 Stages of Professional Identity construction 
Professional identity formation is an ongoing process throughout one’s life and is most 
often a complex, individualised process that cannot be prescriptive or generalised. 
However, Jebril (2008) identified four broad stages of professional identity development 
that help researchers understand the phases an individual experience in his quest for 
professional fulfilment (Figure 2). 
In the first stage (the preoccupation stage), a child is exposed to different professions 
through social interaction with family, school, friends and the media. It is in this stage 
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that core values, personal characteristics, strengths and weaknesses are formed. In 
puberty, the adolescent will start searching for a profession that matches his 
personality, values and strengths. The level of self-knowledge and exposure to career 
options will impact when and whether the young adult can move to the next stage or 
continue to search for the appropriate career fit.  
The next stage, the learning stage, lasts from formal education until the first formal 
employment and is the most intensive stage in professional identity construction. During 
this stage, the individual learns the profession's theoretical underpinnings, gain 
knowledge and skills, and learn the professional language, ethics, and morals. The 
individual will also socialise with others in the same profession, thereby affirming that 
the chosen career fits his values and professional self.  
The third stage, the professional stage, lasts from first employment until retirement. In 
this stage, the individual closes the gaps between theory and practice, continuously 
learns or develops new professional related skills, strengthens socialisation with peers, 
specialises or diverts into the management stream and even mentors new professionals. 
This thesis mainly deals with this stage of professional identity development, the 
professional stage. In the last stage, the post-professional stage, people can choose to 
forego their previous professional identity altogether by either starting a new career or 
mentally and physical retiring from all semblance of professional activity. Others might 
choose to invest in the profession by becoming mentors or teaching at universities and 
private training companies.  
Figure 2: The four stages of professional identity construction, based on Jebril (2008) 
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2.4.7 Typical professional identity struggles and their coping mechanisms 
During the professional stage, the individual will often experience identity crises or 
struggles that would require her to execute coping mechanisms or strategies. The 
literature on the types and nature of professional identity tensions people experience is 
very limited.  The literature defines the continuous process of juggling and renegotiating 
professional identity due to changes in the individual’s own expectations, new 
organisational practices, structures and roles, and societal complexities on professional 
identity as identity work. It includes the “cognitive, discursive, physical, and behavioural 
activities that individuals undertake intending to form, repair, maintaining, 
strengthening, revising, or rejecting collective, role, and personal self-meanings within 
the boundaries of their social contexts” (Caza, Vough, & Puranik, 2018). Identity work 
has a dual nature: inward-looking, where an individual actively constructs his 
professional identity through his sense-making processes, and outward-looking, where 
the person interacts with and receive feedback from others. Identity work strategies can 
be grouped into two categories: identity protection and identity restructuring strategies. 
i)   Identity protection strategies 
Individuals can distance or disassociate themselves from a social group and its negative 
stereotypes, as evidenced by Cobbold (2015), who concluded that Ghanaian teachers 
dissociate themselves from the professional teaching body but still see themselves as 
professional teachers. More often, one would engage in impression or image 
management when there is an effort to restore a group’s positive distinctiveness by 
dispelling negative stereotyping. Individuals working in occupations that are often 
stigmatised or considered “dirty”, like coal workers, garbage collectors or socially 
“unacceptable”, like massage therapists, would recalibrate and reframe their identities 
by internally enhancing the positive aspects of the profession (Butler, Chillas, & Muhr, 
2009; Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). Externally directed image management strategies 
would include awareness campaigns, change in appearances (like changing uniforms), 
rhetoric and public relations drives (Alvesson, 2001; Brouard, Bujaki, Durocher, & 
Neilson, 2017; Roberts & Creary, 2013).   
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ii)   Identity restructuring strategies 
Identity restructuring responses usually occur when the professional identity is 
challenged in social interaction with new networks, new role expectations, when there 
is self-doubt in complex or problematic social institutions or when there is a mismatch 
between self-understanding and the social role expectations (Alvesson, Ashcraft, & 
Thomas, 2008). An individual would restructure his identity if it is advantageous to him 
or leads to self-enhancement by associating with perceived prestigious collectives, 
enhancing his distinctiveness from others, and the need to belong or feel connected to 
others (Caza et al., 2018). Individuals would also apply different strategies 
simultaneously, which sometimes lead to further identity conflict until they succeed in 
executing the most appropriate strategy within that specific context. Identity work 
restructuring strategies among surgeons (Pratt, Rockmann, & Kaufmann, 2006) include 
enriching (where one’s understanding of what their profession means to them and 
society is deepened), patching (when one use elements of another “better” identity to 
reduce deficiencies in the current identity) or splinting (when one adopts a previous 
stronger identity to strengthen a current weaker one).  
Kreiner, Hoolensbe & Sheep (2006) identified different categories of identity work in 
their research among Episcopal priests relevant to other professions. The first identity 
work category is segmentation or compartmentalisation tactics, where individuals who 
perceive too much identity tension in favour of the collective professional identity will 
employ tactics where their personal identity balances out the demands of the collective. 
These coping mechanisms include setting limits to execute a role, creating an identity 
hierarchy, escaping into a totally different role or deciding when to activate or 
deactivate specific identities to suit a particular context. The second category, 
integration or blending tactics, is useful in understanding how individuals manage 
multiple professional identities or where there is not sufficient professional 
identification on an individual level.  Here one merges one’s role (what one does) with 
one’s identity (who one is). Individuals could either fully integrate themselves or only 
some aspects of the self with the profession or even go so far as to see themselves as 
embodiments or symbols of a particular identity. 
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In summary, professional identity management is dynamic and dependent on the 
individual’s contextual interpretation of self-interest in the midst of competing for social 
demands and personal self-interest. In all cases, each individual’s self-awareness of his 
role as a professional would determine the extent to which identity work takes place 
and the extent to which he associates with collaborative professional identity 
endeavours. Every person will have their own complex set and degree of self-awareness 
and self-interest, and it would be difficult to theorise generally due to these factors. 
2.5 Collective professional identity  
Fundamentally, the professional identity construct is dualistic; it is simultaneously 
individual and collective due to the social interaction between the employee and the 
professional group he considers himself to be a member. The study of collective identity 
has different schools of thought: for psychologists like Ashmore et al. (2004), collective 
identity is a psychological concept that refers to the individual’s belief that he is a 
member of a specific group because of shared values, cognitive qualities, stereotypic 
traits, ideology or objectives, and not the group’s collective feeling of being the same in 
some sense. In contrast, organisational studies and sociology scholars like Alves & 
Gazzola (2013) and Evetts (2011) argue that to disregard the contribution of the 
collective group’s sense of commonalities and only focus on the individual sense of 
belonging does not acknowledge the complexity of professional identity.  
In this thesis, the two viewpoints are merged to study the collective identity of the 
professional group, SRIA, first to determine if individual analysts self-categorise as being 
members of the group and secondly, what the perceived elements and strength of the 
shared membership, beliefs, traits and values of the collective group are. Thus, collective 
professional identity is defined here as both the individual’s sense of belonging to a 
professional group and the group’s shared behaviour and values, perception or collective 
action.  
Until recently, identity researchers such as Groth (2015) used Ashmore et al.’s (2004)  
collective identity construct based on individual self-categorisation theory to explain 
collective professional identity. However, Bayerl et al. (2018) asserted that the Ashmore 
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construct was not appropriate for professional identity studies as the individual-level 
elements could not fully accommodate professions' peculiarities, such as specialist 
knowledge or roles or occupations across national contexts.  
This limited the conceptual understanding of how the collective understand and 
describe themselves collectively–what Bayerl et al. (2018) call the “collective framing of 
professional groups”. This gap limits our understanding of how professional collectives 
perceive themselves and how differences between different professional groups and 
even disconnects or dis-identification between the individual and the professional 
collective impact several professional related aspects such as career choice, 
commitment or job satisfaction. 
Bayerl et al. (2018) were the first to identify professional identity self-descriptions from 
diverse professional groups across different countries. They used police officers and 
market researchers from four nationalities to answer “What do you associate with being 
a police officer/market researcher?” in a 20-statement test analysed with content 
analysis methodology. They identified five themes that frame how people collectively 
make sense of their profession, namely people (who we are), work (what we do), 
environment (where we are located), valence (what we get out of it), and profession 
(what our profession is like) as seen in Figure 3. Their research showed that these five 
themes remained constant across different professions and nationalities, although the 
emphasis or relevance on themes or topics may vary when people self-describe. 
The identified “people” theme deals with people’s description or perception of their 
personalities and how it fits their profession, what they can do in their professions, their 
attitudes towards their profession, the shared values and norms, and if and how they 
share a physical appearance. 
 The “work” theme comprises the description of the work members of the profession 
perform. They found that the members of a profession would have three foci of role 
descriptions: inward-directed (roles within the professional group such as “team 
member”), outward-directed (roles performed for stakeholders outside the profession 
such as “community advocate”) and task-descriptive roles which focused on activities 
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  37 April  2021 
and products such as “product developer”.  Furthermore, the topics they deal with while 
working and the products they deliver or results have pointed to the importance of 
professions’ technical artefacts and practical accomplishments (Reed, 1996) to help 
define who they are.  
The “environment” theme deals with the organisational and social environment in which 
the target group functions and the resources they need to fulfil their roles. Here, the 
specific type of knowledge needed to perform and the networks of stakeholders, both 
within and external to the organisation, are relevant. The “valence” theme describes the 
value of the profession to its members, including what they “get out” of being a member 
of a profession and how other people see them (the profession’s image). Here, 
Figure 3: Bayerl et al (2018) Collective professional identity themes and topics in self-descriptions 
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statements dealing with evaluations of the professions, benefits and challenges 
represent the ability to be self-aware and critical of the external perceptions and how it 
might impact the profession’s legitimacy in networks and society in general. Likewise, 
the “profession” theme describes the statements people make on how they perceive 
their collective profession in terms of changes, developments, trends and outward signs 
or symbols, which can be self-critical.  
Some professions might not assign the same importance to symbols like police officers 
with their uniforms but might still have symbolic artefacts like “grey suits” for the market 
researchers that help them claim professional identity. In their research, Bayerl et al. 
(2018) discovered that market researchers’ self-description was much more prevalent 
in terms of technical artefacts (their deliverables in the “work” theme) than symbolic 
artefacts in the “professional” theme.  
This thesis supports the multi-dimensionality of the collective professional identity, 
being both personal and collective, and will use Bayerl et al.’s (2018) framework to 
investigate SRIA’s collective professional identity in the private sector in Chapter 4. The 
absence of, or a weak collective professional identity, could affect both the individual 
and the group of professionals that feel they belong to the group. On an individual level, 
the professional would lack confidence in his skills and role in society. On a collective 
level, if there is a weak cohesiveness or a limited shared identity, the group will not have 
professional pride or would have difficulty in exerting legitimacy in society.  
They will also not be able to communicate the specialist knowledge and value they bring 
to society as there is no shared frame of reference, which could enhance communication 
and collaboration internally and with external stakeholders. If a professional group or 
collective is not defined by its members, it may be mislabelled, misrepresented and 
wrongly defined by others (Alves & Gazzola, 2013). 
Interestingly, an individual’s personal identity and self-categorisation might be strong, 
while a social group's collective identity might be uncertain or vice-versa (Alves & 
Gazzola, 2013; Cobbold, 2015). A strong collective identity could lead to collective and 
collaborative practices and actions or not, depending on the purpose and ideology of 
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  39 April  2021 
such a social group at a specific moment in time and context. This dynamism is 
acknowledged in this study as one of the unknowns in social group identity. When the 
collective professional identity is threatened or challenged by new technological 
advances like equity traders who have to compete against algorithmic internet 
“advisors” (Byrnes, 2017), or where a professional group, like accountants, experience 
large scale reputational damage, the professional group will employ identity work 
strategies, much the same as individuals would. 
Typical responses to identity threats would include devaluating or derogating the threat, 
self-correcting or even socialising its perceived value through identity management 
efforts that would include new standards or ethical codes, or enhanced public relations 
to demonstrate the exclusivity, public benefit, or achievements of the group. 
Professional identity’s complexity becomes more evident when professional 
organisations attempt to formalise collective professional identity across cultural and 
national borders. They often fail to implement global professional or education 
standards as it is seen as too prescriptive and ignorant of national or cultural contexts, 
in addition to prohibitive high membership fees. Often, these organisations reinforce 
the perception that Western or Northern Hemisphere countries impose “international” 
professional standards to maintain the uneven hierarchical power relations in the world 
without taking other cultures’ work practices and traditions into account (Nuttman-
Shwartz, 2017).   
Whereas membership to these elitist professional organisations is often regarded as a 
testimony of competence and commitment in Western countries, it does not hold the 
same value and may be seen as irrelevant in developing or under-developed countries. 
Membership could become an impediment to professionals seen as “sell-outs” to 
Western dogma and expansionism. Regardless, there are still some professionals in 
developing countries who regard the membership of international professional 
organisations more advantageous for them personally than the perceived local 
antagonism against these organisations.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to provide a concise representation of the existing literature 
related to the study.  Although the study of professional identity, which originated in 
social psychology, has been a topic of interest in many disciplines, this study has 
identified the gap in security risk management and the nexus with intelligence analysis. 
The outcome of the literature review highlighted the various dimensions of individual 
and collective professional identity and the possible contributions this study can make 
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The purpose of this research study was to explore SRIA in the private sector’s 
perceptions of their professional identity. An exploratory research approach is followed 
when the study's subject is relatively new, as is the case with this study. The researcher 
would then aim to find approximate answers to research questions that would satisfy 
her curiosity and desire for better understanding but not necessarily provide an accurate 
picture of the phenomena. Babbie (2015) also stated that an exploratory study tests the 
feasibility of a more extensive study of the topic and develop methods to be used in this 
subsequent study. Therefore, the study will also aim to examine which theories, 
concepts, and methodologies are appropriate for the subject matter. 
In this study, the researcher believed that a better understanding of this professional 
phenomenon would allow analysts, their management, human resources personnel and 
learning and development specialists to maximise their impact on the organisations they 
work for and the broader society. On an individual level, the study aimed to understand 
the analysts’ overall search for professional meaningfulness, job satisfaction, individual 
professional behaviour, functional duties, professional development, and their 
relationship with colleagues and clients. In seeking to understand the phenomenon 
across organisational and national boundaries, the study aimed to include participants 
from as wide as possible organisational and national contexts in the sample size.  
This chapter outlines the research methodology used in the research study and explains 
how the pragmatist approach underpins the rationale for adopting a mixed-method 
design. A detailed discussion of each collection and data analysis method will be 
addressed separately in the following chapters dealing with the two separate studies' 
research instruments.  
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3.2 The research questions 
This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of the intelligence analysis 
profession by focusing on the collective and individual professional identity of 
practitioners in this field. The research objective was first and foremost to determine 
whether there is an emerging profession in the security risk intelligence discipline for 
analysts on an international level.   
If such a profession did indeed exist, the second research objective was to explore the 
individual professional identity of SRIA in the private sector. Research questions on this 
level included the following: 
1. How do they conceptualise their professional identity?   
2. What is the perceived unique contribution of intelligence analysis in the 
private security sector? 
3. How do intelligence analysts believe others perceive them? 
4. What do intelligence analysts perceive as the opportunities and challenges 
inherent with their profession?  
5. What experiences and conditions do intelligence analysts perceive as 
contributing to or strengthening their professional identities?  
6. Is there a difference in the individual professional identity of analysts from 
different countries? 
The third objective was to determine whether there is a collective identity of SRIA in the 
private sector on an international level, with the research questions related to this, 
namely: 
1. Is there a shared professional identity across nationalities? 
2. Is there a shared professional identity across organisational forms? 
3. Is there a shared ideology and values of the profession? 
3.3 The pragmatist research approach 
Pragmatism is a relative newcomer to the research paradigm taxonomy (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 1998) and has grown in support amongst researchers who conduct mixed 
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  43 April  2021 
methods research. Pragmatism does not take sides in the endless paradigm wars on the 
nature of reality or truth. Instead, pragmatism acts as a new paradigm that treats 
dichotomous classical research approaches as social contexts for inquiry as a form of 
social action, rather than abstract philosophical systems embodied in ontologies, 
epistemologies and methodologies.  
Pragmatists argue that the aim of research should not be an attempt to most accurately 
represent reality but rather aim to be useful (Feilzer, 2010) to guide behaviour and lead 
to action. Pragmatism epistemology argues that knowledge is socially constructed 
through individual and shared experiences (Morgan, 2014) and that knowledge can only 
be acquired through the combination of action and reflection on the consequences of 
those actions (Biesta, 2010). For the pragmatist, knowledge should give practical 
meaning and action or problem-solving options in specific contexts; otherwise, it has no 
meaning or purpose. A pragmatic researcher embraces the ontological perspective (the 
nature of reality) of the social world as complex and reflects the flux of ideas, processes, 
experiences and practices of individuals and social groups.  
Pragmatism as a philosophy reflects what Dewey explained when he stated that 
phenomena have different elements or layers, some objective, some subjective, some a 
mixture of the two. At the same time, there are layers of the “stable and the precarious” 
and layers of “completeness, order, recurrences which makes possible prediction and 
control, and singularities, ambiguities, uncertain possibilities and processes going on to 
consequences as yet indeterminate” (Dewey, 1925 cited by Feilzer, 2010) of actions and 
their consequences are contextual. Therefore there is no universal “truth” because 
people, situations and the consequences of their actions change continuously. The 
pragmatic research paradigm offered an epistemological justification and logic for using 
mixed methods (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007) in the approach, instruments 
and analysis of the study of the professional identity of SRIA.   
The one dimension of Morgan’s interpretation of pragmatism that resonates in 
sociology, and specifically the first research question of this study (is there a shared 
professional identity among SRIA?), is the notion that beliefs or worldviews are socially 
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shared or interconnected although no two people have the same experiences or 
contexts in which they act. There are varying degrees of shared experience between 
people, which leads to different degrees of shared beliefs. In practice, this would mean 
that people might act in similar ways or give similar meanings to the contexts or 
consequences of their actions when they share beliefs about a particular situation, even 
if their contexts are socially or geographically different. The latter aspect strengthens 
the choice of pragmatism as an approach to study the professional identity of SRIA 
across organisational and national contexts.  
3.4 Research design 
The study's explorative nature dictated an inductive approach in which mixed methods 
was considered the most appropriate as the lack of literature on the topic gave latitude 
to the researcher to explore both the individual and collective professional identities to 
build the body of knowledge in this field.  This research offers an innovative perspective 
on sociological literature (due to the target group) and the security and intelligence 
literature. It is the first such study on the topic and the target group. 
The ultimate research objective—giving these professionals a voice to tell us who they 
are, what they do, what value they bring to the security sector and how they see their 
profession—endorsed the use of different instruments and analytical methods as it 
integrates both nomothetic and idiographic elements. Using mixed methods also 
enabled the researcher to draw from the strengths and minimise the weaknesses of the 
different methods (Johnson et al., 2007) and understand the nuances of this under-
researched group's lived professional experience. This pragmatist approach revealed 
the different layers of intelligence analysts’ professional identity by using quantitative 
methods to measure some aspects and qualitative methods to measure others (Feilzer, 
2010). 
Mixed methods research offered a framework for designing, collecting, analysing and 
interpreting data using both quantitative (QUAN) and qualitative (QUAL) methods 
within one or more of the research stages (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009). The 
sequencing of mixed methods, the timing, weighting and the emphasis of one 
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instrument above another is an important factor in designing mixed methods research 
(Creswell, 2009; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009). It was decided to approach the research 
as two distinct but interrelated studies in a sequential, equally weighted QUAN→QUAL 
approach where the quantitative study (Study 1), using a web survey, set the stage for 
the qualitative study, which used semi-structured interviews (Study 2).  
This integrated sequential research design enabled triangulation as it provided the 
researcher with an understanding of the studied social phenomenon from different 
vantage points (Brannen, 2005). For this purpose, the research processes started with 
an integrated research design matrix which was developed to map the research 
objectives, the underlying theory or constructs, the possible questions for the two 
instruments, possible analysis dimensions and references to ensure that all nuances of 
the phenomena to be explored, were addressed and integrated into the two studies.  
The aim of Study 1 was to provide contextual and descriptive data information on the 
collective professional identity of the target group and elicit participants for the 
interview study. The web survey questionnaire was designed to explore how the 
profession is perceived and constructed by those practising within the field by 1) 
exploring the employment and practice characteristics of intelligence analysts and 2)  
their perception of the role, contribution and future identity of the profession.  
The quantitative study was mainly used as a fit-for-purpose approach to understanding 
the target group's geographic spread and demographics, coupled with their 
perspectives. The survey was piloted with four targeted participants from different 
countries to ensure that the questions were clear and unambiguous. Their feedback was 
positive, with a suggestion to add an additional question regarding the profession’s 
future.  A question, “In light of the fast-changing working environment, what skills do 
you think SRIA need to acquire to be relevant in the future?” was added.  
 The survey was only then launched by using various channels, including professional 
organisations, social media and email targeting.  The survey was open for three months 
(1 November 2018 – 31 January 2019) on the JISC Online academic survey platform. The 
data was analysed using descriptive statistical analysis, nonparametric analysis and, 
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  46 April  2021 
where applicable, with open-ended questions, thematic analysis with qualitative data. 
Chapter 4 will detail the methodology and processes used in Study 1. 
Study 2, using semi-structured interviews as the data collection instrument, explored 
the individual professional identity of SRIA in the private sector.  This study was designed 
to adhere to the principles and methodology of Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA).  Interpretivism sees the world as too complex to be reduced to a set of 
observable laws (Gray, 2014), and therefore the interpretivist needs to get a richer and 
thicker understanding of reality as construed by social actors, specifically the differences 
between humans in their roles as social actors. Phenomenology sees social phenomena 
as socially constructed and is particularly concerned with generating meanings and 
gaining insights into those phenomena (Thornhill, Saunders & Lewis, 2009). Here, a 
specific type of question was formulated to extract detailed information of the personal 
lived experience, the meaning of experience to participants and how participants make 
sense of their experiences (Eatough & Smith, 2017).  
The IPA method is idiographic and committed to understand phenomena from a first-
person perspective, guided by phenomenological and hermeneutic enquiry.  As can be 
seen from the flow diagram, the interviews (data collection) for Study 2 were held as 
soon as the web survey's data collection ended. The participants for Study 2 volunteered 
for the interviews in the survey and had to be approached before they decided 
otherwise or could not be reached. Interviews were held with ten participants, and the 
interviews were transcribed between 10 months and a year after the interviews.  The 
results were analysed according to the IPA methodology and validated with the 
participants.  Chapter 5 will detail the nature of IPA as well as the methodology used in 
Study 2. 
 The weighting of the instruments could only be judged after the completion of data 
collection as it was uncertain whether the web survey would have a high response rate 
and offer interviewee participants.  The number and geographical spread of the survey 
respondents also had to reflect a sufficient sample size to be considered equal weight 
to the interviews. Fortunately, the sampling strategy was successful, and both 
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instruments and their results were equally important and integrated to reach the 
research objectives.  
Finally, the findings from both instruments were integrated in Chapter 6 by exploring 
the similarities, differences and dimensionalities of the analysis to arrive at valid and 
well-substantiated conclusions about the collective and individual professional identity 
of SRIA in the private sector. The researcher found that the two instruments provided 
mostly confirming or complementary evidence and a few interesting contrarian 
viewpoints that gave a richer and deeper understanding of the different layers of the 
issue at hand. Figure 4 depicts the research design flow. 
Figure 4: Flow of study’s sequential mixed methodology 
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3.5 Sampling strategy 
The sampling strategy was dictated by the research questions to determine an 
international perspective of the target group. The sampling frame for both research 
instruments (which will be dealt with in detail in the next chapters) was not 
geographically limited and comprised of those who self-identify themselves as a 
member of the security risk intelligence analyst profession—including those with the job 
titles of a security risk or threat analyst, crime analyst, crime intelligence analyst, 
research specialist, political risk analyst, cyber threat analyst, intelligence manager, 
security risk manager and the like. They were required to work currently in the private 
or non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector in any of the following: 
• A private security company with its own security risk analysis capacity; 
• A security/intelligence/risk unit in a company/multinational corporation 
whose core business is not security; 
• A private company that provides security risk and threat intelligence 
consulting services to external clients, including the private sector or 
government agencies. This would therefore also include contractors who are 
embedded at government departments/agencies and private companies; 
• A non-governmental organisation with its own security risk analysis capacity; 
• An intergovernmental organisation with its own security risk analysis capacity;  
• A researcher in the academia/institutions/foundations/think tanks whose 
primary function is to provide security risk analysis and advice to external 
clients. 
Information on their functional responsibilities was obtained by integrating various 
vacancy announcements on the websites of companies and professional bodies like the 
Association for Risk Intelligence Professionals (AIRIP) and professional sites like LinkedIn 
(Appendix B). For purposes of this study, the analysts were required to either manage 
or conduct the analysis and interpretation of the possible impact of external and internal 
threats on the company or their client/s, including:   
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• Monitoring geo-political and socio-economic developments in countries 
where their company/clients have interests, including conducting travel risk 
analysis services to personnel; 
• Analysing and advising on the prevention of cyberattacks against the 
company/client from the wide array of threat actors; 
• Advising on criminal activities that might impact the company’s physical and 
personnel protection operations, as well as its service and product delivery;  
• Monitoring reputational and other socio-political risks against the company; 
• Conducting due diligence investigations to ensure the resilience and integrity 
of the company’s supply and delivery chains; 
• Investigating personnel integrity risks and/or 
• Conducting strategic analysis and advising on the company’s strategic security 
management. 
The sampling strategy for the quantitative study (Web survey) used non-probability 
sampling with a blend of convenience, purposive, snowball and targeted sampling by 
advertising the study through professional associations, personal contacts, social media, 
LinkedIn and other intelligence analysis related internet interest groups to attract 
participants from as many countries and variations of employers as possible.  
The sampling strategy for the semi-structured interviews was purposive as participants 
emanated from the survey. The interview pool's size exceeded IPA requirements of 
between five and eight (ten) participants who have sufficient experience to generate an 
in-depth exploration of the lived experience of their professional identities and elicit 
detailed narratives from interviewees. Therefore, the only criterion for the interviewees 
was that they should have had at least three years of practical experience in the private 
sector to exclude newcomers who might not be able to relate to the research objectives.  
3.6 Ethical considerations 
The research study adhered to prescribed ethical procedures and was approved by the 
University of Portsmouth Ethics Committee. Before completing the survey and the 
interview, participants were requested to read the information sheet, which outlined 
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details relevant to the research aims, methodology, use, and data storage. Voluntary 
informed consent has been obtained from the study participants and confirmed through 
their completion of the survey and a written consent form (in the case of the interviews). 
Interviewees gave consent that their interviews could be recorded. They could withdraw 
their consent during the interview and up till two weeks after the interview. Participants 
have reviewed their transcripts to ensure that all identifiers have been anonymised.  
None of the interviewees withdrew from the process. 
Confidentiality of personal and professional material shared during the survey and the 
interview was maintained diligently. On-line survey responses were collected 
anonymously per the JISC Online privacy policy and security statement. Personal contact 
information (emails) was only disclosed by participants interested in taking part in Stage 
2 of the study. Pseudonyms or anonymous identifiers have been used to present the 
research findings. Should there have been any concern over possible risks associated 
with the study, the university's contact details, the supervisor and the researcher were 
included in the information sheet.   
To maximise validity, the researcher had to critically reflect at every stage of especially 
Study 2, whether her existing knowledge, experience and pre-conceptions influenced 
the research process. During the interviews, it became apparent that the researcher’s 
embedment in the profession was helpful to elicit personal experiences that would not 
have been shared were there not a familiarity with the challenges faced by the target 
group. In the analytical process of the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
study, the double hermeneutic process acknowledged that engaging with the 
participants’ meaning and experiences requires a large degree of interpretation to the 
extent that the researcher co-construct the lived experience of the participants (Smith, 
Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). The researcher’s reflexive processes (including a journal) and 
guidance from her supervisors have been crucial to obtaining the maximum scientific 
validity in the research process.    
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3.7 Results  
In Study 1, 75 respondents to the survey had 16 different nationalities, working in 28 
countries with three working globally. As the size of the target group is unknown, the 
sample size and the diversity of the respondents should be sufficient to attest to the 
representativeness and generalisability of the findings. The ten participants in Study 2 
fulfil the IPA requirements, and they consisted of five males and five females from five 
different countries.   
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Chapter 4 
Study 1: An exploratory survey on the collective professional 
identity of SRIA in the private sector 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the quantitative study into the collective professional identity of SRIA in 
the private sector was to determine whether people from different contexts self-identify 
with this emerging professional group and, if so, which aspects or dimensions are shared 
among the participants. The collective identity of a group of people is defined in this 
study as both the individual’s sense of belonging to a professional group and the group’s 
shared behaviour and values, consciousness or collective action. The more people self-
identify or categorise with a specific group, the stronger the collective identity becomes. 
A strong collective professional identity contributes to shared values and reference 
frames, leading to better collaboration and communication (Molleman & Rink, 2015). 
4.2 Method 
Study 1 used an anonymous web-based survey as the data collection method as it was 
deemed the best option to reach the target population to explore how they perceive 
and construct their professional identity. Therefore, the survey aimed to obtain valuable 
information on the target group's demographics and contextual and descriptive data for 
the study. The secondary aim was to elicit participants for the qualitative interviews in 
the next study.  
A web-based questionnaire is considered the most appropriate instrument to reach a 
specific population who has access to the internet, is IT literate, and more likely to 
participate if they know their inputs would be anonymous (Lavrakas, 2008). Internet-
based questionnaires have various benefits: they are inexpensive, require minimal effort 
from the participants and are accessible when the respondents have the time. 
Furthermore, the study participants' pool can be geographically diverse, as was the case 
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with this study. Simultaneously, online anonymity encourages honest answers, and 
questionnaires can be customised so that respondents are guided to different questions 
depending on previous responses (Hunter, 2012). The survey's online setting allows 
participants to engage with the questionnaire in their own time and pace in a 
comfortable and convenient environment.  
The main disadvantages of web-based questionnaires are that there is typically a low 
response rate that ambiguities in the questions could lead to a misunderstanding of 
survey questions. It is especially true where English is most probably not the first 
language of some of the target population (Robson & McCartan, 2016). The main ethical 
concerns in research in this field–the confidentiality of the survey and the anonymity of 
participants–was addressed through non-invasive and non-sensitive questions and the 
use of the academic survey platform, JISC Online, which does not collect any identifying 
metadata.   
4.2.1 Survey design 
Due to this study’s explorative and pragmatic nature, the data collection instrument was 
developed to obtain as much relevant data as possible across the heterogeneous target 
population to set the stage for future quantitative and qualitative studies in this under-
researched group. It, therefore, adopted a nomothetic approach that gathered both 
quantitative and qualitative data to explore the professional identity of SRIA in the 
private sector.   
The study drew on existing literature to design the survey questions and relied on 
previous quantitative studies that developed scientifically sound measuring instruments 
to investigate several aspects of identity as there are currently no scientifically validated 
cross-national studies addressing emerging professions’ identity. The survey included 
elements of instruments used in other fields like psychology and counselling (Gazzola & 
Smith, 2007; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Verling, 2014; Woo, Lu, & Bang, 2018),  
organisational studies (Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004), education (Aangenendt et al., 2012; 
Beijaard et al., 2004), medicine (Liu, Lam, & Loi, 2014; Nikendei, Ben-David, Mennin, & 
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Huwendiek, 2016), information technology (Brooks et al., 2011) and coaching (Gray, 
2011; Gray et al., 2015). 
The first part of the survey (Appendix C1) collected demographic details of the 
participants with questions that dealt with their gender, age, qualifications, 
employment, nationality, experience in the security risk intelligence analysis field, job 
title, whether they are in a management position, which sector and type of organisation 
they are working, fields of analysis/advice and their professional affiliation. Specific 
demographic details needed to be standardised to ensure uniformity and ease of 
analysis.  
In this regard, the qualification type criteria used were that of the United Nation’s 
International Standard Classification of Education Fields of Education and Training 2013 
(ISCED-F) (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2015), which classifies education programmes 
and related qualifications by fields of study according to the broad domain, branch or 
area of content covered. It was deemed most appropriate to use the UK Standard 
Industrial Classification–SIC (Office for National Statistics, 2019) to determine the 
economic sector where the respondents are employed. Most of these questions were 
closed-ended questions, with an “other” option to disclose information that was not 
addressed in the predesigned answers. This data enabled the researcher to determine 
the results' representativeness and map demographic characteristics with data obtained 
in the second part of the survey.   
The second part of the survey consisted of a mixture of a 5-point Likert scale (strongly 
agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree) and open-
ended questions. These questions aimed to explore the participants' perceptions of their 
self-identification, their role and function, the professional challenges they face, their 
views on the professionalisation and their views on the profession's future. Appendix C2 
reflects the research questions that guided the data collection process in the survey.   
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4.2.2 Validation 
As discussed above, this study used elements from other scholars' survey instruments 
to compile a list of questions that would already have passed scientific validation. No 
attempt was made to ensure statistical correlation or other validation among the 
variables and questions. The use of the existing instruments served as a guideline for 
questions to elicit responses and a baseline for understanding the target group. Most, if 
not all, elements of collective professional identity, as discussed in Chapter 2, are 
addressed in the survey based on the model and findings of the research of Bayerl et al. 
(2018). Their collective professional identity research identified five themes and 18 
associated topics used as an assessment or validation tool to ensure that all possible 
dimensions of the target group’s collective identity have been addressed in the research 
questions in both the survey and the interviews. (Appendix C3) 
This study’s design process linked Bayerl et al.’s (2018) different collective professional 
identity themes with the broader research questions. Figure 5 reflects how the survey 
and interview questions were linked by using colours to depict the different themes 
people (blue), work (purple), environment (green), valence (yellow) and profession 
(grey) and arrows to indicate where they are addressed in the survey and interview 
questions. The validation process followed an inclusive approach by looking at all the 
possible interpretations of Bayerl et al.’s (2018) themes and linking them with all 
possible similar outcomes in the instrument questions.  As shown in Figure 5, all the 
themes were adequately addressed in the final instrument design.  The study did not 
aim to assign weights to the different themes to determine the strength (or weakness) 
of collective professional identity. 
4.2.3  Survey piloting  
The survey was piloted with four participants from different countries (two from South 
Africa, one each from Canada and Germany) who were requested to be very critical on 
the clarity of questions, the sequencing thereof, the time taken to complete the survey, 
and the number of details requested in the open-ended questions.  A request to add a 
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question on what the participants would think is the profession's future and whether 
they see a future for themselves in the profession was recommended and implemented.  
4.3 Participants 
As there is no information available on the actual number of SRIA in the private sector 
in any country, not to mention the world, the study used non-probability sampling with 
a blend of convenience, purposive, snowball and targeted sampling to attract as many 
as possible participants from as many countries and variations of employment contexts.  
A website was developed, which served as a platform to communicate the researcher’s 
journey and the purpose of the study, elements of the study, contact details, the link to 
Figure 5: Collective professional identity research instrument design: Bayerl et al.’s (2018) 5 
themes for self-expressed collective professional identity (on the left) were used for validation 
of the study’s research questions (on the right) 
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the survey and a blog. The website was frequently shared on social media to increase 
awareness of the study and elicit possible participants (see Appendix C4). 
The study was also marketed through the following channels: 
• Professional associations, like the Association of International Risk Intelligence 
Professionals (AIRIP), marketed the survey in an email newsletter to their 172 
strong membership and during their annual meeting. Simultaneously, the 
International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE - with members 
across the US, UK, Europe and Australia) also requested their members to 
market the survey among their students who work in the private sector. The 
Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers (AIPIO with about 500 
members) tweeted the survey link. The Association of Crime and Intelligence 
Analysts (IACA) also sent out an email to their non-law enforcement analysts 
(217). 
• Twitter: a total of 20 tweets were posted between 1 November 2018 and 31 
January 2019, which had 5573 impressions (how many times the tweet was 
seen on timelines or in search results, with 121 engagements (the total 
number of times a user interacted with a Tweet).   
• Three posts were published on LinkedIn to the researcher’s 581 followers, 
while the study was also introduced to 15 intelligence analysis related LinkedIn 
groups. 
• Email requests were also sent to several private security or intelligence risk 
companies that the researcher was referred to by people who saw the survey 
marketing on LinkedIn or Twitter or whom the researcher knew would be 
willing to participate. These companies were in the US (21), South Africa (1) 
and Germany (1).  
4.4 Procedure 
The survey ran from 1 November 2018 to 31 January 2019 on the JISC Online Survey 
platform that is GDPR compliant and certified to ISO 27001 standard. The fact that the 
JISC Online tool is reputable among universities in the UK and that the link to the survey 
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reflected the name of the University of Portsmouth reinforced the study's research 
nature and provided credibility to the process.  
The participants were requested to read the information sheet on page 1 of the survey 
to understand the study's purpose, the requirements to participate in the study, and 
related information regarding their data security, confidentiality, the advantages and 
possible disadvantages of participating. They were also informed that it would take 
about 20 minutes to complete the survey.  
A total of 1220 people accessed the survey, but 1069 left already on the first page where 
the information sheet was located, 78 left without completing the demographic part of 
the survey (page 2), while another 27 left at page 3 (which consisted of their role and 
function).  A total of 75 people completed the survey, which is 6 per cent of the initial 
number that accessed the survey.  As the size of the target population is unknown, the 
researcher had no expectations of the number of people who might participate in the 
survey. On the last page of the survey, they were invited to participate in the second 
study (the interviews) by emailing the researcher with a link to her email address that 
served as a pop-up window with a predetermined subject line “Participation in 
interviews for your thesis” and “I would like to participate in your interviews for your 
study of the professional identity of SRIA in the private sector. Please contact me.” in 
the email content. 
4.5 Data organisation and analysis  
Surveys that include closed and open-ended questions are a good example of using 
mixed data (Bazeley, 2015), where respondents provide data that could be used for 
demographic analysis, with comments and contextual information at the same time.  
Not only do open-ended questions provide useful anecdotes and quotes, but they also 
provide the opportunity to do a detailed analysis of relationships between the 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the data.   
The quantitative data in the survey was analysed using descriptive analysis with MS 
Excel, while SPSS (Version 25) was used for the nonparametric statistical tests to 
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determine whether the pattern observed during the descriptive analysis could be the 
same when conducting other statistical analyses. Due to the sample size, certain 
parameter assumptions for parametric analysis were not met, including that all analysed 
populations have the same variance.  
Nonparametric analysis was found to be sufficient for this exploratory study. The data 
was re-coded in SPSS (Appendix C5), and two different tests, the Mann-Whitney test 
(Saunders et al., 2009) and the Kruskal-Wallis H test (Pallant, 2003), were used to 
determine whether there are similarities or differences in professional identity scales 
(Questions 16 and 17) and the perception of how others perceive the profession 
(Question 20) between the respondents according to their demographic characteristics. 
The Mann-Whitney test determines whether the distribution of scores is the same 
across the dichotomous independent variables, e.g. gender, management position, 
professional organisation membership and previous government experience. The 
Kruskal-Wallis H test (Pallant, 2003) determines whether there is a statistically 
significant difference between the multinomial independent variables (where there are 
three or more groups, e.g. age groups, years of experience, qualification level, 
organisational types, economic sectors and countries).  
The survey's seven open-ended questions allowed the participants to share their 
opinions or voice their perceptions and experience of being a security risk intelligence 
analyst. The data was sanitised so that only those valid replies (that contained 
contextual data to analyse) were used for the analysis. A small number of respondents 
did not complete some open-ended questions, explaining the variance in respondents 
from the 75 who completed the closed questions survey.  The three respondents who 
work globally were also excluded from the open-ended questions as their responses 
would have skewed the results where the number of countries in which respondents 
work was relevant.  
NVivo (Version 12) was used to analyse the qualitative data by identifying themes or 
categories of responses in the open-ended questions and determining the relative 
frequency of the identified themes. Here it is critical that the researcher, keeping the 
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research questions in mind, combines the frequency of codes with an analysis of their 
meaning in context, thereby being mindful of the subtlety and complexity of the issues 
at hand (Marks & Yardley, 2004). 
As the purpose of the research was to determine whether respondents from different 
countries and economic sectors share perceptions about their profession, the results of 
the open-ended questions and the country's results and economic sector where they 
work were imported in NVivo12.  The responses were manually coded using mostly 
inductive coding, which also exposed further dimensions or nuances of the responses 
that were useful in the analysis. The content was analysed, re-examined and compared 
until a list of higher-order categories was generated.  
Throughout this process, operational definitions were developed for each category and 
labelled with a code, after which possible themes were identified to categorise the open-
ended answers (see Appendix C6). The findings were cross-tabulated in NVivo12 with 
the country, and economic sector attributes to determine whether there are shared 
professional identity perceptions across national and economic sector boundaries. The 
findings were summarised in tables with the frequency for each particular coding 
category presented as a percentage of all the respondents who provided answers to that 
specific question and the percentages of the countries and economic sectors in which 
they work. This enabled the researcher to conduct a descriptive statistical analysis to 
answer the research questions. 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Demographic analysis  
i) Gender, age and experience distribution 
The sample of 75 respondents is mostly male (76%), with the majority of males slightly 
older (45-54 years) than the majority of females (35-44 years), with the most prevalent 
age group overall is those in the age group 35-44 years old. The spread of years’ 
experience in security risk intelligence analysis was surprisingly wide, with those in the 
11-20 years and more than 25 years experience being equal, while those in the 1-5 years 
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experience and 6-10 years experience slightly lower (see Appendix C7.1).  A total of 68% 
of the respondents are currently in a supervisory role, while the same percentage 
previously worked for the government and then moved to the private sector.  
ii) Geographical representation 
The 75 respondents are citizens of 16 different countries across South and North 
America (Argentina n=1, Venezuela n=1, the US n=29 and Canada n=4), Africa (South 
Africa n=11, Botswana n=1, Kenya n=1 and Tanzania n=1), Europe (the UK n=13, the 
Netherlands n=1, Germany n=4, Finland n=1, Greece n=1, Slovenia n=1 and Bulgaria n=1)  
and South East Asia (Singapore n=1). Should the three respondents hold dual or triple 
citizenship be included in this tally, the total would be 19 different countries’ citizenship 
(the above plus Croatia, Australia and France). A total of 16 respondents (or 21% of the 
total), all males, work outside their own countries.   
The map in Figure 6 illustrates the findings that the 75 respondents work in 24 different 
countries (those listed above as well as Mexico, Nigeria, Switzerland, Ukraine, Lebanon, 
and one who works in the US, UK, Australia, Taiwan, China and South Korea), with two 
respondents working globally without mentioning the countries. An analysis of the 
different countries represented in the survey, combined from the nationalities and the 
countries where the participants work, indicates that 27 countries are “represented” in 
Figure 6: The 27 countries that are represented in the study, with participants with 19 
nationalities working in 24 different countries  
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the survey, which indicates the countries where the function of security risk intelligence 
analysis is performed.  
iii) Qualifications analysis 
All the respondents have qualifications ranging from associate degrees/diplomas (1-2 
years of tertiary education) to doctoral degrees. The majority of both genders have 
Masters Degrees; most degrees were attained in the Social Sciences (43%) with the 
second most qualifications attained in the Services category (15%), which includes 
security, military and law enforcement (see Appendix C7.2). Other interesting results are 
that nearly all of those with doctorate degrees are currently in supervisory positions and 
that those with Master’s degrees are well presented in all the age groups. 
iv) Job titles 
None of the 75 participants had the job title of “security risk intelligence analyst” or 
“security risk intelligence manager”. Only 26 of the 75 (35%) participants had the word 
“intelligence” in their current job titles, while an additional three stated that their 
preferred job title should include “intelligence” to suit what they are doing.  Only nine 
(9) of the participants currently had “risk” in their job titles, of which only 3 have the 
words “risk intelligence” and another three “security risk” in their job titles. Only three 
stated that another job title that would fit what they are doing included “risk 
intelligence”. 
v) Economic sector 
The participants are employed across all the private economic sectors (15 in total), 
where most of them work in the Professional/Scientific/Technical industry (32%). The 
Finance and Insurance sector has the second-highest presentation with 13% of the 
respondents, followed by equal representation in the Electricity, Gas, Steam and 
Aircondition industry, Human Health & Social Work and Information & Communication 
sectors, each representing 7% of the total respondents (see Appendix C7.3). 
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vi)  Type of employer 
Figure 7 depicts the survey participants' distribution according to the type of employer 
for which they work. Most of the participants (47%) are employed by a private 
company/multinational corporation or university whose core business is not security, 
where they fulfil a security risk intelligence role. Examples here would be in a 
pharmaceutical, beverages or technology company. The countries where they are 
employed are from every continent and thus have the broadest geographical spread 
(see Appendix C7.4). 
The second most, or 16% of the participants, work for local, national or international 
security risk intelligence consulting companies that provide security risk intelligence and 
other related services to the private or government sector. Some of these companies 
would also have embedded analysts in their clients’ sites. Participants working in these 
companies work in Australia, Finland, the Netherlands, South Africa, the UK and the US. 
The survey did not attempt to obtain the names of employers. However, typical 
companies in this category would include Calhoun International, Kroll, Control Risks, K2 
Intelligence, Stratfor, S-RM, and Tenácitas International, to name a few. 
Figure 7: Type of organisations in which respondents work 
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The third most significant employer of 10 of the total of 75 participants (13%) is private 
companies who provide the whole spectrum of security services, including guarding, 
investigations and security systems but which also have their own security risk 
intelligence analysis capacity, are mostly from Nigeria, Ukraine and the US. Companies 
that would typically resort under this category would include Securitas, GardaWorld, 
G4S and Pinkerton.  
Interestingly, 12% or nine of the respondents are self-employed, which would imply that 
their specialist knowledge and business know-how provide good entrepreneurial 
opportunities in this field. They are working in South Africa (5), Germany, and the US, 
while two work globally. Fewer respondents are employed by non-governmental 
organisations (NGO’s) with their own security/risk intelligence capacity (8%), research 
foundations or think tanks that provide intelligence advisory services to clients (3%) and 
lastly, regulatory bodies (1%). 
vii) Analytical focus areas, deliverables or advice to clients 
The respondents could choose multiple answers to indicate the type of analysis and/or 
threats they advise regularly.  It was evident from the survey results that SRIA monitor 
or focus on multiple disciplines or threat areas simultaneously in the execution of their 
functions (with a mean of 4.4 different focus areas), and not only on one or two areas 
like their counterparts in the national security or law enforcement sectors (see Figure 
8).  
Appendix C7.5 illustrates how the different focus areas were grouped in broad 
categories to enable in-depth analysis of the variety of topics SRIA in the private sector 
have to research, analyse and provide advice. The category focus area that most of the 
respondents conduct research and advise on is Analytical Practices (a mean of 51%).  
Although further details have not been elicited in this part of the survey on what this 
entails, it most likely refers to integrating different analytical methods in deliverables to 
get their message across. It has become common in the intelligence analysis field to 
explain the analytical methodology to clients to strengthen credibility and instil rigour in 
the analysis process.   
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The second most prevalent category is that of Security Management (48% mean), 
followed by Protective Intelligence (42% mean), Geostrategic and Political Intelligence 
(39% mean), Crime Intelligence (35% mean) and lastly that of Cyber Intelligence with a 
mean of 24% of the respondents.  When the single most prevalent focus areas are 
identified, the majority (more than 50%) of the respondents deals with security risk 
management (71%), strategic analysis & foresight (64%), geopolitical developments 
(63%), followed by general crime (59%), travel risk (57%), security management strategy 
(55%), terrorism & counter-terrorism (53%), with personnel security incidents and 
reputational risks both at 51% of the respondents.  
 
viii) Professional organisation membership 
The purpose of including membership of professional organisations in the survey was to 
determine whether SRIA deliberately associates themselves tangibly and more officially 
to the collective self-identification with others in the field. The majority of the 
respondents are members of professional organisations (69% against 31% who are not). 
This analysis's age distribution was interesting: those in the 25-44 age groups were less 
prone to be members of professional organisation than those in older age groups–on 
average 63% against 88%. Those older than 44 years are overwhelmingly members of 
Figure 8: The workload of participants according to the different analytical 
categories or Focus Areas that they are responsible for in advising and providing 
deliverables: n=75 
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professional organisations, with between 80% and 100% of the respondents in that age 
group. The anomaly is the two respondents in the age group 18-24 who are both 
members of a professional organisation (see Appendix C7.6 and C7.7). 
The survey indicated that most supervisors (84%) hold professional organisation 
membership, while only 50% of those in non-supervisory roles belong to professional 
bodies. The reason for this result might be more complex than making a sweeping 
statement like “when you are a member of a professional organisation, your chances for 
promotion are better”. The nature of the work indicated that networking and 
stakeholder management are essential for success in this profession.  
Membership of professional bodies enables more extensive networking (34% of those 
who hold membership of professional bodies state networking as a reason why they are 
involved). The other reasons for belonging to a professional organisation are in order of 
frequency are “information sharing” (20% of responses), “benchmarking of best 
practice”, and “learning and professional development” (both at 18%), while on 8% 
mentioned “certification and professional recognition”, while 2% stated that their 
company requires it. One respondent replied that he/she sees no value in being a 
member of a professional organisation.  
The main reasons given by the 23 respondents for not belonging to professional 
organisations can be grouped into four categories in order of frequency.  Firstly, they do 
not feel they need it (50%) with comments such as “it doesn’t appeal to me”, “it’s not 
necessary for my job”, “they feel outdated”, “I have sufficient qualifications and don’t 
need professional designations”. Secondly, there is a lack of awareness of relevant 
professional organisations (30%) from Canada, the US, South Africa and Tanzania – 
which is surprising because one would have assumed that at least Canada and the US 
analysts are exposed to professional organisations. Some of the remarks in this category 
included: “no existing organisation for the private sector”, “one exists?” and “never 
occurred to me”.   
Thirdly, 16% of the respondents stated that the cost is too high compared to the 
perceived membership benefits. When comparing the respondents’ professional 
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organisation membership with the qualification level, it is clear that those with higher 
qualifications are also more likely to belong to professional organisations (see Appendix 
C7.7).  
The majority (78%) of all respondents who have Masters’ degrees belong to professional 
organisations. At the same time, the mean of the number of memberships is also higher 
in this group (1.9) while those with Doctorate degrees have a mean professional 
organisation membership of 1.8, compared with those with lesser qualifications, i.e. 
Honour’s degrees (0.9), Bachelor’s (1.4) and one or two-year qualifications (1.3) mean. 
The professional organisations to which the respondents belong could be categorised 
into two main groups: those professional organisations that provide opportunities for 
knowledge sharing, networking AND certification (n=20, see Appendix C7.8), while the 
other group was those organisations that do not offer certification or professional 
development opportunities, but are mainly collaborative networks with a code of ethics 
or professional standards and/or standards for affiliation by educational institutions 
who underwrite their objectives (n=23, see Appendix C7.9).   
Due to the wide selection of sectors in which the respondents work, the professional 
organisations to which they belong range from risk intelligence or security management 
organisations to specialised organisations dealing with, for instance, university security 
or business continuity. The most global membership professional organisations are the 
Association for International Risk Intelligence Professionals (AIRIP) and ASIS, with 14 
members each work in 19 different countries or 68% of the 27 different countries. 
4.6.2 The perceived role and function of SRIA 
The survey question “In your experience, what is the main role and function of SRIA in 
the private sector?” aimed to obtain the self-descriptions of the tasks of the target group 
of SRIA in the private sector. Three distinct themes of tasks were identified with the 
majority (78% of the 73 respondents and 83% of the 24 countries and 100% of the 
economic sectors represented) emphasised that their responsibility is to provide 
forewarning and situational awareness of the threats to the business (see Table 1).  
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A closer look at the data indicates that the second role—to support the decision-
maker—is a customer-centric perspective of the primary role and function of providing 
forwarning and situational awareness. The third most mentioned role, the provision of 
security risk management functions, relates to the methodology or craft applied to 
execute the primary role and function of forewarning and situational awareness. 
 An interesting finding is that those analysts working for a security company with its own 
security risk intelligence analysis capacity preferred the function of “assisting and 
supporting consumers to make sense and better decisions” more than the other two 
functions. They might be more involved in operational matters where they assist 
investigators than those analysts working for other types of organisations. 
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Table 1 
The role and function of SRIA: n=73 
Themes and typical quotations for defined 
themes 
% of respondents 
whose answers 
included a code in 
the theme 
% of countries whose 
answers included a 








code in the 
theme: n=15 
Provide forewarning by identifying & 
analysing threats and risks to business 
78% 83% 100% 
“Anticipating and mitigating risks and threats to the corporate world.” 
“To provide strategic forecasting intelligence to help guide Company decisions and advise on tactical 
and operational events that may impact the Company's people, assets, or reputation.” 
“To make the company aware of security and political risks which threaten the security of personnel 
& key assets as well the viability of ongoing or future business.” 
Assist & support consumers to make 
sense and better decisions 
36% 50% 80% 
“Assist consumers to make sense of the past and the present.” 
“To provide stakeholders and decision-makers reliable, accurate information layered with astute 
assessment to enable them to make business/security decisions.” 
“To bring expertise to business owners and executives to make informed decisions. By quantifying 
and identifying risks, analysts provide insight into business operations and provide risk information 
for business executives.” 
Provide risk management advice  32% 50% 60% 
“Monitor and assess risks to the business, alert the business to emerging or escalating risks, 
recommend risk mitigation measures.” 
“Enable efficient business functions through the proactive identification of applicable risks so that the 
proper assessment, mitigation, and acceptance of any residual risk can be undertaken.” 
“Extensive research and analysis and designating each risk with a risk level (typically ‘high’, ‘medium’, 
or ‘low’) through use of a risk matrix (impact of event happening vs likelihood that it will happen) 
along with their own comment on whether they think the risk is worth taking and they should 
invest/travel there or whatever it is they needed the risk assessment for.” 
 
4.6.3 The perceived unique contribution of SRIA to the private sector and to society 
It is evident from the responses to the question “What is the unique contribution that 
you bring to the private sector and society?” that respondents had very similar replies 
to what they have given in the previous question in terms of their role and functions. 
The purpose of the question was to determine whether they share a perception of the 
unique value or impact (Bielska & Pallaris, 2017) they bring to the corporate world and 
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society. As this was an open-ended question, participants offered multiple answers see 
Table 2.  
Just more than a third of the respondents (37%), which represented 45% of the countries 
and 67% of the economic sectors represented in the survey, stated that their specialist 
knowledge helps identify and prevent threats to their company, the sector, and the 
society as a whole. In a similar vein, the second most prevalent theme is that of 
supporting decision-makers (35% of respondents, 80% of the countries and economic 
sectors represented) to make better-informed decisions that would assist business, and 
in some cases, “improve investments in developing and post-conflict countries that can 
improve societal conditions”.  
The third highest response rate to the question was that of “to enable a safe working 
environment, risk reduction & loss prevention for companies & industries that 
contribute to national economies” which a slightly lower percentage of the respondents 
(32%), but still 50% of the countries and 73% of the sectors represented in this sample 
offered as their contribution. An interesting minority view is that of four respondents 
from South Africa and the US from the Professional, Scientific and Technical as well as 
Information and Communications sectors, that stated that “they augment government 
capability to understand security risks to deliver stability” and that they “provide a 
service that the government and law enforcement cannot provide due to a lack of 
resources or different focus”. 
This question's overall results show a relatively equal distribution of viewpoints on the 
unique contribution they bring to society and that the viewpoints are directly related to 
the role, and functions discussed previously. The three identified themes share a 
common purpose: protecting or defending the company's interests, clients, and society, 
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 Table 2 
The perceived unique contribution or value of SRIA: n=71 
Themes and typical quotations for defined themes % of 
respondents 
whose answers 
included a code 
in the theme 




code in the 
theme: n=22 




code in the 
theme: n=15 
Provide insight into threats to a business, sector, 
industry or national security 
37% 45% 67% 
“The ability to apply unique industry insights towards threats.” 
“To allow organisations (and their communities) to be proactive against risk and improve resiliency.” 
Enable more informed decision-making 35% 68% 80% 
“An informed point of view that can be objectively applied towards business decisions.” 
“We are able and experienced in providing honest assessments to those in positions of influence and 
are therefore able to enable business in environments which would not otherwise be accessible. In 
the developing world and post conflict countries, this can bring great investment which can improve 
societal conditions”. 
Enable a safe working environment, risk reduction 
& loss prevention for companies & industries that 
contribute to national economies  
32% 50% 73% 
“Mitigate losses for major private corporations, which contribute significantly to national economies.” 
“We help foster a secure work environment - ensuring our physical job sites are safe, our colleagues 
are appropriately vetted, and our travellers are educated on security trends worldwide. This fosters a 
productive and safe workforce on a global level.” 
“Ability to advise the business of the potential emerging threats which will, in turn, contribute to the 
protection of the business assets and its people.” 
 
4.6.4 The perceived benefits/opportunities that respondents derive from being a 
SRIA in the private sector  
The survey question on the benefits respondents derive from the profession aimed to 
determine which experiences or conditions strengthen their professional identity and 
whether they share the same viewpoints. In essence, the question targeted the meaning 
or value the profession holds for its members, as self-interest (and a positive self-image) 
is the primary determinant for self-categorisation with a group or profession. 
Membership of social groups, like professions, are associated with positive or negative 
value connotations (Tajfel & Turner, 2004).  The analysis of this specific open survey 
question was done deductively, applying the three themes in Bayerl et al.’s (2018) 
“valence” factor to determine what the respondents “get out of” being SRIA. Valence in 
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psychology indicates the subjective value or intrinsic attractiveness  (positive valence) 
or aversiveness (negative valence) of an event, object, person, or situation (N Pam, 
2013).  
The themes are 1) the personal, concrete examples of what they gain by being in this 
profession, 2) image – or the standing the profession gives them inside and outside the 
professional group and 3) the value of the profession in their own eyes or their 
evaluation of being in this profession. The sub-themes were inductively determined 
based on the replies of the respondents. 
The analysis indicates that the respondents derive not many common benefits from 
being in this profession. The most common benefit—that of them valuing the 
intellectual stimulation of the job—was only mentioned by 51% of the respondents, 
although they are working in 55% of the 23 countries and 73% of the 15 economic 
sectors represented by the respondents. No specific demographic commonalities or 
differences could be detected as the responses were equally spread across demographic 
and sectoral boundaries (see Appendix C7.10). 
Most of the respondents (80%) identified personal benefits, with the majority (51% of 
all participants, 55% of the represented 23 countries and 73% of the 15 sectors) stating 
that they enjoy the work's intellectually stimulating nature. Comments such as the one 
hereunder reflect that the respondents value the fact that they are intellectually 
challenged to fulfil their primary role and function of staying abreast of new 
developments that could impact their organisation.    
“I have been in this environment for twenty years, and not one day is the 
same. I enjoy working for and with different people. All my clients have 
different requirements and needs, and it is great to work on a diverse 
range of topics.”  
Many also reflected that they are continuously developing new skills like “I have the 
opportunity to do extremely interesting work and the potential to constantly learn.”  The 
second most common sub-theme in personal benefits with 47% of the 15 economic 
sectors represented, is that the profession provides them with the opportunity to know 
and understand what is happening in the world, much more than other people, which is 
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good for their self-esteem with comments such as “I see what is over the horizon before 
others”.  
The second theme, the profession's image, was mentioned by only 17% of respondents 
that represent 53% of the economic sectors. Comments such as “My clients recognise 
me as a valuable expert”, “the profession is considered prestigious by co-workers”, “I 
have access to decision-makers” and “I have management’s attention” emphasise that 
at least 13 of the 71 respondents to this question value the good image the profession 
offers them personally. The value of being recognised by their peers are slightly higher 
than the value they place on being recognised by their management. 
About a third of the respondents mentioned the third theme of Bayerl et al.(2018), 
namely the profession's self-perceived value. For most of these, the fact that they have 
an impact on business (53% of the economic sectors) such as “the ability to influence 
large-scale strategic business decisions and projects” and “forming part of an 
organisation's early warning system along with other executives” is a crucial benefit they 
derive from being in this profession. 11% of the respondents feel that they are “making 
a difference” or “have the opportunity to help others with difficult problems”. 
4.6.5 The perceived challenges of being a security risk intelligence analyst that could 
impact on their professional identity 
The respondents had to offer at least three challenges they face as SRIA in the private 
sector that might impact their resilience to develop and maintain their professional 
identity. This question is relevant to determine whether the respondents share the same 
challenges across nationalities and economic sectors and, where possible, recommend 
systemic recommendations to address these challenges. Challenges in the workplace 
serve as cues to professionals to rediscover whether they want to remain in this 
profession and, if so, strengthen their resolve or commitment to their professional 
identity by finding ways to minimise or circumvent the impact of these challenges 
through identity work.  
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The results of the survey of this question were analysed inductively. Four main themes 
were identified: 1) those challenges they face that are stemming from their task as SRIA, 
2) challenges that are related to the organisational context in which they function, 3) 
challenges relating to the broader environment, and 4) the challenges related to their 
experience of the profession itself. It has to be kept in mind that respondents might 
experience similar challenges than others but might not have put it in the top three of 
their most pressing challenges. Should they not have been limited in their responses, 
the similarities and difference could have been even more interesting (see Appendix 
C7.11). 
The challenges faced by most of the respondents are those related to their working 
environment (theme 2), with 80% of the respondents representing 92% of the countries 
and 93% of the economic sectors, citing a total of 12 challenges. The most common 
workplace challenge that respondents share across national boundaries and economic 
sectors is a lack of understanding about the value and purpose of security risk 
intelligence analysis in the organisation they work. More than half of the respondents 
(54%) across a third (67%) of the countries and 80% of the economic sectors stated this 
as one of the main frustrations in their workplace.  
The most interesting finding relates to the variable of the different type of organisation 
where 80% of those working in private security companies said there is a lack of 
understanding of intelligence analysis. In comparison, those working in private 
companies whose core business is not security had 51% stating the same, while those 
working for NGO’s (50%), are self-employed (44%), and even working for security risk 
companies (41%) feel that their function is misunderstood. Statements included “it is 
difficult to combat the narrative and misperceptions of intelligence”, or “helping 
business partners to understand that this is not a crystal ball”, “clients or partners are 
not listening to advice or analysis and doing their own thing, or they do not want to 
make a decision”, “my company discounts sound intelligence and then complains they 
were not informed”, “the function is seen as a necessary cost rather than contributing 
to the financial success of the company” and “it is a challenge to educate leaders on 
what the Security Risk Intel Analyst can bring to the table”. 
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The second most shared challenge is that of lack of resources (27% of all respondents, 
25% of all countries represented and 60% of the economic sectors, with the highest 
percentage of 58% from respondents working in private security risk companies), with 
the lack of funding and access to information the main challenge. Furthermore, it seems 
as though most of the economic sectors struggle with a lack of human resources support 
(60% of the economic sectors, 33% of the countries represented and 23% of the 
respondents). The main identified issues relate to the fact that the HR personnel do not 
know what the functions of a SRIA are, with resultant mismatched recruits. 
Furthermore, analysts' lack of career pathways is also perceived to be a challenge, 
especially in private sector companies whose core business is not security (34% of the 
respondents in this type of organisation).  
Other noteworthy challenges include the counter side of the main benefit of being a 
security risk intelligence analyst in the private sector–an intellectually challenging 
career–where nearly a quarter of the respondents and countries, and 60% of the 
economic sectors stated that they experience information and cognitive overload. Some 
of the comments here included “Small teams with large workload leads to high analyst 
Figure 9: The five highest rated benefits and challenges of being a Security 
Risk Intelligence Analyst in the private sector 
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turnover and high burnout rates”, “the rapid change of the geopolitical landscape and 
open source intelligence collection methods”, “very expansive priorities, difficult to 
become expert in all facets” and “I have to keep constantly up to date with geopolitical 
developments across the world.  Everyone expects you to be an expert on geopolitics in 
every country.”  
A third of all the economic sectors represented find time pressures challenging when 
conducting their tasks. Some of the comments included “people do not understand that 
it takes time for a good research product” and “little time to learn on the job due to 
competing priorities”. A further challenge related to their function is the lack of 
cooperation and information sharing with other departments in the same organisation 
across 33% of the economic sectors.  Figure 9 depicts the five highest rated benefits and 
challenges of being a Security Risk Intelligence Analyst identified by the respondents. 
4.6.6 Values shared by SRIA in the private sector 
The purpose of including a question on the three most important professional values or 
ethical standards to which the respondents execute their task was to determine whether 
values or norms were shared across national and sectoral boundaries. The issue of ethics 
and morality in the private security sector, vis-à-vis that of the formalised ethos found 
in the intelligence community, police or military, has received attention in the last few 
years (Bean, 2015; Franke & Von Boemcken, 2009; Voelz, 2009).  
These studies found that the notion that private-sector employees would forfeit all 
other values for profit was misplaced and unfair due to the internalisation of common 
ethical standards and professional values by the vast majority of private security 
employees. Many values are universal and transversal across multiple professions, such 
as integrity and honesty, reflecting the individual and professions’ aim to contribute and 
positively service society. 
From the inductive analysis results, it is clear that the respondents do not experience 
major ethical dilemmas that might impact their commitment or loyalty to their 
companies. Only one respondent remarked that he had been tasked to do something 
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unlawful, which he refused to execute. There was no indication that respondents 
experienced tension between their values and the profit objective of their companies. 
Their stated values were taken at face value and were not changed if they were to use 
integrity and honesty as they perceive these to be two different, although related, 
concepts that they associate with.  
Four main themes emerged from the inductive analysis of the 71 respondents to this 
question, related to their personal (in-ward looking) values, those values that guide 
them when they execute their task, those values which guide them in their work 
environment and those values that guide their interaction with other people (see 
Appendix C7.12 and Figure 10). 
The most common theme was “personal values”, which represented 80% of the replies, 
83% of the countries and 73% of the economic sectors represented.  The most shared 
value in this theme was that of “integrity”, which 52% of the respondents followed, 
followed by “honesty”. One respondent remarked, “A rock steady - even keel personality 
- we are the calm in the crisis”, “honesty before sales”, and “I always tell the truth. You 
can ask me anything as long as you are not afraid of the answer.” Respondents who work 
in NGO’s, in companies whose core business is not security, research institute and self-
Figure 10: The four main values themes identified in the survey 
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employed respondents offered these personal values most often as the values according 
to which they function in the workplace. 
The second most prevalent theme was those values that dictate how they perform their 
task, which was mentioned by 72% of the respondents. The most commonly shared 
value here was “objective” with 34% of the respondents, across 50% of the countries 
and 73% of the economic sectors, with comments such as “objective analysis is non-
negotiable” and “remove bias as much as possible from the end product”. The second 
most prevalent value in this theme was using discretion in dealing with clients, 
stakeholders, and sources of information. Those dealing with sensitive sources or 
projects commented: “trust - we have to keep secrets” and “I have to maintain 
confidentiality when necessary”. The values of respondents who work in security risk 
intelligence consulting companies, private security companies, and research institutes 
and think tanks were more task-oriented, especially valuing objectivity, discretion, and 
striving for excellence higher than other values. 
The third and fourth themes, namely those values that their organisation espouses 
which they agree with and those values that govern their dealings with other people, 
both represented only 10% of the respondents, but still a sufficient commonality among 
the different countries (25% and 17%) and economic sectors (33% and 27%) to confirm 
that there are shared values across the spectrum. 
4.6.7 Collective professional self-categorisation and self-identification 
Self-categorisation is regarded as the heart of collective identity and a precondition for 
other collective identity dimensions (Ashmore et al., 2004). Survey question 16 aimed 
to determine whether the respondents, individually and collectively, self-identify with 
the security risk intelligence analysis profession. The nine questions measured their 
need for professional identification and self-categorisation with the profession and their 
emotional attachment to the profession. 
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i)  Analysis of results of all respondents combined 
After the reverse coded item was rectified, the overall results for this part of the survey 
show that the majority (74%) of all the respondents self-identify with the security risk 
intelligence analysis profession with a median of 43% that strongly agree with the 
statements and 31% that agree across all nine related statements with a standard 
deviation of only 0.91 and a mean of 1.95 (Agree) (see Appendix C7.13 and Figure 11). 
When combining the “strongly agree” with the “agree” results (positive perception) and 
the “strongly disagree” with “disagree” (negative perception) with “neither agree nor 
disagree” indicating a neutral perception, the results were: 
• 85% feel that their personal goals, values and beliefs overlap with that of the 
profession; 
• 93% would regard themselves as part of the in-group by using “we” rather than 
“I” when talking about the profession; 
• 68% explicitly define themselves as a security risk intelligence analyst 
professional with 20% being neutral;  
• 74% are interested in what others think about the security risk intelligence 
analysis profession; 
• 96% of the respondents are positive to socialise with colleagues to share best 
practice; 
• 60% stated that it feels like a personal compliment when someone praises the 
profession, with 33% being neutral; 
• 73% stated that they are interested in what others think about the profession; 
• In the question, whether they would feel embarrassed when the profession is 
criticised or negatively portrayed in the media, the response was more evenly 
distributed: 33% answered positively, 35% was neutral, and 31% negative. 
• 65% stated that they would instead search for another employer than to 
change their profession, with 16% neutral and 
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• 76% agreed that it is more important for them to conduct their work 
professionally than being a member of a specific “profession”, with 11% being 
neutral. 
ii) Analysis of results per demographic variable 
The research questions required that the elements of self-categorisation in the survey 
are compared with the demographic variables by using non-parametric tests (Mann-
Whitney and Kruskal Willis tests) in SPSS to determine whether there was any significant 
statistical similarities or differences with professional identity elements across the 
genders, type of organisations, countries, and economic sectors. Overall, there was a 
similar distribution across the different demographic elements, confirming that most 
analysts share the same professional identity elements of self-categorisation (see 
Appendix C7.14). However, from this data, it can be concluded that the following 
instances had statistically significant different distributions (meaning that the 
respondents have significantly different opinions about a particular issue): 
• It is more important for males than females (U= 334, p=.013) and for managers 
(U=443, p=.031) to be professional in their work than being a member of a 
specific profession; 
Figure 11: The collective self-identification and self-categorisation with the security risk 
intelligence analysis profession 
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• Not all respondents would like to attend events where security risk intelligence 
analysis best practice is shared. People with previous government experience 
are less likely to attend than those without prior government experience 
(U=444, p=.014). Respondents in the agriculture, mining, finance, public and 
health sectors are more likely to attend these events than the other sectors. 
• People who are in management positions are more likely to feel embarrassed 
when a story in the media criticised the security risk intelligence analysis 
profession than those who are not in a management position (U=412, p=.020)  
Although the statistical difference between the type of organisations for whom the 
respondents work were negligible, it was interesting to note that there was only a .6 
difference in the mean between those who self-categorise the most with security risk 
intelligence analysis as a profession (research institutes or think tanks with a mean of 
1.61) and those who least self-categorised with the profession (those who work for 
independent regulatory bodies with a mean of 2.22). 
4.6.8 Collective self-perception of the security risk intelligence analyst profession 
i) Analysis of results of all respondents combined 
Survey question 17 measured how the participants perceive the security risk intelligence 
analyst profession. After the reverse coded item was rectified, the results show that the 
majority (75%) of all the respondents have a good perception of their profession, with a 
median of 36% that strongly agree with the statements and 39% that agree. The five 
related statements reflect a standard deviation of only 0.87 and a mean of 1.75.  When 
combining the “strongly agree” with the “agree” results (positive perception) and the 
“strongly disagree” with “disagree” (negative perception) with “neither agree nor 
disagree” indicating a neutral perception, the results (see Figure 12) were: 
• 84% think highly of the security risk intelligence analyst profession with no 
negative perception and 16% being neutral on the issue; 
• 68% consider it prestigious to belong to the profession, with 25% being neutral 
and 7% having a negative perception. The same percentage defined 
themselves as SRIA in the previous question.  
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• 74% of the respondents consider the Security Risk Intelligence Analysis
profession to be one of the best professions for people with the relevant skills
and education;
• 75% stated that they would recommend the career to someone else;76% of
the respondents were positive when asked whether they see a future for
themselves as a Security risk intelligence analyst and would like to remain in
the profession in some capacity.
ii) Analysis of results per demographic variable
The research questions required that the elements of collective self-perception in the 
survey are compared with the demographic variables by using non-parametric tests 
(Mann-Whitney and Kruskal Willis tests) in SPSS. The purpose was to determine whether 
there was any significant similarities or differences to this specific professional identity 
element across different demographic variables, including genders, type of 
organisations, countries and economic sectors.  
Overall, there was a similar distribution across the different demographic elements, 
confirming that most analysts share the same professional identity elements of self-
perception of their profession. Only one out of the five sub-elements from self-
perception had statistically significant different distributions (meaning that the 
Figure 12: The collective self-perception of the security risk intelligence analysis profession 
in % 
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respondents have significantly different opinions about a specific issue). The data (see 
Appendix C7.15) showed that the respondents do not agree that they consider the 
security risk intelligence analyst profession one of the best professions for people with 
the relevant skills (H=11.712,p=.039). Further to this, the analysis shows the following: 
• People with more years experience (21 years and more experience and those 
with less than five years experience have a less positive perception about it 
being “the best profession” than those with 6-20 years experience. The group 
that perceives the profession as one of the best are those with between 11 
and 15 years of experience.  
• There were broad differences in the economic sectors when they answered 
this question. The agriculture, mining and health sectors are much more 
favourable than those in the professional, manufacturing, wholesale/retail, 
electricity and accommodation, which are the least positive.  
• Respondents in a management position are more likely to think that security 
risk intelligence analysis is the best profession for people with a specific skill 
set than those not in a management position.  
When comparing the means of self-perception between the different type of 
organisations for whom the respondents work, there is a difference of 1 between the 
respondents who are the most favourable towards the profession (NGO’s at 1.6 mean) 
and those who are the least favourable towards the profession (those working for 
independent regulatory bodies at 2.6 mean). 
4.6.5 Collective perception of how others perceive the security risk intelligence 
analyst profession 
i)  Analysis of results of all respondents combined 
The survey results that dealt with how the participants view others' perception of their 
profession are more ambivalent than the previous two results. After the reverse coded 
item was rectified, the results show that 48% of the respondents think others have a 
relative good perception of their profession, with a median of only 10% that strongly 
agree with the statements and 38% that agree. The neither agree nor disagree median 
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is 34% which illustrates the high level to which the participants lack an opinion on how 
others perceive their profession, with 18% perceiving that others perceive their 
profession negatively. The five related statements reflect a standard deviation of only 
0.90 and a mean of 2.63. 
When combining the “strongly agree” with the “agree” results (positive perception) and 
the “strongly disagree” with “disagree” (negative perception) with “neither agree nor 
disagree” indicating a neutral perception, the results (see Figure 13) were: 
• 44% of the respondents think that others, in general, think highly of the 
Security risk intelligence analyst profession, while 41% is neutral on the issue 
and 16 are negative about the statement;  
• 47% perceive that others think it is prestigious to belong to the profession, 
with 41% being neutral and 12% perceiving that others do not think it is 
prestigious;  
• Only 21% of the respondents believe that others consider the Security Risk 
Intelligence Analysis profession to be one of the best professions, with 49% 
having no opinion and 29% perceiving it to not being considered as prestigious 
by others; 
• The highest positive perception of others is that of the participants’ 
stakeholders who are perceived to value their contribution to achieving the 
organisation’s mandate (80%), with 15% being neutral and only 5% believing 
that their stakeholders do not perceive their contribution positively.  
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• A thought-provoking result is that the participants’ management and/or 
clients are perceived to be less appreciative of the profession (51%) than the 
stakeholders (80%), as discussed above. 21% were neutral, while 28% perceive 
their management to have a good perception of the profession. 
 
ii) Analysis of results per demographic variable 
Again, the research questions required that non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney and 
Kruskal Willis tests) be used to determine to what extent there is a difference across 
demographic variables in how the respondents think others perceive their profession 
(see Appendix C7.16). In general, there is an equal distribution across the demographic 
variables except in the age groups where it was clear that age was the primary 
determinant where people had statistically significant differences about how others see 
the security risk intelligence analyst profession (H=11.580, p=.041). It seems as though 
the older respondents are, the more cynical they are about how others perceive the 
profession. Those who stated that people, in general, do not think highly of the 
profession are in the 65 and older and 45-54 age groups. In contrast, those between 18-
34 years are much more optimistic about how other people, in general, think very highly 
of the security risk intelligence analysis profession.  
Figure 13: The collective perception of others’ perception of the sria profession in % 
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4.6.6 Suggested strategies to strengthen and improve the professional identity of 
SRIA  
In an open-ended question, 61 of the respondents offered suggestions on how the 
professional identity of SRIA in the private sector could be strengthened. Again, the 
purpose of the question was to determine whether there are common outcomes across 
national and sectoral boundaries and which of these outcomes are shared by what 
percentage of respondents. This question was not mandatory.  
Table 3 reflects that a large section of the respondents (43%, representing 48% of the 
countries and 80% of the economic sectors) want to see education, training, 
development and research in the profession improved.  Most of these respondents want 
international certified or accredited training and education programs.  The second most 
common strategy offered was that there should be a concerted public relations 
campaign to reach executives, HR personnel, clients, and other stakeholders to 
articulate the task and value of security risk intelligence analysis in the private sector.   
A total of 37% of the respondents, which represent 43% of the countries and two-thirds 
of the economic sectors, feel that this type of intervention will address their previously 
stated challenge that people in and outside the organisation do not know what they are 
doing. Comments such as “getting buy-in outside the security department and getting 
power within the security department”, “helping decision-makers or clients who use 
analysis to understand more about the profession and what analysts do (and cannot 
do!)” and “it should be championed at C suite level as an enabler rather than a 
hindrance” reflected these suggestions. 
The other identified themes reflect some of the previously identified challenges, 
specifically that HR practices should be improved so that the recruitment and retention 
problems are sufficiently addressed. Most of the 18% of the respondents, who 
represented nearly half of the economic sectors, suggested that HR practices be 
improved. They feel strongly that security risk analysis should not be seen as “a second 
career for the military/law enforcement, or something that people who cannot cut it as 
operators do… as our identity will be muddied and devalued”.  
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Table 3:  
Suggested strategies to strengthen the professional identity of the security risk intelligence 
analyst profession: n=60 
Themes identified  % of 
respondents 
whose answers 
included a code 
in the theme: 
n=60 




code in the 
theme: n=21 




code in the 
theme: n=15 
Improved and targeted training, education and 
research 
43% 48% 80% 
Improved articulation of identity and contribution 
within and across organisations, professional 
bodies and society 
37% 43% 67% 
Improved HR practices 18% 19% 47% 
Enhance the role of professional bodies 10% 14% 33% 
Self-awareness and ethical behaviour 10% 29% 27% 
 
Suggestions to enhance professional bodies' role (offered by 10% of the respondents) 
included that these associations should provide certified career pathways and give 
recognition to experience and accomplishments, including success stories where 
analysts’ work led to successful convictions or threat mitigation. The theme of self-
awareness and ethical behaviour stressed the importance of analysts’ commitment to 
ensure the highest ethical behaviour standards and provide reliable and credible 
professional advice. Other terms used by the respondents included “trustful”, “taking 
ownership of their responsibilities”, and being “transparent in their analysis methods”. 
4.6.7 The required skills to ensure that security risk intelligence analysis remain 
relevant in the future 
An optional question was included in the survey, which prompted the participants to 
indicate which skills they think SRIA would need to remain relevant in the fast-changing 
private sector environment. A total of 52 respondents offered various opinions about 
the required skills in the face of the challenges they face and artificial intelligence 
developments that could replace analysts’ media monitoring functions.  The analysis of 
this specific question's results was done deductively, using the four broad future 
intelligence analysis skillsets identified by Hare and Coghill (2016) as categories or 
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themes (see Table 4). The most prevalent skill is that of “information management”, 
which the researchers define as the analysts’ ability to understand and interact with data 
tools & data analytics.  Hare and Coghill (2016) state that  
“Tomorrow’s cadre of analysts will need more explicit training or 
experience in method, reasoning, logic, and inference: a basket of skills 
that enable robust analytical structures to be spun from the tangled wool 
of messy problems and represented within the literal mind of a machine”.  
The 58% of the respondents, representing 47% of the 15 countries, but 86% of the 14 
economic sectors, agreed with this typology and stated that analysts would need to be 
skilled in: 
• Dark web exploitation 
• Data visualisation and use of infographics 
• Coding, data science, data ethics 
• Using quantum computing power and creating real-time response 
algorithms to spot vulnerabilities 
The second most prevalent required skills set is that of “collaboration”, which relates to 
a better understanding of the decision-makers requirements and collaborating with 
peers to present the required information in tight deadlines in the right format. Half of 
the participants, but most of the countries represented in the answer set, agreed that 
collaboration and the skills that make collaboration happen would be crucial for future 
analysts. The emphasis was on the analyst's responsibility to understand his context and 
reach out to other stakeholders to understand their intelligence needs.  
Statements such as “analysts need knowledge of individual private sector industries to 
understand better the threats posed to employees daily” and “to speak the business's 
language - it is the only way companies will maintain their in-house intelligence 
programs” were typical of the responses.  
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 Table 4:  
Suggested skills and attributes to strengthen the professional identity of a security risk 
intelligence analyst profession: n=52 
Themes  % of 
respondents 
whose answers 
included a code 
in the theme: 
n=52 




code in the 
theme: n=15 




code in the 
theme: n=14 
Information management skills 58% 47% 86% 
Collaborating skills 50% 67% 71% 
Attributes 15% 47% 29% 
Creative skills 10% 20% 36% 
Thinking and reasoning skills 8% 20% 21% 
This kind of immersion into the business would need “flexibility in various cultural 
environments”, the “ability to adapt to changes quickly” and “expert adaptability such 
as being able to integrate with the other departments within a given business (e.g. R&D, 
manufacturing, supply chain, commercial, finance and so forth.” One respondent 
eloquently states that “I think good analysts should broaden their experiences within 
their security shops and throughout their respective organisations.” 
The third most mentioned skill referred to attributes that respondents felt analysts 
should have and develop. The respondents offered flexibility, continuous learning, 
resiliency, adaptability, listening skills and resourcefulness.  Fourthly, “creativity” was 
stated as a required skill, with comments such as “creative thinking for how to provide 
value (we are analysts before we are security professionals, so move outside the security 
box and focus on being someone who can answer questions” and “imagination and 
innovation in analysis and delivery” were offered. Lastly, “thinking and reasoning skills” 
were suggested by some respondents, but they generalised analytical thinking skills, 
without offering detailed descriptions of what they meant by this skill.  
4.7 Discussion 
In this study, collective professional identity has been defined as both the individual’s 
sense of belonging to the professional group and the group’s shared behaviour and 
values, perception or collective action. The survey's research objective was to determine 
whether such a shared collective professional identity exists among professionals who 
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conduct security risk intelligence analysis in the private sector. This international study 
is the first to explore the collective professional identity of an emerging profession in 
the private sector that contributes to protecting companies’ employees, clients, their 
processes and products, against an array of traditional and hybrid threats.  
As with any other exploratory study, the survey results are not definitive, mainly due to 
the unknown representativeness of the respondents (Babbie, 2015). However, the 
survey results provide sufficient evidence that the respondents indeed share a collective 
professional identity even though they are from diverse national and organisational 
backgrounds.  
The demographic factors themselves provide a good indication of the potential strength 
of SRIA’ professional identity. The demographic results concur with Alvesson (2001) that 
a high level of education (the majority of respondents have Masters degrees), status 
(68% are in supervisory positions, 69% belong to professional organisations, and 31% 
mentioned that they value self-esteem and external image the profession gives them), 
agreeable salary (only five of the 75 respondents complained about their salary) and 
exciting work tasks (half of the respondents enjoy the intellectually stimulating work) 
facilitate positive identity constructions.  
A further indication that the sample size's collective professional identity is healthy is 
that the mean years of experience of the respondents are between 11 and 15 years. The 
majority have worked for the government in similar roles previously, consistent with the 
assertion (Jebril, 2008) that the professional stage exhibits the most solid phase of 
professional identity development. The study's international scope confirms Miscenko 
& Day’s (2016) assertion that the growing globalization of occupations brings about 
standard practices allowing professionals to identify with an occupation that transcends 
national borders. 
4.7.1 Sharing of individual belongingness to the profession 
Therefore, the survey's objective was, first and foremost, to determine whether the first 
element of collective identity (the individual’s sense of belonging) is present among the 
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participants. The fact that 74% of the participants self-identify as SRIA, who perceive 
themselves to be part of an emerging profession in security risk intelligence analysis on 
an international level, is a significant finding in this study. The analysis also confirmed 
that the respondents’ self-identification with the profession is not dependent on social 
interaction (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), such as belonging to a professional organisation, 
even though most of the respondents belong to such organisations. Social interaction, 
networking, and sharing best practices would only strengthen the pre-existing sense of 
belonging and need for professional self-enhancement. It is not an indicator of or a 
prerequisite for a strong professional identity.  
4.7.2 Shared professional behaviour or collective actions 
The results indicate that the participants have similar viewpoints on most of the core 
elements of their professional identity, thereby indicating a collective or shared 
professional identity. These elements include their role and function, their self-
perception, values and experiences. 
i)   A shared role and function that emulates meaningful work 
Contrary to government intelligence analysis scholars’ statements that the analysis 
function there still does not “know itself” and is not susceptible to a precise definition 
(Herbert, 2013; Kerbel, 2008), this study showed that SRIA in the private sector generally 
agree with what their role and function is.  
The vast majority of the respondents (78%) stated that their main task is to provide 
forewarning to clients by identifying and analysing threats and risks through situational 
awareness. The function of warning is the universal fundamental task for intelligence 
analysts. The “forewarning” and “foreknowledge” roles also directly relate to the 
“emergent risks” aspect of enterprise risk management. A third of the respondents also 
stated that they provide actual security risk management advice to clients indicates that 
they have started to find a niche for their skills in the corporate world.  It seems as 
though the security risk intelligence analysis profession is starting to come to its own in 
the private sector and increasingly do not need to “legitimise” themselves by 
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deliberately linking it with enterprise risk management to be seen as a credible partner 
to business success (Petersen, 2013).  
The rhetoric used by the respondents to describe their role and function also have 
implications for their collective professional identity. The use of almost mythical words 
like “forewarning”, “anticipating and mitigating risks and threats”, “forecasting”, 
“making sense of the past and the present“, and “provide insight” concurs with 
Alvesson’s research (2001, 2011) that knowledge-intensive workers (such as consultants 
or in this case intelligence analysts) use rhetoric skills or symbolism to describe their 
claimed core product (knowledge), what they are doing (working with knowledge) and 
the results of that work and its meaning to clients. This rhetoric also strengthens their 
professional identity because it is seen as the essence of their trade, resulting in a 
mutually beneficial relationship where the more they use rhetoric, the stronger their 
professional identity becomes. 
ii)  A shared positive self-perception of the profession  
The vast majority (75%) of the participants have a good perception of their profession 
and recommend the job to other people with the same interests and skills. This forms a 
good foundation for the formation and growth of the professional identity of this career 
group. Also, the participants have a similar idiosyncratic perception that they offer—
according to them—something unique that no other profession does.  Within the 
context of professional identity, it is irrelevant whether the function, role, or 
contribution to stakeholders is unique because no one else has a similar role. When 
individuals or groups construct their professional identity, they subjectively make sense 
of and articulate their perceived uniqueness or distinctiveness in their quest to find ways 
to contribute meaningfully to society (Wilkinson, Hislop, & Coupland, 2016).  
The three equally important unique contributions identified in the study put the newly 
discovered professional identity on solid ground for further research.  According to SRIA, 
their uniqueness lies in the fact that they: 
• provide insights into threats to a business, economic sector, industry or 
national security; 
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• enable more informed decision-making by stakeholders and 
• enable a safe working environment, risk reduction and loss prevention for 
companies that contribute to national economies.  
Most of the respondents stated elements of all three themes in their answers and only 
differed in the organisational contexts they placed their perceived unique contributions. 
These unique professional contributions could be the primary marketing themes to 
future clients, colleagues in related professions and other stakeholders. 
iii)  Shared values 
The shared values of integrity, honesty, and objectivity that most participants offer are 
typical of many professions and not unique to security risk intelligence analysis. If the 
survey has listed specific values and the participants ranked them, the results might have 
been clearer and more uniform. The evidence of Turner’s self-categorisation theory is 
reflected in the fact that most participants self-categorised, associated or identified with 
a group whose values and ethics, whether explicit or perceived, are similar to theirs.  The 
fact that respondents who do not work in security companies or who have to fend for 
themselves as entrepreneurs value their ethics, i.e. integrity, honesty, courage, learning 
and lawful, higher than the those working daily in a security-related environment, 
emphasises how they feel strongly about their ability to portray a particular type of 
personality and work ethic.  
In emerging professions, like security risk intelligence analysis, there is often no specific 
or codified set of rules that could serve as a Statement of Values. Only one professional 
organisation, the Association for International Risk Intelligence Professionals (AIRIP), has 
a Code of Conduct (2015) for its members explicitly focused on the function and role of 
SRIA. Their values are very similar to those in the survey: loyalty, truthfulness, lawful, 
objectivity, honesty, professionalism, and responsibility.  Statements like these official 
Codes of Conduct help define, reinforce and crystallise a shared sense of professional 
identity (O’Flaherty & Ulrich, 2016).  Although professional membership is encouraged 
and assists in forming professional identity, it must be kept in mind that one does not 
need to be a member of a professional organisation to support the values it presents. 
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The person’s self-identification and belongingness to the profession are more reliant on 
the values it represents than the membership of a professional organisation.  
iv)  Shared challenges  
In what might seem contrarian, even the challenges that the survey participants faced 
could positively impact the formation and maintenance of the career group's 
professional identity. The fact that the respondents face various challenges, of which 
the most shared challenged (which 51% of the respondents shared) is that of their 
colleagues and clients not knowing what intelligence is and can do for them, is indicative 
of an emerging profession that has not yet marketed and established itself. It is also 
consistent with the notion that experienced professionals (as is the case with the 
participants) are generally satisfied with themselves and rely less upon others to form 
their professional self-image and conduct their work (Alves & Gazzola, 2011). This self-
sufficiency and the “black box mentality” of corporate security (Crump, 2015) foster a 
secretive, ambiguous working environment in which analysts cannot convey what they 
are doing and how they are doing it. Unfortunately, this mentality and ineffective 
marketing will be the death knell for the profession in the commercial world beyond the 
security department. The public’s unfamiliarity with the profession and the value it 
brings to companies and society as a whole need to be countered by increased visibility. 
This visibility should improve the profession’s organisational environment, networks 
and ultimately, how others perceive it. 
4.7.3 Professional identity elements that are not shared 
There are two elements that the participants do no share: a similar job title and the 
benefits they derive from being in the profession. These elements are not as crucial to 
the formation and maintenance of professional identity as self-identification, self-
perception and other’s perception. The lack of a similar job title could be due to the lack 
of support and cooperation with HR has been identified as one of the significant 
organisational challenges that the respondents face. The third reason might be that due 
to the complex nature of the work done by respondents situated in different functional 
areas within the organisation, that would impact their job title.  
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This analysis confirms what Petersen (2013) calls the “hybridity” of people in corporate 
security, who are neither entirely situated in the field of security nor the field of 
business, or as the results of the survey suggest, execute different roles within corporate 
security. Unfortunately, the survey did not attempt to gather data on the other roles the 
respondents would fulfil in corporate security, which could have given the context of 
the other roles and that of a security risk intelligence analyst they fulfil.  
The complexity and variety of intelligence focus areas or topics that SRIA in the private 
sector research and advise on is congruent with Peterson’s (2013) assertion that 
corporate security has widened to include risks and threats that have been the domain 
of national security to make the “entire society” more resilient and resistant to all kinds 
of threats. It is not known whether the absence of a shared job title like “teacher”, 
“doctor”, “advocate”, and the like has an impact on the strength of the professional 
identity of SRIA. However, it is evident from previous research that similar job titles 
make it easier to self-identify or dis-identify as the name embodies the role that the 
person or group is performing and assist with external marketing (Neary, 2014). The 
fluidity and complexity of the functions that the participants fulfil might make it nearly 
impossible to standardise a job title as that would then ‘limit” the understanding of 
potential clients on what this profession can offer. Further research is necessary to 
determine whether the target group think a standardised job title could provide 
organisational and external currency, thereby strengthening their professional identity. 
The analysis that the respondents do not share common benefits that they derive from 
being in the security risk intelligence analysis profession is understandable and does not 
impact on the main finding that they have a shared professional identity. Each 
participant has their circumstances and motivations for becoming and remaining in the 
profession. The only benefit mentioned by the majority (51%) participants is the 
intellectually stimulating nature of the work. This finding can prove useful for 
recruitment and retention purposes as people who are naturally inclined to be 
inquisitive, love reading, writing, learning and passionate to “be-in-the-know” might 
have a better chance of job satisfaction. The idiosyncratic nature of job satisfaction and 
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how it impacts professional identity will be addressed in Study 2 during the interviews 
of the ten individual SRIA.  
4.8  Limitations 
The exploratory research of the perceptions of the target group, whose existence and 
extent was unknown, is always problematic as it clouds the research's validity. 
Therefore, the main limitation of the study was the fact that the sample may not be 
representative.  Also, the subjective nature of self-perception could be time and context-
based, thereby increasing the research topic's ambiguity further. One could take the 
approach that the survey merely reflected a “snapshot” of the conscious process of self-
categorisation and the respondents' self-identity at that specific time. In that case, the 
value of the research becomes more visible.  
Another limitation of the data analysis was that the researcher had to caution against 
the temptation to compare countries due to the data's heterogeneity. Often, the 
researcher was tempted to compare a single respondent's data from country X to the 
33 from country Y but refrained because the outcome would not be valid as it was not 
known whether the respondent pool is a typical representation of the target population 
in those countries. The researcher aimed to interpret different combinations of 
demographic variables to understand the nuances of the participants’ collective 
professional identity. However, as it would not withstand the representativity test, 
cursory remarks were made to indicate possible interesting hypotheses that could be 
tested in further research.  
4.9 Conclusion  
The quantitative study's objective has been met in as far it has empirically proved that 
75 professionals from 27 countries self-identify as SRIA and have a shared collective 
professional identity. Despite being a new or emergent profession, most participants 
exhibited that they individually have a sense of belonging to the professional group and 
that the whole group shared a common understanding of their role and function, their 
self-perception about the profession, as well as their values and experiences.   
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They perceive their professional role as meaningful when they provide critical 
forewarning and situational awareness about the company's threats and risks. They see 
themselves as a valuable partner in protecting the private sector’s interests, including 
their employees, clients, processes and products or services. Their main shared 
frustration or professional challenge is that people in their own organisation, and 
sometimes clients, do not understand their function and what value they bring to the 
management of a company’s operational risk.  
However, their collective professional identity is vulnerable because they do not share 
a common job title and that outsiders do not perceive them favourable enough to be 
considered critical to business’ success. These challenges could be overcome by 
measured marketing and influencing efforts to the different stakeholders. These should 
include human resources personnel, universities and the broader security and corporate 
risk community through awareness efforts that should highlight the function, value and 
skills that the profession offer in a world that has become increasingly dangerous for the 
private sector to operate in. 
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Chapter 5 
Study 2: An interpretative phenomenological analysis of the lived 
professional experience of SRIA in the private sector 
5.1 Introduction 
 Where the survey aimed to determine the collective professional identity of SRIA in the 
private sector, the qualitative part of the mixed methods research design aimed to 
answer the second research question, namely, what is the individual SRIA’s professional 
identity?  The way in which the study attempted to answer the research question was 
to focus on their lived experience by giving them a voice to share their search for 
professional meaningfulness and their sense-making in the face of professional 
challenges and opportunities. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was 
deemed to be the most appropriate qualitative research method to explore the study’s 
third research objective of understanding how individual SRIA in the private sector 
experience their profession in an individual or idiographic manner.  
The main objective of IPA is to understand what personal and social experiences mean 
to the people who experience them and then analyse how participants make sense of 
and give meaning to their lived experience (Smith et al., 2009). This chapter will detail 
the IPA research methodology, the process that was followed in the analysis of the 
interviews with the participants, present the findings and discuss the results relating to 
literature, deal with the study’s shortcomings and touch on possible avenues for further 
research. 
5.2 Research method 
5.2.1 The interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) approach 
IPA is a relatively new research methodology introduced by Jonathan Smith in the 1990s 
in the UK’s psychology field as part of the family of phenomenological approaches to the 
psychology of experience in health, clinical and counselling psychology (Eatough & 
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Smith, 2017). IPA has two primary aims: to look in detail at how someone makes sense 
of life experience and to give a detailed interpretation of the account to understand the 
experience (Tuffour, 2017).  
IPA is a useful method in social science where researchers give voice to the participants' 
experiences, followed by sufficient and credible interpretation of their narratives. The 
IPA methodology has been applied in various disciplines other than the original 
psychology. With specific reference to the study of professional identity in different 
professional contexts, IPA has been used in education (e.g. Wood, Goodall, & Farmer, 
2016), organisational studies (e.g. Gill, 2015), health studies (e.g. Sylvia, 2018),  
occupational therapy (e.g. Warren, 2014),  psychology or counselling (e.g. Idowu, 2017; 
Verling, 2014) and even working environments like the Army (Dynes, 2014; Topp, 2015), 
security industry contractors in Iraq (Messenger, Farquharson, Stallworthy, Cawkill, & 
Greenberg, 2012) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in the US 
(Becker, 2020). The IPA methodology has not yet been used in security risk management 
or intelligence disciplines, which adds to the current study's value to understand the 
personal experiences of professionals in the private sector.  
5.2.2 Rationale for using IPA as a preferred qualitative research method 
The main reasons why IPA has been chosen as the preferred qualitative research 
methodology were fourfold. Firstly, IPA has been found useful by other researchers 
when exploring a new phenomenon in which people whose lived experiences have not 
yet been investigated, as is the case with this study. This exploratory approach provides 
useful cues for understanding the phenomena and give direction for further research. 
Secondly, as seen from the studies above, IPA has been proven to be a suitable approach 
for investigating individual identity construction and their lived experience after Smith 
pointed researchers to this possibility (2009). Thirdly, IPA offered an accessible, 
systematic methodology for the researcher (who has a little psychological background) 
as it provides the theoretical framework (phenomenology), the types of questions to 
ask, the sampling strategy (a small, homogenous number of participants), the data 
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collection method (semi- or unstructured interviews) as well as the analytical 
procedures to be followed.  
Lastly, IPA embraces the insider perspective by accommodating the researcher’s own 
experience as a security risk intelligence analyst in the private and government sector. 
Alase (2017) states that for the participants' lived experience to make sense 
interpretively, the interpreter must have a “true and deeper understanding” of those 
lived experience by putting oneself in the shoes of the participants. IPA literature 
provides practical guidance on managing one’s own biases and preconceptions in the 
interpretation process, mostly by using a reflexive journal and applying various 
interpretation strategies. The researcher will comment on the reflexive journey 
throughout the study later in this chapter. 
5.2.3 IPA theoretical foundations 
IPA relies on three fundamental theoretical underpinnings to examine the way people 
make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenology, hermeneutics and 
ideography. The following discussion is not exhaustive and only touches on the most 
relevant constructs as it applies to IPA.  
i)   Phenomenology 
Phenomenology (Greek: to show itself or bring to light) is a well-known philosophical 
approach to studying human experience in all of its aspects, but specifically to those 
things that make up our lived world and the meaning we give to it. IPA does not prefer 
a specific school of thought in phenomenology but sees the different emphases of 
Husserl, Heidegger, Melreau-Ponty and Sartre as complementary to create a “mature, 
multi-faceted and holistic phenomenology” (Smith et al., 2009). 
Adopting Husserl’s “phenomenological attitude”, which involves one’s conscious focus 
or reflection on the thoughts, values, goals or means involved in a specific experience, 
IPA established itself as a systematic approach that reflects on the actual activity as well 
as the mental and affective responses to that activity. Furthermore, IPA concurs with 
the critical importance of the interpretation of people’s meaning-making in 
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phenomenology by adopting Heidegger’s construct of “Dasein” or “there-being” in 
which he explains that a person is always in a world of objects, relationships and 
language and that this being-in is always relying on perspective, is temporal and in 
relation to something else, therefor must be interpreted as such. Smith et al. also 
support Merleau-Ponty’s view that the self’s embodiment subjectively shapes one’s 
experience, while Sartre’s layered analysis of experience is contextualised in the 
presence and absence of relationships with other people resonates in IPA’s purposeful 
layered interpretative analytical process. In summary, Smith et al. (2009, p.27) state that  
“… through the work of all of these writers, we have come to see that the 
complex understanding of ‘experience’ invokes a lived process, an 
unfurling of perspectives and meanings, which are unique to the person’s 
embodied and situated relationship to the world.”  
ii)   Hermeneutics 
IPA is also interpretative, meaning that it goes beyond the descriptive to explain and 
interpret individuals' lived experiences. Interpretative phenomenology is based on 
hermeneutics, which is the theory of interpretation or meaning that can be traced to 
Greek philosophy and later biblical exegesis. It aims to understand the methods and 
purposes of the interpretation process, including whether it is possible to uncover the 
intentions of an author or speaker and the relation between the context of the author 
and the interpreter (Tomkins & Eatough, 2018).  
Following Schleiermacher, IPA posits that the interpreter can, through a range of skills 
and intuition, conduct a detailed, comprehensive, holistic analysis that can understand 
the participant better than he understands himself, or at least the explicit claims of the 
participant (Smith et al., 2009). IPA can offer a perspective that the participant alone 
cannot. The IPA researcher’s added value is the systemic and detailed analysis of a text, 
brought about by having oversight from a more extensive data set and access to other 
theories.  
The hermeneutic circle is used to depict the dynamic relationship between the part and 
the whole on a series of levels in which one needs to look at the whole to understand 
one part, while you need to look at the parts to understand the whole. This dynamic and 
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active interpreting role of the researcher gave rise to IPA’s double hermeneutic circle or 
dual interpretation process in which the researcher not only sees experience at face 
value but also as a whole while making sense (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2014). In this process 
(see Figure 14 below), the research participant makes sense of his own experience 
(sense-making), while the researcher makes sense of the participant’s sense-making and 
gives it meaning (meaning-making). In this iterative and inductive interpretative analysis 
process, the researcher employs various interpretation strategies (the outer layer of the 
double hermeneutic circle) to assist in her meaning-making and ensure multi-layered 
and rich interpretation. These interpretation strategies give the researcher entry to the 
meaning-making process while providing different perspectives on the text's part-whole 
coherence (Smith et al., 2009).   
As IPA’s main objective is to understand what an experience is like from the participant’s 
perspective by putting oneself in the shoes of the participant, the primary interpretation 
strategy follows Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of empathy which aims to produce a rich 
experiential understanding of the phenomenon and remain close to the participants’ 
sensemaking (Eatough & Smith, 2017). Most of the IPA literature employs the 
Figure 14: The double hermeneutic circle with interpretation 
strategies for the researcher 
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  103 April  2021 
empathetic interpretation strategy to enter the sensemaking process by focusing on 
their experiences (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006) as well as interpreting the language 
used like metaphors, symbols and temporal construction of the experience, including 
the use of present tense vs past tense (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2014).  
However, the researcher also needed to put aside what she believed at face value and 
looked for a deeper meaning that the participants might be unwilling or unable to do 
themselves by asking critical questions about intentions, subtle meanings, undisclosed 
feelings or agendas, and nuances in the participant’s sense-making, after Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of suspicion (Shinebourne, 2011). IPA does not take this critical approach 
to include psychoanalysis or psychological theory, as Smith et al. (2009) deemed this as 
“reading something into the text” that the participant did not offer. The researcher had 
to be sensitive to guard against superimposing her own experience or theories on the 
participant’s text and sensemaking by frequently verifying her interpretation against the 
entire text and the iterative process of analysis—the typical hermeneutic circle. When 
one wants to bring theory to assist in the analysis, it must be clear that this is the 
researcher’s subjective interpretation and not the participant's text. Therefore, the 
researcher was acutely aware that there are different interpretation possibilities and 
that her interpretation was merely a subjective analysis or a snapshot of her 
interpretation in a specific time and place and that another researcher might interpret 
the participant’s experience differently.   
iii)   Ideographic 
IPA is “committed to the detailed examination of the particular case… and wants to 
know in detail what the experience for this person is like, what sense this particular 
person is making of what is happening to them (Smith et al., 2009). The ideographic 
philosophical foundation of IPA has two dimensions: firstly, its commitment to the 
particular detail and the depth of analysis and secondly, its commitment to 
understanding how specific phenomena have been understood from the perspective of 
particular people in a particular context. This idiographic focus on the individual 
experience makes IPA useful to explore the complexities, richness and thickness of an 
unresearched topic such as the professional identity of SRIA in the private sector.  
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Therefore, the sample size is relatively small and reasonable homogenous so that 
convergent themes, as well as divergent experiences, could be found amidst the 
individual participants. 
5.2.4 The IPA Process 
Smith et al. (2009) propose a six-step process that provides guidelines for the novice 
researcher to conduct an IPA study. These guidelines make the analysis process more 
manageable, although the researcher needs to understand that it is iterative and 
dynamic and not necessarily linear. In this vein, the researcher customised the IPA 
process (Figure 15) for this study as a two-phased, seven-step process based on or built 
on the three theoretical foundations of IPA discussed above.  
In the first phase, consisting of 5 steps, the researcher started with Step 1, in which the 
transcript and recording were read and re-read to obtain an overall perspective of the 
interview. In Step 2, the researcher did some initial noting to produce a comprehensive 
and detailed set of notes and descriptive, linguistic and conceptual comments on the 
data. In Step 3, the researcher developed emergent themes by applying the 
hermeneutic circle to determine what might be a crucial reflection of the participant’s 
sense-making and the researcher’s understanding. In Step 4, the researcher searched 
for connections across the emergent themes to produce a structure of the participant's 
account's most important and interesting aspects. In Step 5, the researcher moved to 
the next participant’s interview, deliberately bracketing the previous case and treating 
the new participant on their terms. These five steps are then repeated for each 
participant. 
After all the separate cases have been analysed, the researcher moved into the second 
phase in Step 6, where she looked for patterns across all the cases, recurring or 
convergent themes, contrasting or divergent themes. Finally, in Step 7 (which the 
researcher has added to Smith et al.’s six-step process as they do not acknowledge this 
as a further step), the findings were interpreted across the cases and written up.  The 
researcher had to apply double hermeneutics in five of the seven steps, thereby 
ensuring that the interpretation was rich and reflected the researcher's various levels of 
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analysis in the sensemaking and meaning-making process. The detailed description of 
the process followed in the study is discussed in the data management and analysis 
process description.  
5.3 Ethical considerations 
The Ethics Committee of the University of Portsmouth approved the interview schedule, 
information sheets and consent forms, and the data processing and retention processes 
(see Appendix D1). There were four risks identified that needed to be addressed in the 
study. Firstly, the confidentiality of the identity of the participants could be breached. 
To minimise this risk, all identifying information like the interviewees' names and their 
employers were removed to ensure anonymity. All transcripts were shared with the 
interviewees to ensure that the transcript was a true reflection of the interview and that 
any identifiers have been removed. Only one interviewee had to have the transcription 
of his interview approved by his employer. Secondly, the confidentiality of the 
information had to be guaranteed by using a password-protected computer that is only 
Figure 15: The 7-Step Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis process with its 
three theoretical foundations followed in this study (based on Smith et al 2006)  
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accessible to the researcher and storing the data on this protected computer and a 
secure devoted server administered by the University of Portsmouth.  
The third risk was that the participants’ emotional and psychological wellbeing could be 
affected by sharing experiences in the interview. Participants were informed that they 
had a right not to answer a question if they feel uncomfortable with it and that they can 
withdraw from the study at any time. None of the interviewees withdrew during or after 
the interviews. The researcher found that most of the participants enjoyed talking about 
their personal, professional experiences, many of them for the first time. Two 
participants remarked that the interview allowed them to reflect and gain perspective 
on many aspects of their work-life that they never considered before. 
The qualitative study's primary ethical consideration was the possible impact of the 
researcher’s personal experience to define her professional identity when she moved to 
the private sector as an intelligence analyst. Although this is ideal for an IPA research 
study as it provides valuable insider insight, it is necessary to manage possible ethical 
challenges. The researcher could not allow her knowledge, experience, and 
preconceptions to influence the interpretation and analysis of the interviews and the 
data and the familiarity with terminology that might have influenced the conduct and 
analysis.  The chances that both the participants and the researcher made assumptions 
that could have led to misunderstandings and misinterpretations of experiences could 
also not be excluded. The researcher was aware that her professional relationship with 
four of the ten interviewees could have influenced the interview dynamics. It was, 
however, found that the familiarity resulted in more personal reflection and overt 
sensemaking that was not necessarily found with the other interviewees.  
In her effort to be an ethical and moral responsible researcher (Johnsson, Eriksson, 
Helgesson, & Hansson, 2014), the researcher acknowledged that she could manipulate 
or direct interviews and interpret participants’ experience. She realised that she had a 
responsibility towards science, the university and the participants to manage this 
“power” effectively by maintaining a reflexive or self-aware attitude throughout the 
study. A reflexive journal (see Appendix D2) assisted the researcher to document her 
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thoughts throughout the study. Interaction with her supervisors and other researchers 
also helped the researcher remain conscious of ethical conflicts in data interpretation.  
5.4 Research procedure 
5.4.1 Interview schedule design 
IPA studies are inductive and focus on the ideographic experiences of a small target 
group. This study’s questions aimed to obtain rich and detailed descriptions of how 
individuals experience and make sense of their professional identity in their professional 
lives. The qualitative study's main research question is, “how do SRIA in the private 
sector experience their profession, and how does this impact their identity?” Interview 
questions were formulated to reflect the study’s research questions (see Appendix D3). 
Questions focused on people’s experiences, perceptions and views on the phenomenon 
of professional identity (Smith et al., 2009) and included the following: 
• What does being a security risk intelligence analyst mean to you personally? 
What makes this career different from any other career? 
• In your experience, what are the biggest challenges you experience/d as a 
Security Risk Intelligence Analyst? How did you overcome/are you overcoming 
these challenges? 
• Did you ever feel you had a professional identity crisis as a security risk 
intelligence analyst? What happened, and how did you deal with the 
experience? 
• In your experience, how do other people perceive you as a Security Risk 
Intelligence Analyst? How do you feel about that? 
The interview schedule started with demographic details to set the stage for the 
interview, give context in terms of the participant’s professional experience, and lead 
the discussion into more intimate details about their lives. The questions also had 
prompts should the interviewees struggle to verbalise or share their experience upfront. 
The questions were sufficient to determine whether the interviewees perceive 
themselves to make a unique contribution to the organisations they work for and the 
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broader society (meaning-making of their professional purpose) and how they make 
sense of challenges and opportunities in their professional lives (sense-making). 
5.4.2 Recruitment  
The sampling strategy for the semi-structured interviews was purposive as participants 
emanated from the survey and self-identified as SRIA. The survey ended with an optional 
email link to the researcher if participants were willing to be interviewed in the second 
study.  The ten participants were provided with consent forms for the interviews (see 
Appendix D4). Four participants were from the US, two from South Africa, one from 
Canada, the UK, Germany and a South African working in the US).  
This homogeneous group (concerning their profession) conform to IPA requirements of 
selecting a defined group for whom the research problem has relevance and personal 
significance (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). The only criteria for the interviewees were that 
they should have had at least three years of practical experience in the private sector to 
exclude newcomers who might not be able to relate to the research objectives. They 
had sufficient experience to generate an in-depth exploration of the lived experience of 
their professional identities as security risk intelligence analyst in the private sector.   
5.4.3 Data collection  
The semi-structured interviews were conducted using the Skype and BlueJeans internet 
communication applications preferred by the participants, or in-person in February and 
April 2019 and March 2020.  The last two interviews took place a year later than the 
others in consultation with the researcher’s supervisor to extend the participant pool 
and geographical representation. Before the interviews commenced, the interviewees 
were reminded of the study's purpose, their anonymity, the confidentiality of the 
information they shared, and the right to withdraw, as reflected in the consent forms 
they signed. They agreed that the interviews can be recorded for transcription purposes 
and reiterated their willingness to participate in the study.  
The interviews ranged from 35 to 107 minutes in duration. The researcher transcribed a 
total of 695 minutes with NVivo12 Transcription in February and March 2020. The 
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transcriptions amounted to 112 A4 MSWord pages with a 53,387-word count. The 
interviews (see Annexure D5) could roughly be divided into three major parts: the 
demographic narrative of who they are and what their work entails, their narrative 
about their lived, personal experience in the profession, and thirdly a segment on what 
they think can be done to strengthen the profession. The interviews and transcripts 
were stored according to the agreed data storage prescriptions of the University of 
Portsmouth on a password-protected computer of the researcher and the University’s 
cloud server.  
5.4.4 Data management and analysis 
The researcher used an amended template for the transcript analysis proposed by Smith 
et al. (2009) by designing an MS Excel workbook in landscape format and dividing the 
page into five columns.  MS Excel was more comfortable to use as a line-by-line analysis 
of the data facilitated the sorting and filtering of data and easier identification of themes 
and sub-themes. Columns could be hidden and unhidden, themes filtered and grouped 
and searched more effectively for the “gems” as insights deepened, and the process 
became more streamlined and effective. 
The IPA method of data analysis discussed above was useful and helped the researcher 
maintain focus throughout the analysis process. The two main research questions were 
used as parameters and compass for the analysis and interpretation of the data. It 
proved easy to go astray with an interesting diversion that does not directly relate to 
the study. Each interview was analysed separately on a case-by-case basis on separate 
spreadsheets.  
The far left column A was used to number the transcript lines (i.e. E23 for line 23 of 
Emma’s interview), the column B for those parts of the transcript that were relevant for 
the analysis (pure biographical elements were removed in the sheet as it is reflected in 
the interviewee details hereunder), the third column C was used for Step 2 of the 
process - the initial notes and comments on the descriptive, linguistic and conceptual 
elements of the transcripts after each was read, and re-read at least four times (in 
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different colours).  Interesting or useful sections or “gems” that could be used in the 
write-up of the analysis were identified and bolded in the text in Column B. 
In Step 3 of the process, the transcript column was hidden. The comments in column C 
were analysed and abstracted as a further interpretative process by identifying and 
developing emerging themes and then put in column D.  In step 4 of the process; these 
emergent themes were then filtered, similar themes grouped and further abstracted, 
some themes subsumed under more robust themes, others elevated in importance and 
others contextualised in Column E as “cluster” themes.   
However, as the researcher analysed the next transcript, it became clear that most of 
the “cluster” themes in Column E might be similar. An alternative strategy, proposed by 
Willig (2013), was then followed whereby the original list of final themes for the first 
interview was used to code the other interviews, adding or elaborating on the themes 
as the process evolved. A separate Excel workbook was created for sheets for each of 
the identified superordinate themes, in which the matching subthemes were listed with 
the line number of the relevant subtheme, with the researcher comments and parts of 
the transcript for context, sometimes “gems” that could be used in the write-up of the 
analysis. In this strategy, it was prudent that the researcher followed the hermeneutic 
process. As her insight into themes grew, she went back to earlier transcripts to see 
whether a newly identified theme appeared in previous transcripts that she might have 
missed (Figure 16).  
 
In Phase 2 of the IPA process (Figure 17), step 6 required that the researcher seek 
relationships between the different themes by identifying convergent and divergent 
Figure 16: Screenshot of the IPA Excel sheet used for analysing Emma’s transcript, with the 
cluster theme column filtered to reflect the provisional cluster theme of “Confidence in 
cognitive abilities, skills and ability to stretch and grow”. 
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patterns in the themes and cluster them accordingly.  When themes did not fit well with 
the emerging structure of themes, they were subsumed in other themes if they 
supported or strengthened that theme, or else were discarded if they did not fit well 
with the emerging paired themes and their arguments or basis was weak (Pietkiewicz & 
Smith, 2014).  In the end, this resulted in an extensive list of subthemes under each 
superordinate theme, which then again went through the process of interpretation, 
abstraction and merging so that between three and five final subthemes under each 
superordinate theme were identified.  
In step 7, the themes were analysed and explained with extracts or vignettes from the 
participants in this chapter's Results section. This step aims to detail the researcher’s 
interpretations while retaining the emic voice of the participants’ experience. Lastly, the 
researcher related the identified themes and the interpretations of existing literature in 
the Discussion section of the chapter and discussed the implications of the study, its 
limitations and possible future applications.  
 
 
5.4.5 Interviewee details 
The ten participants’ demographic details and their working contexts were analysed as 
a precursor for analysing the interviews (see Table 5). The interviewees' average age is 
45 years, with an average of 7.3 years of experience in the private sector. Eight of the 
ten interviewees were previously employed in the government sector in similar roles 
where they functioned as intelligence analysts. These eight participants worked an 
average of 12 years in the government before moving to the private sector.  Only two 
Figure 17: Screenshot of the final spreadsheet for the superordinate theme Purposeful 
Professional Self with the identified subordinate theme of Multi-faceted Professional Self-
concept, with the identifier point “Traits”, the researcher’s comments and the transcript lines. 
The different columns could be easily filtered for analysis. 
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participants work for employers whose primary business is to deliver research or 
consulting services in security risk. The other eight participants work in security 
departments for organisations that provide services and products ranging from 
pharmaceuticals, beverages, telecoms, university and commercial banks and financial 
regulators. Half of the interviewees (5) work in small teams of between two and five, 
while the other five execute their function as the only person responsible for that role 
in the organisation. Four have Bachelor’s degrees, two have Honours degrees, and the 
remaining four have Masters degrees, all in the Social Sciences. 
Andy (A) 
Andy is a 38-year-old male senior security analyst working at a pharmaceutical company 
in the US.  He served as an intelligence analyst in the military for ten years and has 
worked in the private sector in the same capacity for the last six years. He is responsible 
for a wide range of functions, including investigation support, insider threats, physical 
security threat assessments, supply chain risk intelligence, and political and geostrategic 
risk assessments. He works in a small team that contracts in security risk consultancy 
firms to provide general assessments that the team then customises for internal 
consumption. He is a member of the Association for International Risk Intelligence 
Professionals (AIRIP). 
Ben (B) 
Ben is a 54-year-old male cybersecurity intelligence analyst and manager at a major 
research university in the US. He is responsible for analysing the threats to the 
university’s IT system. Ben is the manager for cybersecurity and does the occasional 
cyber forensic investigation as well. He has fulfilled this specific role for the last nine 
years. Ben was a management consultant before this position and is a member of 
various professional organisations in the IT Security, cyber and intelligence domains. He 
is currently busy with a Masters in Intelligence Studies. 
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Table 5:  
Information on the participants of Study 2 
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Gender M M F M F M F F F M 
Nationality US US US DE ZA UK US ZA ZA CA 
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in private 
sector 
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107 79 64 48 43 79 76 20 47 102 
*The names have been changed to ensure confidentiality 
Celia (C) 
Celia is a 64-year-old female former analyst and manager in the US's intelligence 
community with 30 years of experience. She has been in the private sector for the last 
ten years. She worked in a management consulting firm before moving to a bespoke 
security risk analysis firm that provides advice to Fortune 500 companies. She does not 
belong to any professional organisations but is active in the profession and is often 
invited to speak at conferences. She serves on a few boards of organisations that 
promote national security, social sciences and intelligence analysis and mentor younger 
women in the intelligence community. 
Dave (D) 
Dave is a security risk analyst at a major European financial regulatory institution in 
Germany. He has an engineering degree and did electronic engineering and security 
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installations before moving to his current employer, where he has been for the last 20 
years. Dave was one of the first people recruited to start a security risk management 
unit. He has a wide variety of skills and experience due to this, including doing threat 
assessments for VIP protection, ensuring secure building designs, and monitoring major 
political events and socio-economic trends. His current role is to understand and 
communicate the threat to the organisation in a multi-dimensional manner as the start 
of the security risk management function and any other role the organisation might 
assign to him. He does not belong to any professional organisation as he does not see 
the need “to sell himself”. 
Emma (E) 
Emma is a 47-year-old female who has worked at one of South Africa’s major 
commercial banks for the last three years as a crime analyst on serious and violent crime 
against the bank, i.e. armed robbery, cash in transit (CIT) attacks, ATM bombings and 
other physical threats against employees and clients. She has a post-graduate degree in 
criminology and worked as a lecturer at a local university and a financial crime analyst 
in the regulatory sector before moving to her current position. She is a member of the 
Association for Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) and wants to become a certified fraud 
examiner in the absence of similar certification in intelligence or crime analysis and 
improve her employment opportunities. 
Josh (J) 
Josh is a 30-year-old male security risk analyst in the telecoms industry in the UK. He has 
degrees in international politics and a master’s degree in philosophy and served in law 
enforcement as an analyst dealing with terrorism and serious economic crime for five 
years. Three years ago, he moved to the financial sector, where he was an intelligence 
analyst dealing with threat assessment to the sector. He moved to his current position, 
where he provides cyber threat analysis a year ago. He is not a member of a professional 
organisation. 
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Kate (K) 
Kate is a 34-year-old female analyst at a major beverage company in the US.  She has a 
bachelor’s degree in history and Russian and served in the US intelligence community 
for 12 years. She has been a senior risk intelligence analyst with her current employer 
for three years. Her team of five analysts was responsible for a wide range of security 
risk and opportunity assessments in countries where the company has business 
interests. They focus more on broader strategic and geopolitical risks and opportunities 
than tactical physical security threats. Their clients within the company include Supply 
chain management, Operations, finance, and Human Resources, all of which need 
information and advice on anything from modern slavery, geo-political events, currency 
and commodity futures, social impact, and corporate responsibility issues. Kate is a 
member of the Association for International Risk Intelligence Professionals (AIRIP). 
Lynn (L) 
Lynn is a 54 year old South African working in the US at an NGO/think tank that provides 
analysis and advice to various companies and other NGO’s regarding security, risk and 
governance issues. She has a master’s degree, previously worked in the South African 
Defence Force as an analyst and has worked for the last nine years in the private sector 
analysing threats in the maritime environment. She does field research, runs a database 
on her desk and produces various analytical reports on maritime crime. She is not a 
member of a professional organisation.  
Tina (T) 
Tina is a 38-year-old South African security risk analyst in the financial regulatory sector. 
She has a Master’s degree in Applied Intelligence from a US university. She was 
previously a researcher in the energy sector, where she mainly researched Africa's 
energy market. She worked as an intelligence analyst in her current employer's security 
management department for three years before becoming the unit manager when the 
post became vacant. She has a team of 4 analysts that provides analytical products and 
services to various internal stakeholders, including the physical security team, the VIP 
protectors, the supply chain management department, and departments requesting due 
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diligence investigations into people and companies. She was a member of the 
Association for International Risk Intelligence Professionals (AIRIP) but cancelled her 
membership as the distance meant that she could not attend any meetings or events. 
Vic (V) 
Vic is a 37-year-old male working in the Canadian financial regulatory sector as a senior 
intelligence officer. He has a post-graduate degree in political science and international 
relations. Vic has 13 years of experience in intelligence analysis, seven in the Canadian 
armed forces and law enforcement and six years in the private sector.  In his current 
position, he is responsible for a wide range of functions, of which threat intelligence is 
just one. He also executes the entire security risk management function, including 
building vulnerability and risk assessments and security countermeasure 
implementation. He is a member of three professional organisations as he values 
learning opportunities and networking. 
 5.5 Results 
The following section will detail the findings of the IPA process of the lived experiences 
of the ten participants of being a Security Risk Intelligence Analyst in the private sector. 
As seen from the demographic analysis, the participants all have a unique background 
and are from different countries.  
The researcher was doubtful whether there would be sufficient shared perspectives and 
experiences among the participants' different experiences and professional journeys but 
was pleasantly surprised at the findings. The analysis process discussed resulted in three 
superordinate themes that emerged from the transcripts:  
1. Purposeful Professional Self 
2. Connectedness to Professional Others 
3. Enacting Professional Identity in the Workplace 
Figure 18 provides an overview of the identified superordinate and subordinate themes. 
Each of the themes will be discussed narratively by illustrating the themes shared across 
the data with quotes from participants divulging their unique perspectives. 
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5.5.1 Superordinate theme 1: Purposeful Professional Self 
The superordinate theme Purposeful Professional Self refers to the participants’ self-
perception of their profession and their lived experience of their journey to meaningful 
work as a security risk intelligence analyst in the private sector.  This theme focus on the 
intimate, personal and reflective experiences of their professional life that the 
participants shared during the interviews. All the participants indicated that they have 
never had the opportunity to think about how they feel about their profession and what 
they bring to the table that is truly unique and contributes to the organisation and the 
wider society’s well-being. The three subthemes are depicted in Figure 19. 
The first subordinate theme is Shared Ideology of Occupation, which refers to the shared 
understanding of the meaning and purpose of the occupation and their experience on 
the significance of job titles and values for executing the SRIA role; the second is  Multi-
faceted Professional Self-concept, which reflects the foundation of their professional 
identity, which is constituted by their 1) skills and knowledge they use in the execution 
of the SRIA role, 2) their characteristics or traits that they use that lead to their perceived 
success within the role and 3) the feelings that doing their job elicits (valence). The third 
Figure 18: Identified superordinate and subordinate themes 
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subtheme, Dealing with Professional Identity Tension on a Personal Level, refers to the 
identity work they perform when they experience events or stressors inconsistent with 
their values or their expectations of the role to stabilise their professional identity. 
 
Superordinate theme 1: Purposeful Professional Self 
Subordinate theme Key concepts and issues 
1.1  Shared ideology of 
occupation 
1.1 (a)  Role and function 
1.1 (b) An analyst by any other name… 
1.1 (c)  Values guiding professional conduct: Integrity, 
Objectivity 
1.2  Multi-faceted 
professional self-concept 
 
1.2 (a) Pride in unique blend of skills and knowledge: 
Thinking skills, communication skills, same fundamental 
skills in a new context 
1.2 (b) Personal attributes and attitudes: Growth 
mindset with willingness and ability to adapt and learn; 
Tenacity, perseverance and patience 
1.2 (c) Valence: positive feelings, negative feelings 
1.3:  Using professional 
identity tensions to grow 
1.3 (a) Impression management to counter negative 
perception of the security function 
1.3 (b) Job crafting and innovation 
Figure 19: Superordinate theme 1: Purposeful professional self 
 
Subordinate theme 1.1:  Shared Ideology of occupation 
In this study, occupation ideology refers to the meaning that the participants give to 
their work—that set of beliefs on how and why they do their jobs. As an emerging 
profession, security risk intelligence analysis does not have a generally accepted job 
description, job titles and set qualification and experience requirements. Therefore, the 
research needed to focus on what they perceive their role and function to be, their 
current job titles, what they would prefer it to be, and whether there are any codes of 
conduct or personal values that serve as a compass for their professional behaviour.  
Subordinate theme 1.1(a):  Role and function as SRIA in the Private Sector 
All the participants exhibited a service-oriented attitude towards their work. They 
understand their main role and function is to provide a support service to their 
organisations or clients to enable them to protect assets and people by providing expert 
advice on threats and risk:  
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My job is to contribute to my organisation understanding threats, 
identifying the bad guys and maybe trying to figure out a strategy on how 
to at least try to prevent them from harming us… (V35) 
Protecting the company’s assets – that’s the most critical part. Not only 
that, because you're not only looking to defend assets, but also its 
employees. I would say we are protecting everything: the company’s 
assets, its employees and the clients. (E67) 
I see myself as a supporting function in making this organization more 
secure. And with that, I'm in the front line with regard to the domain that 
I have been entrusted with. I mean, we are corporate services. We are 
already in the machinery room of the company. (D74) 
There's always a crisis… there's always an incident…This is not a job you 
do, and then maintain the status quo for the rest of your life. It is always 
fluid. You're usually in the front line if something comes up.  You have 
those antennas, and they sense first, and then you carry them in the 
organization. And then that keeps the organization busy for a while. (D72) 
When people ask me what I do, I start with “I do research and analysis” 
because that's what I do: “in-depth research analysis on security related 
topics with a focus on anything that involves crime impacting the 
company”.  It's really where our bread and butter is, criminal impact on 
the company and that's what it is… research analysis on that… (A34) 
Security isn’t the bread and butter of most organizations, and with that 
comes a lack of awareness and a lack of understanding and sometimes 
naiveté. And I see my role and responsibility as providing to the 
organization an understanding of the changing and evolving nature of 
threats and what could cause them harm so that they are able to update 
their network defences or their security posture so that their stay current 
with what is out there. (J3) The purpose is for the organisation to 
understand its operating environment better, to contextualise the space 
around the society it serves and to give an indication of evolving issues 
that might not be to the organisation’s benefit”. (J88, J95) 
My mission is really switched almost to sort of a counterintelligence 
posture. My primary goal is to keep my network safe and use expanded 
tools I've learned by studying analysis and intelligence analysis to do this. 
(B18) 
Two of the ten participants’ role and function only relate to security-related matters 
(Dave and Emma), while the other eight participants also provide decision-making 
support to a broader range of clients in the organisation, or as is the case with Celia and 
Lynn, who work for think tanks that provide risk advice to external clients.   
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Those participants who have expanded their function beyond the security department 
share a philosophy that they play a supporting role for the larger organisation in making 
better decisions by providing them with relevant information on issues that might 
impact their operations. This second function, to provide support to decision-makers 
throughout the organisation, or external clients, to make better decisions, is either 
already the function or desired function of the majority of the participants. Celia, who 
has more than 30 years of experience in the intelligence industry, commented that: 
Well, I would hope that what we do is help businesses make better, more 
informed decisions. And then if those decisions are more informed, then 
the expectation is that they will be better decisions… The cynical part of 
me thinks that what we provide is cover for people's decisions so that 
they can check the box and say, “Jip, we at least spent time thinking and 
we consulted with experts. So if the decision goes bad, it's not because 
we didn't do it the right way. (C18) 
Tina, who manages an analysis unit in the security department, stated that her ideal is 
that her unit provides the type of analytical support service to other functional 
departments: 
I want our unit to become the basis of informed decision-making 
throughout the organisation. That’s what I think we as a profession stand 
for… certainly, that's what I try to endeavour towards and everything 
whenever I'm conducting my work. (T22)  
My ideology would be that we enable and facilitate better decision-
making. I would have said perfect decision making, but… (laughs) So my 
drive is towards actionable intelligence. So that's the ideal outcome. It's 
not necessarily that what the information that I'm giving or what I'm 
recommending should be taken, but as long as the information that I've 
gathered has a “So what?” and the “So what?” leads to something that…  
it has a ripple effect in terms of action that's taken. So it can never be an 
end on its own. But it has to enable something to happen within the 
business itself. So it must be actionable. (T24) 
Andy sums his role to provide risk intelligence to different divisions in his company up 
as: 
My goal is to try and influence our corporate security decision-makers 
and decision-makers within the business—whether that's commercial or 
research and development or manufacturing or even our non-security 
supply chain folks trying to bring them some of that risk intelligence to 
incorporate into their broader risk picture. (A8, A69) 
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Kate explains that when she provides geo-strategic advice on whether her company 
should enter a new market, she thinks as her job being: 
… to help the company understand what's going on in the world and how 
it could affect them. We want to do the strategic analysis because that's 
a lot more value to the business, particularly as you can bring up issues or 
opportunities or happenings early on and give the business time to plan 
and adapt. (K2).  
Vic expanded his support role to his employer's broader risk environment when he did 
a geospatial analysis project to assist the distribution department in understanding 
product saturation in the country better. At another time, he conducted marketing 
research and due diligence of companies and persons for the department responsible 
for international relations, stating he is: 
… able to offer advice and analyses that contribute to decision making in 
relation to business decisions that involve in some way reducing or 
dealing with a potential risk situation to business. (V2, V33)  
In addition to these operational level broader assistance to the other departments in 
the organisation, the participants’ value on a strategic level is also evident. Ben is often 
used in his organisation when strategic planning is done to share the risk and threat 
scenarios. His ability to do red-teaming is well-regarded in his organisation: 
One of the roles that I played successfully inside my organization is 
reminding my colleagues that, you know, the adversary gets a vote. They 
just assume that nothing will change and nothing will go wrong and that 
they have all the information. And I then do this thing where I tell them, 
“I don't want to disappoint you, but that's not going to happen the way 
you figure. These are all the things that could derail that… (B36). I get 
invited to many meetings that have nothing to do with my particular 
responsibility because people want to hear the red team perspective 
from me on what they forgot. (B37)  
Subordinate theme 1.1(b): An analyst by any other name… 
While all the participants have more or less the same role and function within their 
organisations, none have the same job title, possibly mainly due to differences in 
organisational responsibilities, human resources practices or organisational culture. 
Only Andy’s title is a security risk intelligence analyst, while four others have variations 
of “intelligence analyst” in their title: 
• Kate is a senior risk intelligence analyst 
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• Josh is a senior intelligence analyst 
• Ben is an information security intelligence analyst and  
• Vic is a senior intelligence officer. 
The other job titles are information and analysis centre manager (Tina), crime analyst 
(Emma), consultant (Celia), researcher (Lynne) and the least alike is senior lead security 
expert (Dave). 
The majority of the participants feel that job titles are irrelevant. Dave, who has worked 
for his organisation for the last 20 years, might have had the most telling reply about 
the insignificance of job titles for him: 
So, in my career, I've been called a security coordinator… I've been called 
a security engineer… I've been called a security expert, a senior security 
expert, a principal security expert, a lead business expert. And now I'm a 
senior lead security expert… I mean, these titles…they don't mean 
anything to me. I couldn't care less about the current title I have. Do I care 
what type of title you have? No! I know what you're technically capable 
of. I know your capabilities, and more importantly, I know you as a 
person. So I couldn't care less about the current title you have. (D13) 
In a similar vein, Andy is quite vocal about his experience with job titles and ranks and 
how he would instead focus on the content of his work:  
I don't care about the rank or the name - I care about the actual work that 
I do. It's about the work, not about my job title or some ego. I think that 
was the identity thing you're talking about: is it really about the position 
title, or is it about the actual work I’m doing, and I think people get that 
mixed up in things. They think they could still do the work with a better 
job title, and it's not the same. (A90) 
Only two participants (Vic and Josh) regard their job titles to be important, mainly 
because they perceive their current roles to be different from purely an analysis function 
and the status it might give them in their organisation. It seems as though their 
organisations are still quite bureaucratic, where being a manager or having “senior” in 
front of one’s job title is necessary to get recognition or be considered expert enough to 
be afforded attention. They prefer being called senior intelligence advisor, mainly to gain 
access to other business units in their organisations as they are engaged in relationship 
management in their quest to extend their service outside the security department.  
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It is telling that participants from South Africa and Germany were not keen to use 
“intelligence” in their preferred job titles, unlike those from the US, UK and Canada. Tina 
states that intelligence has a negative connotation in her country, while Dave feels that 
one should move away from using intelligence:  
So I think we need to move a little bit away from this myth about the word 
intelligence. It's easily being misused and it's often also misused to 
increase one's importance… I don't like to be called an intelligence officer 
because that only raises questions… I am not sure whether this is so 
important to call it intelligence outside the classical police and military 
environment. (D13, 89)  
For those participants like Kate, who is steering her function away from a narrow 
security role to provide decision-support to all business units in her beverage company, 
it is similarly essential to speak to a broader possible client base by removing “security” 
from their job titles by focusing on operational or general risks to the organisation: 
My job title is senior risk intelligence analyst. It's interesting that you ask 
about being a security risk analyst because we are really working on as 
we develop the program is not having security part of our titles and not 
having security part of our… It is that we think of security as one small 
piece of what we do. (K2) 
Subordinate theme 1.1(c): Values guiding professional conduct 
Integrity 
Half of the participants were vocal about the values or codes of conduct that guide them 
in executing their roles as security risk intelligence analysts in the private sector. The 
first value is integrity. Ben, the cyber threat intelligence analyst, feels that organisations 
entrust him with sensitive and confidential information and that trust needs to be 
earned by living out the values of integrity and honesty. He is especially annoyed about 
how cyber domain vendors or some of his counterparts, often without any experience 
in the intelligence field, would be drawn into the “fake James Bond” culture:  
Some of my colleagues get a little drawn into, you know, kind of the fake 
James Bond. They won’t share information, and they’re exaggerating a 
little. They’re leaving stuff out so that they can look mysterious – it’s 
annoying! (B57)  
This focus on truthfulness and trustworthiness echoes in Emma’s words that “Integrity 
should be priority…integrity and honesty” (E67) and in Dave’s sentiments that “you need 
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to have trust with those with whom you work. You need to be able to have healthy 
conflict. You need to take over responsibility and accountability. (D83). Kate is vocal 
when she stated that being a security risk intelligence analyst is like adhering to an 
honour system as there are no rules that bind an analyst to work in a certain manner.  
For her, this honour system is also part of not having an agenda when conducting 
analysis or making recommendations to the organisation: 
It's a bit of an honour system to work as a risk intelligence analyst. We 
have an assumption that you have that curiosity and those questions and 
the critical thinking and analysis skills and will then want to apply those 
in a professional manner, right? Like there's no certification, there's no 
required experience or qualification. (K53) 
Objectivity 
Celia strengthened the importance that the participants assign to objectivity as a way to 
conduct their work by stating that it’s essential for her to be apolitical, non-ideological 
and the voice of reason when she conducts her work. She aligns herself with the 
philosophy and values of Stoicism: 
I really admire stoicism as a philosophy - the Stoics. I like to think that my 
value system is kind of carved into that template… what I get out of it that 
applies to risk analysis… is that Stoics try to keep everything in 
perspective, everything in its proper proportion. I try to be the voice of 
reason - I'm trying to be calm and the voice of reason… I very much strive 
to be not ideological. Which is another way of controlling, say, in a more 
meaningful kind of control of your biases. (C25) 
The need for objectivity is strengthened by Celia, who uses the example of a Pulitzer 
prize-winning journalist to contrast how SRIA would conduct their work by stating that 
analysts do not have or should not have a vested interest in a product and therefore 
does not need to highlight specific areas to drive a particular agenda.  
When they decide on a story, the Pulitzer Prize journalist gets really 
invested in that story and pursues it. You know they're often discovered, 
some of them, to have exaggerated the story. Or got a little light on the 
details, right? And I believe ideally we do not do that. If there is no story, 
there is no story there. We're not invested in it. We really don't care. We'll 
move on to the next story. (C21, C22)  
Kate and Andy reinforced the notion that the analyst’s value of objectivity should 
become the hallmark of their conduct in the workplace: 
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…the nice thing about being the intelligence analyst is you can be the one 
that brings information relevant to everyone but doesn't have an agenda. 
(K18)  
The analyst is supposed to remove the bias, look at the facts, and then 
make an analytical judgment based on the facts. If we could learn 
anything from our roles, if we could promote anything about the position, 
it's about candid, unbiased analysis, and that's what leaders want. I mean, 
nobody, leaders, don't want things sugar-coated; they don't want things 
derived from an agenda. (A96) 
Subordinate theme 1.2:  Multi-faceted professional self-concept 
After establishing what the participants view to be their role and function, how their 
organisations and themselves name their function and what they perceive to be the 
profession’s values, the analysis moved to determine how they perceive themselves, on 
a personal level professional role. This subtheme identified the tenets of individual 
professional identity, which is influenced by 1) their skills and knowledge they apply 
when executing their roles, 2) their personal attributes and attitudes that they perceive 
to play a role in their professional experience, and 3) how they feel (positive and 
negative valence) when they execute their professional role. As could be seen from the 
demographic analysis, the participants have a wide range of different life and 
professional journeys (combining a total of 209 years of work experience of which 82% 
or 171 years are in the intelligence or security risk environment), which resulted in a rich 
and multi-levelled analysis. 
Subordinate theme 1.2(a): Pride in a unique blend of skills and knowledge 
The participants were vocal about what they perceive as their unique sets of skills and 
knowledge that enable them to perform their work effectively. These skills and 
knowledge can be broadly grouped in 1) thinking skills, 2) communicating skills, and 3) 
the cluster of contextual understanding skills that enable them to excel in the private 
sector workplace. 
Thinking skills 
The participants first take pride in their thinking skills and use this intellectual ability to 
earn a living.  Celia articulated it well by saying: 
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I think of myself as a professional thinker. That's really what I am. But 
what does that mean? I'm a professional critical thinker. So that means I 
can evaluate information for its value better than other people… I'm more 
aware of my biases than other people, and I can correct them better… to 
me, a real intelligence professional is aware of his or her biases and other 
people’s and has developed heuristic thinking methods that allow them 
to get closer to the essential facts of the matter. Better than other 
thinkers... (C10,16) 
Similarly, Ben realised that the value he brings to his organisation is “to think clearly. 
And “I was succeeding in the sense that my analytic skill was in high demand across the 
organization.” (B46,47). Other participants have also stressed the ability to think 
critically. Kate thinks asking questions and challenging assumptions is the essence of 
their roles: 
Analysts… we’re critical thinkers… being the ones who ask questions, 
challenge assumptions and bring together the information that I think 
that's vital for society. (K18) We are the people who ask questions 
without an agenda. (K24) …my space is asking questions, trying my best 
to figure this out, hold this puzzle together… (K33) 
Other participants mentioned their ability to think at different levels of analysis by 
applying their strategic, operational, and tactical thinking levels to understand a 
problem and provide effective recommendations. Emma and Ben illustrated this when 
they said: 
I come from a diverse background and experience. If you take all of it into 
account, being operational, tactical and strategic - you put those three 
into one – so it brings a lot to the table in terms of how I look at things in 
my current space. (E13) 
And I can, because I have a lot of business experience, bridge the gap 
between my technical security issues and how that relates to financial 
and business risk issues. And I'm good at switching between a high-level 
strategic view and an operational view… how those sort of the larger ones 
might actually impact things at the university. (B24) 
Tina uses the puzzle metaphor to explain the thinking skills necessary to execute her 
task by saying: 
…it's exciting to be looking at an issue… to get to the bottom…. to get to 
the “so what?” to put pieces together ... to view it as a puzzle and say 
you'd like to resolve it and give a full picture. (T12) 
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A related thinking skill is to discern macro-level patterns or events that may be of 
importance and sensibly ascribe meaning to them in a certain context. Celia feels that 
this is her unique contribution: 
My comparative advantage…and what I'm good at is noticing weak signals 
from multiple sources and figuring out what possible emergence they can 
contribute to. (C10) and  “I have a sense which I think is important… of 
macro trends in the world.  Not just the micro particulars of a given 
situation. (C16) 
Dave also feels that this sensing or identification skill is essential to his work by stating, 
“you have those antennas, and they sense first, and then you carry it in the 
organization”. On a more operational level, Andy used the metaphor of “needles in a 
haystack” when he described his experience of looking for specific pieces of intelligence 
when he was in the military and now still uses the same skills in the private sector by 
saying:  
The best way to explain it essentially is the proverbial needle in a 
haystack. So in the military, you have to find that needle faster; that's the 
key. So I think in the private sector, we don't have to find that needle as 
fast, but I still do that because of my military experience. And the needle 
is essentially the “So what?” like you're thinking, “why is it significant?” It 
comes down to that; you go in the haystack and get it. I mean… find that 
needle, understand what it means to get it to where it needs it to go. 
That's what it's all about. I feel like I have an advantage because I 
understand it's really about focusing, identifying, understanding what's 
important, why it's important and get it out to whoever needs it. (A59-
61)  
Communication skills 
The ability to communicate well seems even more critical in a work context where one’s 
stakeholders do not necessarily understand your role and what you bring to the table. 
Vic stated that he could communicate better than most other people in his environment 
when he said: 
I also bring the ability to communicate in a clear manner that's 
understood by a non-security risk professional. I found that that's a 
unique skill that often security types or people who do analysis cannot 
communicate relevantly to the business, right? (V31) 
Vic explains how his ability to communicate well also assisted him in information 
gathering by “talking to people, attending meetings, walking around and trying to 
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identify threats in the environment” (V4) and “discuss the issue or I might say “hey, do 
you know anything about this or about that?” (V6) and “I like the social element, and I 
like the liaison.” (V50). Kate's skill to write and communicate well has been highlighted 
as essential skills for any intelligence analyst (K54). Josh sees his ability to use language 
as tradecraft to influence decision-making in his company: 
You already know the discipline of threat… you have the language. It's like 
you can do what you want with language. If something needs to sound 
more serious than it is, it can, without being dishonest, if the desired 
outcome is a change of behaviour from senior leadership and if that 
means you have used a certain type of language, and then you use that 
type of language without being dishonest. Well, actually, the power of 
intelligence is to influence decision making. And it's not being dishonest. 
If you have what type of decision will bring about a reduction of risk to 
the organization, and how can I help facilitate that? So, I don't see that as 
being dishonest. I see it as an extension of tradecraft. Like in the same 
way, if we were in other sectors, we would see tradecraft is what we do. 
What about when we go into the private sector? What is intelligence 
tradecraft about? It’s probably these types of things. (J47,48) 
Same fundamental skills… in a new context 
From the above, the analysis revealed that the participants are critically aware of their 
work context and employ various skills and knowledge to ensure relevancy and 
legitimacy in the private sector context. Andy, Tina and Josh were specific about the 
application of their intelligence analysis skills and their understanding of threats in the 
new private sector context:  
I think what I've learned is this position is less about being a security 
analyst; it's more about being a research and analysis professional. You 
can take your research and analysis skills set and apply it to pharma. (A13)  
So it's really about focusing, identifying, understanding what's important, 
why it's important and get it out to whoever needs it. So basically, you’re 
taking the fundamentals and overlay them on a new data set, instead of 
counter-terrorism, its pharmaceuticals or whatever. It’s the same 
fundamentals that you overlay onto new types of missions. (A65) 
What we do is actually more of a transdisciplinary skillset than an actual 
discipline. Because we would be able to do whatever we do, we can do it 
in whatever field. (J98) 
I think what we bring to the table is an understanding of the adversary 
mindset… whether it is a nation-state or a particular group or an 
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actor…about what actions they want to do and how they would be able 
to do that. (J40) 
The participants highlighted how they have to understand the business of the 
organisation, its operational risk, the stakeholders, its supply chain and internal politics 
to provide a relevant risk intelligence service. They had to relook their approach and 
learn new or apply existing skills and knowledge to do their jobs effectively. Kate stated 
that she had to research and analyse her employer to be able to identify what 
intelligence needs they might have so that she can provide that service to them: 
I changed the way I think about my work. Instead of being a good 
intelligence analyst, I changed my focus, and I tried to really take the skills 
and apply them to the work… which is why I think I could really 
understand quickly that I needed to know how my company works to do 
my job. (K45)  
Good communication skills align with one’s ability to manage relationships with 
stakeholders in the company. For Kate, an essential component of communication skills 
can identify one’s stakeholders “to know whom to talk to within the company, even who 
in the company will be the end-user of your work or your product” (K8). She sees her 
skill to “help people understand what they don't even know they want” (K28) as one of 
her strengths when she communicates her vision to extend her risk intelligence service 
to the broader organisation: 
Our job is to tell our customers what they want, that they don't know they 
want. And I am perfectly comfortable going out there and knowing that I 
have to convince someone that what I am giving them is what they want, 
not necessarily what they asked for. Or give them something they've 
never even heard of. To me, it's fun.  (K20) 
Vic summarises SRIA skills and knowledge as the ability to identify threats, relate them 
to the business interests and communicating the risks to enable decision-making: 
I guess my speciality would really be identifying and linking issues that are 
not obvious and being able to go in-depth and really understand how a 
business works and how the external environment can affect some 
internal business operation inside… and communicate it in a clear 
manner. (V31) 
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Subordinate theme 1.2(b): Personal attributes and attitudes 
The participants shared certain personal attributes and attitudes relating to their 
professional role that they perceive to be essential in their lived experience. The 
participants exhibited different personalities but related some attributes to have 
moulded who they are as SRIA in the private sector.   
Growth mind-set 
The most common attribute shared among the participants is that of a growth mindset 
with a willingness and ability to adapt and learn. It most probably relates to their quest 
for intellectually challenging situations and roles to apply their thinking skills and learn 
new things. Dave, Tina and Kate illustrated how they enjoy working in an environment 
that changes all the time:  
When I come to the office, it will always be interesting. I have not had a 
single boring day in those 20 years of service, not a single one. (D34)  
There's always something… It never gets boring…There is always a crisis… 
there's always an incident, there's always an item that is new, and you’re 
constantly learning. This is not a job that you do and then maintain the 
status quo for the rest of your life. It is always fluid. You're usually in the 
front line if something comes up. (D72)  
So no two days are the same, no two hours are the same. So that's what 
keeps me going. (T30) 
It's a continually evolving process. The business evolves, the business 
makes changes. We have to be able to learn and evolve with it. (K14) 
Similarly, Lynn liked constant change stating that “I have a very low boredom threshold. 
I mean, I don't see what's the sense of doing the same thing over and over for years.” 
(L32). Vic concurred with the issue of boredom by stating that he needs variety and 
intellectually challenging work “if the job is narrow and it's the same and repetitive, I get 
bored, and I want more variety and personal fulfilment.” (V57)  “In my previous role, I 
did the same job for about six years… and I got bored of the subject matter that I was 
analysing and at the time, I didn't have enough self-patience.” (V22) Emma was the only 
participant who felt that her current role did not provide sufficient growth opportunity 
and indicated that she wants to do a different kind of job: 
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I want to branch out from what I'm currently doing. I've done analysis for 
over 15 years now. Now I want to go into something new to do with 
investigations. (E2) 
This attribute to adapt to continuous change is closely related to the willingness to learn, 
improve continuously and expose themselves to other opinions.  This attribute was a 
common thread among the participants. The word “learn” has been found 37 times in 
eight interviews, with Vic using it the most (15 times), Andy (6), Ben (5), Celia (3), Kate 
(3), Josh (2), Emma (2) and Dave (1). Vic’s growth mindset is evident throughout his 
interview. He mentions his eagerness to learn what intelligence analysis is as the main 
reason he decided on this career path.  
What drove me is the mystique and the mystery of it. And it sounded 
interesting and difficult… So what drove me is why I want to learn about 
it. I wanted to find out about it, and I wanted to see how it's done; I 
wanted to see who does it and how to do it. (V142) 
Andy and Emma’s ability to learn and adapt was evident when they learned how to 
support the business areas with their risk intelligence analysis.  
Where the support infrastructure allows, you can really learn a lot about 
a topic, you can really dive into it and I kind of like that ability to know 
more about the topic than just make a decision on… I like to know more. 
I like to dive into it and get a better understanding, even for my own 
benefit. You know, I got to see interesting stuff; I just want to learn more 
about it. (A72) 
I have tried to learn a lot of other things in the process. Instead of 
operating from a laptop… of what you see in a formal report, I’d rather 
go there physically and check what is happening. So that added more 
value to what I'm doing. It is something that is very special. (E15,16) 
Tenacity, perseverance and patience 
A second shared attribute is that of tenacity, perseverance, and patience required to do 
one’s job as a security risk intelligence analyst. Andy stated that “…it's really hard work 
we’re doing. And it's hard trying to stay on top of things if you can persevere through 
the end result whether that's a good case you resolved, or you've influenced a business 
decision.” (A40). He found the task of staying abreast of developments across many 
intelligence priorities intellectually challenging but fulfilling when he used that 
knowledge to achieve impact. Tina concurred that one would need hard work and 
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perseverance to execute this role (T38). Lynn echoed this when she stated that one 
needs “lots of patience” to do this job (L24) and that her task to develop a database of 
piracy events from multiple primary and secondary sources to then only start the 
analysis and writing process is “extremely time-consuming” (L26). She shared her 
frustration at researchers who do not need to do this grunt work or stakeholders and 
clients who do not have an inkling of how long the process takes to understand a 
problem and then look at how it can be presented to make actionable 
recommendations. She eloquently explained it as “I think analysts and the people they 
work for, need to know this is not fast food, this is slow-cooked…” (L44) 
Andy, who was very vocal in his perception that his role is a supporter of decision-
making, reflected that humbleness is an important attribute for him.  He discussed how 
he realised that being an intelligence analyst, both in the military and the private sector, 
is like being a “worker bee”. “I’ve always been a worker bee. I'd rather do this work… I 
guess it's more about the work than the position.” (A86, 87). Further to this metaphor, 
he feels it is necessary to be humble “I think if you're humble enough to understand that 
even though you've done a bulk of the work that the lead investigator may be briefing 
it, and you know, getting a lot of good feedback, you have to find satisfaction in that…” 
and “I think if you can be humble enough, it can be very satisfying”. (A38-40) 
Subordinate theme 1.2(c): Valence 
Positive feelings 
Positive and negative emotions play an important role in creating and maintaining a 
professional identity. In this study, the narratives of positive feelings far outweighed 
those that reflected negative feelings. The majority of the positive feelings related to 
pride in their intellectual abilities and their feelings of fulfilment and job satisfaction. It 
stands to reason that as the participants’ main skill relate to their perceived ability to 
provide professional thinking skills, it is also this cerebral ability that elicits feelings of 
pride, which might be interpreted as arrogance if it were not applied to a “greater good” 
and not for personal gratification and benefit. Celia stated, “It feels good to think of 
myself as a good thinker” (C31), while Josh was a bit more modest when he said that he  
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“… felt privileged to be able to try and understand quite intellectual topics 
like geopolitics and political tensions and the strategy and these types of 
things. I do enjoy it…to talk about what's happening and try and make 
sense of it. That feels good”. (J36), and “I like the variety of work. I like 
the subject matter… the intellectual aspect of it.” (J62)  
Vic likes the freedom that his organisation gives him to do his job without restrictions. 
I like the freedom of identifying and researching. I like not having 
restrictions on a specific theme or specific area…  I like the ability also to 
talk to different people on different subjects, different current events. I 
like the variety of the work. (V46) 
He then pushed the envelope when he stated his preference for working with complex 
issues rather than “petty, straightforward issues that can be handled by someone 
junior… I prefer to deal with something a bit more complex that's maybe 
multidimensional and worthwhile and something maybe that even engages multiple 
stakeholders.” (V79) 
Some participants derived pleasure from having access to sensitive information or to 
have intimate knowledge about threats and risks that are people rarely would have 
access to (or interest in).  Andy likes the idea that he knows what is going on, regardless 
of whether he is a decision-maker or a worker bee, “you always have your finger on the 
pulse of what's going on. And you're always in the know…” (A67) Dave exhibited the 
same emotions of exclusivity when he stated that he likes finding something that no-
one else has found before: 
Well, the motivation is that you always have a little flashlight and a dark 
room where you try to light up that room, and you always find some dark 
corners that nobody has found before. It is so interesting ... (D42)  
These feelings of accomplishment may come over as elitist, even arrogant. However, the 
participants’ knowledge and thinking ability are valued and respected by their 
colleagues and stakeholders. Kate said that she “feels respected and that people see my 
value” (K51). Lynn says that she gets recognition and that her work has been published 
on BBC, Forbes and the Economist (L38), while Josh said that his opinion is often 
requested “as you're the subject matter expert.” (J77) 
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Participants expressed feelings of job satisfaction, stating that their work is meaningful, 
not only to them personally but also to their organisations. Kate and Emma had fun and 
was grateful to contribute to something worthwhile. “I enjoy doing this… I have a lot of 
fun… I get to do my best in what I'm doing… “(K33) and “It gives me pleasure to know 
that at least I can contribute towards protecting the bank’s assets, its employees and 
our clients. (E11) Ben’s happiness with his role as a security risk intelligence analyst was 
especially powerful when he stated 
Oh, It's just the most creative and engaging, challenging, fun work I've 
ever done. I personally feel I'm able to sort of use all of my gifts. You 
know, I get to do a little of everything, and I love it. (B39) I think that real 
satisfaction in your work… just raises the tone of your life, and it allows 




Overall, the participants did not exhibit negative feelings about their profession or role 
as SRIA in the private sector. Negative valence was evident in only two aspects, namely, 
where participants had negative feelings towards their perceived image of working for 
a security department in the private sector. Secondly, the organisational culture could 
not effectively deal with gender and race issues.  
Not all participants who work in security management departments had the same 
negative experience that individuals like Vic had as the organisational culture, and even 
personal aspects such as emotional intelligence might differ. The essence of the negative 
feelings centred on perception inside and outside the organisation that being part of the 
security department is of lesser importance or value to the organisation.  Vic illustrated 
this perception explaining his culture shock when he came from an environment where 
intelligence was the core business into a function that was situated in a support 
department: 
In the military or in the defence where I came from, security is really seen 
as a dirty area…Where you know, those who didn't make it or didn't have 
education would go there. All those security people are sort of the low 
level… sort of the uneducated, inexperienced, stupid sort of 
unprofessional security guard. So I came into this job with a very negative 
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view of security and the people who were just out to get you for no good 
reason, not to help you or to facilitate you. (V87,88) 
Some female participants found their workplaces dominated by former law 
enforcement and military males, who imprint their preconceived ideas about 
intelligence analysis into the private sector and their outdated racist and sexist mental 
models. Emma shared how the security department in her workplace is dominated by 
former police types who could not understand her role and where she had to teach them 
how to write reports on incidents to build a database. She also mentioned that she finds 
many challenges as a black female where her initiatives are stone-walled by her male, 
white colleagues. Celia shared how her professional identity has been impeded by the 
mental models of those in the intelligence community who expected her, as a Latino 
woman, to be a South or Central American expert while she wanted to work on China. 
Also, the way she looked did not match their idea of a professional, and she thinks that 
affected her professional trajectory: 
So the man in the crisp suit and the crisp tie - that’s an expert. The woman 
in a dress and wearing jewellery does not look like an expert. So there's 
that issue, right. And so I felt that my contribution was undervalued… 
(C43) I mean, someone has to say that being a woman can lead to earning 
many problems for you... (C50) 
Subordinate theme 1.3:  Using professional identity tensions to grow 
Most of the participants’ professional identity was challenged in various ways, but they 
acted with self-awareness and reflected on their circumstances and their professional 
ideals, and where necessary, actively performed identity work. Those who moved from 
the intelligence community to the private sector experienced a massive culture shock, 
which required intensive professional sensemaking and recalibration. They were 
confronted by a perceived lack of legitimacy, as they now had to justify their roles, while 
it was never necessary for their previous roles. Also, very few of the stakeholders 
understood their function and the value they bring to the organisation. 
This prompted them to reinvent themselves and use their skills and knowledge in their 
new context to attain legitimacy in the organisation. Both Dave and Andy had no issue 
professionally because they are situated in a support structure. As seen before, Andy 
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saw himself as a “worker bee” that knows everything that is going on, and that is 
sufficient validation and work satisfaction for him. Likewise, when asked whether he 
minds being in a support role, Dave saw himself as playing a leading role in the support 
department of his organisation, and that is sufficient validation for him: 
I see myself as a supporting function in making this organization more 
secure. And with that, I'm in the front line with regard to the domain that 
I have been entrusted with. I mean, we are corporate services. We are 
already in the machinery room of the bank. (D74) 
Subordinate theme 1.3(a): Impression management to counter negative perceptions 
of the security function 
The most explicit professional identity crisis was shared by Vic, whose professional 
identity is closely linked to how other people perceive him and how he feels when he 
works. He explained he moved to the private sector for a higher salary and senior analyst 
position. His main professional identity challenge in the private sector occurred when 
he had to deal with his own and others’ negative perception of people working in the 
security department as a subdivision of the overall support services:   
I started to think that this is maybe not a career or a respectable career 
…it's a highly peripheral central support service …you're not core 
business. You're perhaps sometimes not even enabling core business… 
yes, you're keeping people safe and everything… (V87). I’m not proud to 
say I work in the corporate services department. Through most of my 
career, that's the paperclips and paper and toilet cleaners right? No 
really! So I actually am very conscious of that and focus more on the 
actual work area. (V110) 
He used a dual approach to manage the tension he experienced: firstly, he disassociated 
himself from those in the security department that was known to “aim to get you on a 
security violation” (V88) by making sure that he is never seen in their company:  
I just didn’t want to be seen hanging out with them and be buddy-buddy, 
at the coffee stand, at the cafeteria - I didn’t want to be seen hanging out 
with them, so I would only transact with the No-Sayers as required. (V40) 
He even went as far as redesigning his email signature by “removing corporate security 
service depending on the audience of my email.” (V110).  In his interaction with people 
from outside the security department, he deliberately portrayed himself as different 
from his security colleagues: 
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So I branded myself internally as not that guy. So I don't … none of the 
advice I provide is framed in a way that would restrict someone from 
doing something. I've also physically distanced myself from people, other 
security professionals in the bank who are the No-Sayers and No-Doers. 
(V38) 
These identity protection strategies is typical to control others’ opinion of oneself for a 
personal purpose. In Vic’s case, he both disassociated himself from a certain group of 
people and employed impression management to be accepted professionally and to 
ensure that professional interaction with those he perceived important for his 
professional well-being goes smoothly. 
Subordinate theme 1.3(b): Job crafting and innovation 
Emma became operationally involved with the investigators to understand their context 
and make recommendations that are valued and executable. Andy explained how he 
used to have ten analysts working for him in the military, and suddenly, he has none and 
had to change his expectations and adapted to the organisation's pace and context: 
I think the challenge was reinventing yourself on how you execute your 
work.  I really had to reinvent how I work … understanding they're 
(consultants) not going to get me intel - finished like my analysts would 
do in the Military. That really was the big challenge. (A92, 93) 
The participants faced their professional identity tensions with creativity and crafted a 
new role that stretched beyond the job description for which they were appointed. 
Emma and Lynn developed new databases, while Kate, Tina and Vic immersed 
themselves in understanding the business better to extend their intelligence service to 
a wider audience in the company.  Initially, Ben was frustrated when he was being pulled 
into side projects that had nothing to do with his role, like “ghostwriting his boss’s 
presentations”. He wanted to spend his time and energy on new threat analysis but 
never had the time to get to it due to his other, unrelated responsibilities.  He did some 
introspection and  
… realised that I was succeeding in the sense that my analytic skill was in 
high demand across the organization.  But I had narrowly defined the 
value that I brought to this particular arena. So I was unhappy for a while 
because I wanted to perfect something instead of maybe being more 
generous - you know, use skills that the organization had afforded me 
more broadly than in a less narrow way. The challenge for me has been 
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to realize that my value to the organisation is my value to think clearly. 
(B46-48) 
Vic also managed the professional identity crisis by looking at ways to rise above the 
perception of his work context. He creatively extended his client-base and deliverables 
by deliberately seeking opportunities to give him exposure to other parts of the 
organisation, leading the organisation's international liaison in security risk and 
intelligence matters and offered to work on large projects with colleagues who are 
certified security professionals. His manager supported these activities, which served as 
validation for him. It can be surmised that Vic focused now more on the value he can 
bring to the whole organisation than where his structure is in the organigram.  
As can be seen from the above analysis, each participant had a unique professional 
journey and life experience that influenced his/her security risk intelligence analyst 
identities. Their job titles might be different, but they share the same ideology of their 
profession in terms of their role and function and what values guide them in executing 
their tasks. The multi-dimensionality of their professional self-concept was highlighted 
by their unique analytical, thinking and communication skills.  
Overall, they ascribed their perceived professional success to a growth mindset that 
values change and learning and being in a role that fosters change and provides plenty 
of opportunities to learn. The participants overwhelmingly portrayed positive feelings 
of pride, fulfilment and job satisfaction and dealt with professional identity tensions in 
creative ways that enhanced their role and impact on the organisation. 
5.5.2 Superordinate theme 2: Connectedness to others in a professional context  
One of the core dimensions of professional identity is the enacting of belongingness or 
connectedness to people who have the same professional function as you do, with a 
sequential “otherness” to people who have a different vocation (see Figure 20). The 
analysis of the interviews revealed two subthemes. Firstly, the participants strongly 
identify with others who perform similar functions in the private sector, but more in a 
network context rather than in the context of traditional professional bodies. Secondly, 
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their interaction with others in the work context is complicated by a continuous 
explanation of their role to gain legitimacy and acceptance.  
This could be ascribed to stakeholders’ unfamiliarity with the emerging profession, 
which, in turn, led the participants to craft and enrich their jobs to achieve the 
opportunities in the workplace. Consequently, the participants adapted and 
strengthened their professional identity to become and remain relevant in the work 
context. 
Superordinate theme 2: Connectedness to others in a professional context 
Subordinate theme Key concepts and issues 
2.1  A network rather 
than an association 
Functional networking 
No need for professional organisations 
Social media 
2.2 “Prove that you 
are a business 
enabler.” 
Lack of knowledge about function leads to 
misunderstanding 
Educating stakeholders 
Building nurturing relationships 
Figure 20: Superordinate theme 2: Connectedness to others in a proefssisonal 
context 
Subordinate theme 2.1: A network rather than an association 
It is relatively easy to have a sense of belonging and connectedness in established 
professions such as accounting, health and legal professions where there are role 
models and standards of behaviour or professional organisations that embody 
legitimacy. However, in an emerging profession such as security risk intelligence 
analysis, there are no prototypes or standards, and the participants of this study are 
testimony of learning while they are doing. There are also limited opportunities for SRIA 
to embed the social aspect of their identity as there is at this stage, only one professional 
organisation that addresses the needs of risk intelligence analysts in the private sector 
per se, namely the Association of International Risk Intelligence Professionals (AIRIP), 
which draws most of its membership from the US and Canada.  
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  140 April  2021 
Half of the participants are the only analysts in their organisation, while the other half 
works in teams of analysts. All of them, except Emma, who works as the only analyst in 
a commercial bank in South Africa, has contact with counterparts outside of their 
organisations, mostly only on a professional and not social level. This networking and 
liaison with analysts in other organisations serve as a valuable reinforcer of professional 
identity and exchange of ideas. The participants explained how insular it could become 
when you do not deliberately network with analysts outside your organisation and feel 
more job satisfaction if your counterparts value your opinion or analytical products. As 
they all value their ability to think critically about the issues they analyse, work-related 
networking serves mainly as a forum to test their insights against those whose critique 
they value. Vic even went as far as making this liaison with his counterparts in other 
organisations and other parts of the world the main deliverable of his function. 
I like the social element, and I like the liaison. And in fact, I told my boss… 
I said as a joke, and I said, “you know if you limit me in my networking 
ability, or if I'm not part of any working groups, I'm out of here.”(V50) 
Being a member of a professional organisation is not important to the participants, most 
probably because they find sufficient networking opportunities while doing their jobs. 
The four participants who are members of professional organisations find it useful for 
different reasons. Andy, Kate and Emma network with other risk intelligence analysts to 
ensure that they know what is happening in the industry and make contacts for possible 
future employment opportunities. Three other participants (Tina, Josh and Vic), who are 
not members of professional organisations, feel that networking through these bodies 
can be beneficial but have not yet made an effort to join or start such a body. Dave is 
outright dismissive of professional organisations as he “doesn’t need to sell myself” 
(D85).  Ben’s networking experience in the intelligence field has been positive, but he 
experienced exactly the opposite in the cyber intelligence field:  
… it's a combination of … anxiety and egotism… everybody wants people 
to feel a bit of schadenfreude—like, you know, you made a mistake, and 
I could catch you. It's not constructive at all. And you know it's profoundly 
unkind, and it sure as hell is not moving the discipline forward at all. I see 
a lack of kindness and collegiality already bring the whole enterprise into 
disrepute. (B60) 
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Connectedness with other intelligence analysts is also strengthened by some 
participants’ membership of online social networks like LinkedIn and Twitter, although 
the engagement is limited to receiving posts and sometimes offering inputs. Only Celia, 
who is at the end of her career, engage more robustly on social media, but with a specific 
mentoring role: 
I get on social networks, particularly LinkedIn and Twitter.  They tend to 
connect with me. I don't tend to connect. I'm at the end of my career. I'm 
not trying to build anything, but particularly the younger analysts will find 
me, right? And then start engaging with me and ask me to comment on 
this or that. And I'm very happy to do that. That's…what I feel like that's 
my proper role now. You know, generationally, that's what I should be 
doing. And so I do feel connected with them that way. (C28) 
Celia is the only participant involved in other initiatives to strengthen the intelligence 
field through her leadership role in a mentoring network for women in intelligence and 
representing intelligence as a discipline at interdisciplinary research institutions.  
Subordinate theme 2.2: “Prove that you are a business enabler.” 
As previously stated, the participants shared a service-oriented ideology of their work. 
They understood their main role and function to provide a support service to their 
organisations or clients by protecting assets and people through expert advice on 
threats and risk. The participants need to connect with stakeholders inside and outside 
the organisation that will enable them to fulfil this role. Dave succinctly linked his 
professional identity to his ability to relate to stakeholders in a manner that helps them 
to do their jobs better: 
So I think the identity would be established if you can prove that what 
you do is a business enabler, not a business hampering effort…  People 
should realize that what you do actually contributes to their success. 
(D80) 
However, initially, stakeholders do not understand intelligence and what value a SRIA 
can bring to the organisation.  Kate and Josh’s frustration with the lack of general 
knowledge of intelligence and its role in the private sector was evident: 
Society does not have a great understanding of what we are. I mean, if 
you talk to people, their conception is government intelligence is spies, 
right? Their reaction is, “that's a thing?” Or they might think it's more like 
corporate espionage. (K24) 
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Tina echoed a shared frustration that people see that you are a good report writer, and 
could therefore push you into a clerical role if you do not explain your role and function 
outright and with confidence guide their expectations: 
So expectations sometimes are misguided… and what is expected of us as 
an output actually doesn't talk to who we are and the role we are here to 
fulfil. So sometimes, we are requested to give clerical support function 
instead of proper analysis and input towards, as we said, strategic 
decision making. So that's frustrating. (T48) 
Participants only made an effort to explain to people their role when they were 
stakeholders or potential clients of their professional services. Most participants 
omitted to identify themselves as SRIA when meeting people socially. They were not 
ashamed of their profession, but they did not feel it was relevant or necessary to the 
discussion or thought it might elicit questions about sensitive or confidential issues. 
Dave joked and said he would tell people he is a well-paid kindergarten teacher, but on 
a more serious note, he stated that he would tell people that he works in the 
administrative part of a bank, which sounds “boring enough to steer the conversation 
away” from him. Emma never told anyone what her work is because she does not think 
it is safe to do so, while Vic would tell people that he deals with “specialised operational 
risk”. Andy would tell people that he does research and analysis, and that would usually 
end the conversation because it does not sound interesting to the other party. Both Josh 
and Ben would say they are cyber threat intelligence analysts because it has become a 
familiar role in the last few years. 
However, when the participants encountered stakeholders in their organisations and 
related industries, they were very clear about who they are and their role. The 
participants were eager to share how they educate the stakeholders, with Josh even 
accepting it as “part of the tradecraft path of enlightening and explaining” (J80).  The 
participants do not have to justify their existence, as their organisations already decided 
they need the function, did a job analysis and went through the recruitment process. 
However, the challenge is to ensure that they add value and are seen to be valuable to 
the organisation by the stakeholders.   
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Kate has a similar approach where she deliberately went out and learnt as much as 
possible about the organisation to determine how she can provide better decision-
support: 
Well, look, I'm part of a new team, and my job is to support you. My job 
is to give you the information that helps you make the decisions you want 
to make. I'm not making any decisions for you; I'm not telling you “No”, 
I'm not telling you “Yes” I'm not telling you “well only if…” I'm just telling 
you “Here's information to help you make your decision.  What 
information do you want to know?” (K13) 
SRIA should also be competent in interpersonal relations within an organisation. As their 
main business objective is to influence decision-making by providing unbiased decision 
support, it requires advanced self-awareness and facilitation skills. In terms of self-
awareness, the participants shared how they build meaningful relations with 
stakeholders by being humble and approachable. Dave was self-effacing to get their 
cooperation or collect information from them: 
I never take myself too seriously. Meaning I would rather surprise 
somebody…I play a bit stupid at the beginning… the Colombo approach. 
People are immediately willing to help. But if you come into the room like 
an elephant, people don't want to help or listen to you. (D97) 
Josh reiterated how he approached stakeholders explaining to them the significance of 
his role and building a trusting relationship with them where he had to prove himself to 
be credible and trustworthy: 
And just having an understanding of their world that's been key to 
building those types of relationships, and that's something that the 
organization didn't necessarily have. (J50) Without credibility, then you 
know… what you're saying has to be taken seriously, has to have some 
substance, and has to have some influence. You can be the best 
intelligence analyst, but maybe like any other job, if you lose credibility 
for any reason, that diminishes. The approachability, I think that's just a 
business skill in any organization - you need to have that. If someone 
doesn't like you, they are not going to listen to what you say. If they do 
like you, they will fall off a cliff if you say so. (J105) 
As with any other profession, the participants faced challenges with interpersonal 
relations at work. Dave was perhaps the most cogent on how he dealt with obstacles in 
the workplace pragmatically and professionally: 
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My colleagues are not part of my frustrations at all. If you're walking 
down a certain corridor and it is blocked, you can either continue to run 
against that wall or find another way. So I'm not dogmatic. You know, I 
do whatever this organization asked me to do. I'm being paid very well. 
So why should there be frustration? (D64)  
In summary, participants’ professional identity is not dependent on the existence or 
membership of a professional body or socialisation with others in the same profession. 
Neither do they need the validation of the general public of their professional status or 
legitimacy. However, they value the occasional functional interaction and liaison with 
counterparts on a professional level which reinforced their professional identity and 
sense of belonging.  When confronted with ignorance of their role in the organisation 
and the possible hampering of their function's execution, they deliberately and 
professionally connect with stakeholders to illustrate their value to the organisation. 
They are pragmatic in their approach to nurture relationships with stakeholders and 
willing to adapt their functional scope if the client requires it. 
5.5.3 Superordinate Theme 3: Professional Identity Enactment in the Workplace 
Professional identities are primarily constructed and maintained in a professional 
workplace context. It, therefore, stands to reason that the participants’ day-to-day lived 
experience would be impacted by their organisational habitus, specifically the dynamic 
interaction between them and the organisations for which they work.  Three major 
themes were identified on how their work environment enabled or frustrated their 
quest for meaningful work (see Figure 21 below). The most common theme was how 
the embedded organisational culture, or “the way we do things here”, influenced how 
they practice their professional identity daily.  
     Superordinate theme 3: Professional Identity Enactment in the Workplace 
Subordinate theme Key concepts and issues 
3.1  Organisational culture is 
paramount 
3.1 (a)  Organisational identity 
3.1 (b)  Values and behaviour 
3.1 (c)  Leadership 
3.2  Organisational structure 
restraints impact  
Matrix model most appropriate, In-sourcing 
3.3:  Inappropriate HR 
practices 
Recruitment, career pathing 
Figure 21: Superordinate theme 3: Professional identity enactment in the 
workplace 
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The organisational culture subthemes included the impact of organisational identity, the 
values and behaviours that enable their professional enactment, and the impact of 
managers and leaders’ actions on their job satisfaction and, ultimately, their 
professional identity. The second theme dealt with the challenges they faced when 
confronted with negative perceptions about the security departments’ place and role in 
the organisational structure and the associated power and image implications, limiting 
the impact they think they have in the organisation.  Lastly, the participants shared how 
damaging inappropriate or ill-advised Human Resources practices can be to enact their 
professional identity. 
Subordinate theme 3.1: Organisational culture is paramount: “This is a great team to 
be the goalie for” 
Organisational culture is a complex combination of values, behavioural norms, artefacts 
and patterns of behaviour—“who we are as an organisation and the way we do things 
here”. The interviews' analysis identified a few subthemes that can be grouped in the 
broader organisational culture subordinate theme. These are 1) organisational identity, 
2) values and behaviour and 3) leadership.  
Subordinate theme 3.1(a): Organisational identity 
As seen in Chapter 2 of the thesis, organisational identity is the individual’s sense of 
belonging to the organisation for which he works. The participants exhibited various 
degrees of association with their organisation, which could reflect what extent they 
choose, or are able, to enact their professional identity in that organisation. Two of the 
participants (Dave and Ben) exhibited a very strong association with their employers, 
which enjoy high public regard for their role, values and impact on society. Dave 
outrightly stated that his organisational identity is stronger than his professional identity 
when asked which identity is the strongest. He reasoned that the organisation afforded 
him opportunities that he would not have had in other organisations, and he, therefore, 
“totally identify myself with the shop”. (D87)  As seen earlier, Dave also exhibited the 
least preference for a job title when he shared the many titles he had for the same job 
in the last 20 years. 
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Ben shared his high regard for the organisational values and the impact the research 
university has where he works as the cyber threat intelligence analyst. He is especially 
proud to be associated with an organisation that is at the forefront of scientific research, 
and he feels his job is to protect the network so that the researchers can do great things 
that matter. His values are embodied in the organisational quest for humanity, and they 
allow him to contribute to this through his role and make his work meaningful. He even 
went so far as to say that his work allowed him to be a better person. 
I knew I could make more money elsewhere. But this is a great team to 
be the goalie for. This organization has given me the latitude to actually 
help. I'm sure you get involved in organisations where you can make more 
of a difference than you are allowed to. But this organization will actually 
let me help… the organization had afforded me the opportunity to use 
my skills in a more broad way than in a less narrow way. I think that real 
satisfaction in your work, you know, just raises the tone of your life, and 
it allows you more resources to be kind to your family and the people 
around you. (B42-46) 
Josh shared that his organisational identity in the private sector is also relatively strong, 
despite him having more “purpose” when he took abusers, terrorists and drug pushers 
“off the streets” when he was in law enforcement. He exhibited self-awareness that he 
might never again feel “really dutiful” or the same job satisfaction in other organisations. 
But he can associate himself with the values and purpose of his new organisation 
because it provided him with other professional identity benefits that he did not have in 
law enforcement.  
I think that in all honesty, there is an element of that (working in law 
enforcement) that you’re not necessarily going to get from other types of 
organizations, and that's maybe just a reality. Now that I’m in the bank, 
you know our values… it's about promoting the public good and acting in 
the interest of the citizens, of financial stability and yes, these things… 
and that ideology is sufficient for me… it’s not the same as what I did 
before. (Job satisfaction) is different. It evolved, right? It’s hard to 
compare… If you got points for good karma, right, then there's probably 
more good karma in taking people off the streets supplying drugs to kids 
than there is preventing cyber-attacks! In terms of most personal 
fulfilment stuff, I found the private sector a new challenge and a different 
challenge and much more challenging and me having to evolve more than 
when I was with traditional law enforcement. (J54-60) 
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In contrast, Kate was less enthusiastic about her organisational identity and exhibited a 
preference for professional identity rather than organisational identity due to her 
experiences at her previous employer in the Intelligence community. The organisation 
experienced serious problems which, together with her frustrations, made her doubt 
the meaningfulness of her work as she could not see that her role contributed to the 
overall effort. This eroded her identification with the organisation and was the main 
reason Kate moved to the private sector.  Her reliance on organisational identity for job 
satisfaction has reduced, making her more aware of her skills and the value she, in her 
profession, can bring to an organisation. 
The challenge was around feeling that as an individual, not me personally, 
it was across the board…it was as an individual, my role wasn’t valued... 
We're putting a lot of time and energy into work that then just kind of got 
stuck in the spinning cycle. So it is important to me that I don't feel that 
my work will go out into the ether… in a vacuum.  I don't have to feel like 
I'm saving lives every day… But there's some value… I should feel that 
there’s value in my work overall or an opportunity to learn.  (The situation 
at the Agency) … made me stronger professionally and personally… I 
needed to really figure out what I liked in the job, and I thought I was 
good at and what it wasn't. (K35-38) 
Likewise, Vic has difficulty identifying with his employer due to the much narrower focus 
than when he served in the military. Previously, he felt that he served a greater good, 
but now, he finds it discouraging professionally to be in an organisation with a narrower 
purpose. This is why he is one of the participants who deliberately expanded his 
professional role and contribution to the broader organisation. He would not feel that 
he contributed to the organisation, thereby impacting his organisational identity.   
But unless I'm working with more of the broader organisation, I actually 
don't feel that I'm making a broader contribution because the internal 
clients I'm working with right now are quite focused; they’re very narrow. 
I feel definitely… when I was an intelligence analyst in my former role, I 
did feel that… I was serving a greater good… and here I feel that I'm 
definitely serving not necessarily a lesser good, but just a much smaller 
and narrower purpose. So personally, for me, it's very discouraging 
professionally. (V36) 
It is interesting to note how the participants with the strongest organisational identity 
are also those for have worked the longest for a specific company (Dave 20 years and 
Ben 9 years vis-à-vis Vic (7 years) and Kate and Josh (3 years). It seems as though there 
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is a direct correlation between the organisational identity, job satisfaction and retention 
of the participants. All three participants with a weaker organisational identity than 
Dave and Ben have moved to other companies since the interviews were conducted. 
Subordinate theme 3.1(b): Values and behaviour 
It is generally accepted that knowledge workers thrive in organisational circumstances 
where they are given the freedom or autonomy to perform their intellectually 
challenging work in a conducive context. Six of the ten participants shared how they 
appreciate the organisational culture where they are given free rein when “I was told to 
do what you think you should be doing.”(J38)  
For most of the participants, the autonomy that the organisation gave them was 
different from what they experienced in previous organisations, whether it was in the 
intelligence community or not. Now, they had the autonomy to identify and decide 
which issues they should focus on, talk to whomever they needed to get the job done 
and decide what resources they needed to do their job effectively and be creative. Josh 
summed it up succinctly when he stated that: 
There's a lot of freedom… there's a good amount of freedom in that 
you're asked to comment as you're the subject matter expert. You know 
the discipline. You determine what you should be looking at and how 
much effort and resources should be given to each other. I enjoy that 
freedom. (J77) 
In the same vein, Dave valued the organisational culture of being open to other 
viewpoints where people have the freedom to differ from each other without 
consequences “the freedom to not agree with other views.” (D36) Ben and Kate 
appreciated their organisational culture, where people are given the freedom to be 
entrepreneurial. Ben recounted an incident when he realised the extent of the latitude 
the organisation gave him when he discussed collection and analysis requirements with 
clients, and they turned the tables on him and said: “well, you're my analyst - tell me 
what they should be.” (B28). Kate shared how she is now thriving in her company as she 
has ownership of her space as she is allowed to shape her function the way she sees fit 
and apply her networking skills to benefit the effort. 
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I have ownership of my space, not a particular product. I have ownership 
over my space, and my space is asking questions, trying my best to figure 
this out, hold this puzzle together, get the information and then present 
it to someone. (K33)  
This laissez-faire organisational culture can be counterproductive for SRIA as they need 
some kind of feedback or validation to ascertain whether they are fulfilling the 
organisation's needs. Ben shared how the lack of feedback from management initially 
made him think that they are not interested in what he has to say, but with time, he 
realised that they trust him enough to do his job and that he should not view their 
inattention negatively. 
I can't get regular time on their calendar to present to them… I'm a victim 
of my own success because I have a process that's working, and they're 
like, “well, that isn’t on fire, that’s not burning down. So I'm going to leave 
it alone and go focus on something else”. (B31) 
Participants shared how they would get validation from interaction with their 
counterparts in other organisations through functional networking, other colleagues 
and their interaction with fellow members of professional organisations. Those 
participants who are not members of professional organisations expressed that these 
networks could provide them with the validation they need to enact their professional 
identity. 
However, there are also values and behaviour in organisations that disable the 
enactment of the participants’ professional identity. Emma shared her frustration with 
the bank's organisational culture, where she works, as it does not afford her “space” to 
do what she wants to do. Even though she was the first risk intelligence analyst in the 
security department, the leadership had different ideas on what the role entails than 
her expectations. She ascribed these to a critical and conservative mindset that was 
mostly from her male colleagues who had a police background and, therefore, a 
different understanding of intelligence's function. 
My challenge is sometimes you come into the environment with different 
ideas trying to change how things are done. It takes a while to change 
behaviour. (E39) Some would try to block the good things it could 
implement; they are sabotaging you because of the mindset that I spoke 
about. (E62)  
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Similarly, a traditional and bureaucratic corporate culture where there is little 
innovation or an influx of outsiders bringing in new ideas is challenging for SRIA in the 
private sector.  Kate’s efforts to broaden the impact of her role to the broader company 
is stilted by the indifference of people who cannot understand the need for intelligence 
in their environments: 
There are parts of the business where people don’t understand what I do, 
and they… it’s an internal cultural thing. People aren't really mean or 
rude. The thing about my current company is that most of the people 
spent most of their career here.  I have seen more interest by people who 
have had other professional experience and exposure to risk, and they 
would then ask me about intelligence and risk intelligence. But the others 
have a very narrow focus that is kind of limited. (K49) 
Celia shared how surprised she was when she realised that the well-known consulting 
company she worked for did not espouse excellence and innovation. Their culture 
seemed to be doing just enough to deliver a service to clients, even if the service is 
mediocre. She resigned from the company because she could not agree with the 
pervasive satisficing attitude while trying to do everything with excellence. 
… Consulting companies… they don't really want to be excellent. You 
know good enough is good enough. You make more money when you just 
satisfy the need. You don't really... You almost never make more money 
by being excellent, you know, by exceeding expectations. And I found that 
very different to my own professional ethic. (C55) 
Subordinate theme 3.1(c): Leadership 
The way management embodies the organisational values and culture is decisive in 
whether the participants could effectively execute their roles and professional identity 
in the organisation. Positive relationships with leadership fostered a sense of support 
and belonging.  Vic shared how his manager’s accessibility and support fostered job 
satisfaction.  
I found it very helpful to have, for example, the head of security 
personally say to me, “You're doing a great job, or you're doing exactly 
what you should be doing”… He was actually very good at that in terms 
of support, and the other thing is the accessibility of senior management. 
He was also very accessible. He will talk to anybody from the registry clerk 
to the security officer, to you anytime. 
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Dave ascribed most of his success in the trust that his manager put in him 20 years 
before in the organisation. He allowed him to build up security risk management in the 
organisation, which expanded with time to become a dedicated protective intelligence 
function with a few spin-offs in other directions. His manager's leadership and the trust 
afforded to him contributed to his positive organisational identity. 
However, negative relationships with leadership erode trust in the person as well as the 
organisation. Employees might be afraid to show initiative as it might be misconstrued, 
even regarded as threatening to the manager. This vicious cycle usually ends up being 
negative for both the people and the organisation. The most common negative 
relationship with management among the participants was their frustration that 
managers do not necessarily understand the role and function of intelligence in the 
private sector but are also not willing to learn and would therefore redirect the function, 
ignore it or sabotage it as seen with Emma’s experience before.  
It has been evident that Vic’s relationship with his manager was healthy and provided 
him with the opportunity to contribute to the organisation to a larger extent. However, 
in subsequent personal correspondence after the interview, Vic shared how the 
company had some leadership upheaval, which led to the manager’s departure. The 
organisational ecosystem disintegrated in the absence of a strong leader, and the 
employees felt that the issue was dealt with in an unprofessional manner that was not 
conducive to job satisfaction or collegiality. The new management team had a law 
enforcement background and focused on the physical security and investigations aspect 
rather than operational and strategic decision support. He decided to resign after it 
became clear that the new management did not support his role and did not heed his 
advice.  
Subordinate theme 3.2: Organisational structure restraints impact 
Some participants repeatedly stated that their function should not be based at the 
security department, especially those analysts who provide a knowledge service to other 
areas of the organisation. The main reason was that they felt that the lingering 
bureaucratic organisational culture is reinforced with their placement in the organigram, 
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although they provide a cross-sectional service fitting in a matrix or functional 
organisation design. To a large extent, this is based on how other people perceive them 
as part of the support function and not the core business of their organisations. Vic’s 
deliberate efforts to disassociate himself with the security department has been 
discussed previously. Tina also shared her frustration with where her unit is placed in 
the security department: 
…the problem is actually being taken seriously and being misunderstood. 
So the role is misunderstood. Firstly are you a security guard? Are you an 
admin person? It's really never understood that you are fulfilling an 
intelligence analysis function. It's really misunderstood because of those 
things not having a professional body, but also not belonging to any other 
grouping within the institution. (T40) 
Both she and Vic advocated that their function should rather be situated at a more 
strategic level where their output is company-wide and where the security department 
would be just one of their clients: 
I would want to sell intelligence to the bank. In the sense that intelligence 
should be a strategic output. (T62) and  
I'm also almost advocating for, you know, that there should be an 
intelligence office for the bank that's outside of security, and security 
should obviously be one of the main clients. (V113) 
There are different types of functional models, wherever the structure itself is situated 
on the organigram. Andy and Kate, who have the widest reach in terms of internal 
clients, use external or embedded consultants or vendors such as Control Risks to 
provide general intelligence. Their task is then to contextualize it with their knowledge 
of the business needs and the operational and strategic requirements. Andy saw himself 
as the hub that gets the information from everywhere (including vendors) and then 
customise it to make it relevant to the client. Kate is concerned that both her external 
clients and companies, in general, would think that intelligence analysis is those 
products that vendors provide, without realising that someone still has to operationalise 
it and contextualise it for the company – asking the “so what for us?”. She sees this as 
the greatest challenge for the profession. 
So I don't have to be, and none of my team has to be, a deep expert on 
Indonesia's electoral politics. We need to understand what the 
importance of elections in Indonesia is for our company… in what ways it 
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could impact it and then find the experts to help us understand and then 
present and then we can take that information and contextualise and 
present it to our business. Our value is that we can understand our 
business really well and make all of that external vendor information 
relevant to this business. (K9-11) 
Here, Kate has reinforced that the security risk intelligence analyst's main function is to 
provide insight and foresight about threat events and threat actors to the business, 
where they need it, and in the manner they need it. Here, the concept of the “right 
intelligence, at the right time, in the right format to the right person” is a timely reminder 
of what the profession should strive for. On a more pragmatic and realistic note, Ben 
admitted that security risk intelligence as a function would be a luxury for many 
organisations. He agreed that such a function is already illustrative of the sophistication 
of the organisation and the leadership’s understanding that they need such a service.  
I think that SRIA is a luxury. In the traditional sense of like... you know if 
you can afford them, they provide value, but to really get the best out of 
people in that position, you have to have a fairly sophisticated …. You 
have to be either fairly far along in your own program, or they have to be 
able to take the initiative and be entrepreneurial. In the private sector,  
no one knows what you do. (A27) 
Subordinate theme 3.3: Inappropriate HR practices 
It is quite a daunting task to find someone with the right qualifications and attribute for 
a security risk intelligence analysis position. One of the refrains in the interviews is that 
analysts should be entrepreneurial to impact the organisation, which is a rare quality to 
find. At this stage, most participants have had bad experiences with Human Resources 
practitioners in the recruitment and staffing of positions in the field.  It is acknowledged 
that HR practitioners should be guided by the recruiting manager for the typical 
processes related to establishing a post, the recruitment process and the retention of 
the individuals. As professionals in their own right, they should know what the job entails 
and the type of person who should be recruited. However, as discussed throughout this 
study, many people inside the organisation do not know the role and function of the 
security risk intelligence analyst. 
The participants shared some of their experiences with inappropriate HR practices, 
especially recruitment. To a large extent, the recruiting managers are the culprits who 
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think, as Vic shared, “I can get anybody and they'll learn this job”. He experienced how 
people without the right qualifications, experience or attributes and skills were recruited 
in his organisation. These appointments eroded the morale and capability of the team 
as they had to be carried by the competent members of the group, while experienced 
members felt undervalued and overworked: 
I'm on a team of six, and four of the six have no post-secondary education; 
they have no relevant experience. For example, we have a human 
resources recruiter who was made into a senior Cybersecurity analyst and 
an executive administrative assistant made into a lead security analyst, 
and none of them has the right qualifications or experience. Those kinds 
of decisions erode the capability of the group… and they make those with 
experience bitter. It sounds personal, but it is very personal because you 
start to feel undervalued and you know you…, it's very basic to the human 
sort of instinct of feeling productive and saying, well, I worked hard for 
eight years to get to this position, where someone who hasn't, just gets 
it right? And we're being paid the same. (V75,76)  
Celia also expressed her frustration with managers and HR personnel that would target 
certain veterans for the security risk intelligence analyst position, even if they have 
never performed the function before. The function then never reaches its full potential, 
while it could also have negative consequences for the company: 
…the company will hire the ex- FBI or Defence guy and ask them or expect 
them to be an analyst.  And the ex-FBI security and the ex-Defence guy 
are so arrogant that they think they can do it. And it’s almost always a 
male, and the company gets terrible advice, right? But it is all kind of 
macho, golf club kind of stuff. You (as a woman) can't breakthrough. (C53) 
Emma is dismissive about the recruitment process in her organisation as it seemed to 
her that the HR personnel uses proforma questions that have nothing to do with the 
outcomes required of the role. 
When we do interviews to recruit such people, we must refrain from 
having these downloaded questions on the internet… it does not bring 
value to the process of recruiting the right type of person for these posts. 
Even the psychometric tests – some of them will not give you what you’re 
looking for. For this specific career, something new has to be developed 
to attract people like that or to recruit people with a specific mindset I’m 
talking about. Most of the questions are, “Where do you see yourself in 
the next five years?” This has no relevance to a person’s job. (E35-37) 
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  155 April  2021 
5.6 Discussion 
This study aimed to develop an understanding of the experiences of SRIA in the private 
sector, including what it means to be in this profession and what factors impact their 
professional identity. The findings in Chapter 5 provide original insight into how they 
perceive their profession and develop strategies to overcome the many challenges they 
face when executing their role.  
Their multi-faceted professional identity and the perceived impacts on professional 
relationships and the workplace have been highlighted. There are no other studies that 
empirically explored the professional identity of SRIA, whether they are in the private 
sector or the government sector, and therefore this study provides valuable insights into 
the lived experience of this group of under-researched professionals.  
The use of IPA as an analytical method has proved valuable as it provided a detailed and 
rich description of the participant’s lived experience. Figure 22 details the themes with 
each participant's relevant contributions. At times, the researcher was tempted to 
remove some of the participants' quotes as the word count increased. However, as this 
is the first study that gave a voice to the target group, it would have been sacrilege to 
do so.  The key findings are reported against each superordinate and its subthemes.  
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5.6.1 Purposeful Professional Self 
The participants revealed a deep-seated service orientation to protect and serve 
through two main objectives: 1) to provide expert advice on security threats and events 
that could impact the business and 2) provide risk intelligence support to decision-
makers throughout the organisations. Only three of the ten focused primarily on the 
first objective of providing only security risk intelligence to clients.  The majority of the 
participants (seven of the ten participants) have expanded their analytical and decision-
support services and expertise to other functional departments in their organisations, 
enabling these stakeholders in procurement, marketing, distribution, and the like to 
make better decisions. On a personal level, some of the participants who have shown 
Figure 22: Superordinate and subordinate themes with the relevant contributions of 
participants 
Professional Identity of Security Risk Intell igence Analysts 
 
 
Dalene Duvenage Page  157 April  2021 
their analytical mettle and understanding of the business are also roped into more 
strategic processes in the organisation, like strategic planning sessions. 
It is clear from the interviews that the participants are not that much concerned about 
their job titles. They would rarely use their official job titles and would use whatever 
name would serve their purpose and audience in a specific context, even if it means that 
they would rather not say what they do, because it can lead to unwelcome questions. It 
seems as though what they do, matters more to them than what title is bestowed on 
them. The values of integrity and objectivity guide them in their professional lives, and 
it does not seem that any of them encountered major professional challenges that 
undermined those values. Only one participant shared that she resigned from the 
consulting company, where she worked as their mediocre deliverables and corporate 
culture clashed with her work ethics. 
The results of their core competencies are aligned to Moore, Krizan, and Moore’s (2005) 
three basic abilities necessary for intelligence analysis: thinking, collaborating and 
communicating. The participants’ ability to think critically, creatively, on different levels 
of analysis and sensing the importance and relevance of events and information to 
business needs is the core of their abilities.  As seen from the results, their competencies 
to communicate well to influence decision-making and liaise or collaborate with people 
to obtain and share information are critical to their role. What sets them apart from 
others, especially those in the intelligence community, is their application of these three 
core competencies in a business context. They need to understand the business of the 
organisation and identify who might be users of intelligence. The networking and client 
relationships become important to build trust relationships in which they foster a need 
for intelligence products and services and make sure they manage expectations 
effectively. SRIA in the private sector is a typical example of intelligence professionals 
that have changed their mind-set from a secretive “need to know” to a “need to share” 
and responsibility to provide” mind-set (Spracher, 2009). 
The main attribute critical to a successful SRIA is a growth mindset in which they would 
welcome opportunities to learn and improve continuously as not one day is the same. 
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To counter-balance this excitement and quest for new information and insights, they 
also stressed the ability to be tenacious and patient. As Lynn stated, “it’s a slow-cooker, 
not MacDonald’s”, as it takes time to understand the complex problems one has to 
analyse, but also to build relationships that might influence operational and strategic 
decisions.  
The participants exhibited positive feelings of job satisfaction and meaningfulness, 
mainly since they can use their skills in an environment that espouses innovation and 
entrepreneurial thinking to benefit the organisation. This finding supports Mercurio 
(2019) that a positive attitude to work, the enacting of personal values, having pride in 
one’s skills and knowledge and developing positive relationships make work meaningful. 
There were no negative feelings towards their personal experience as SRIA in the private 
sector. The only negative aspects were in an organisational context related to the 
external perception of the security department and lingering racial and gender biases in 
organisations. The participants applied both main identity work strategies. Vic only 
applied identity protection strategies (impression management and disassociation). All 
participants used identity restructuring strategies to extend their role content through 
job crafting and innovation to overcome a perceived lack of legitimacy and extend their 
influence in the company.  
5.6.2 Connectedness to others in a professional context 
Their connectedness with others in the workplace had two main objectives: firstly, to 
strengthen their understanding of the subject matter, they have to research and to seek 
validation from peers in functional networks, social media and mentoring while, 
secondly, to gain understanding and acceptance with stakeholders to see them as 
valuable partners in achieving business objectives. Both these objectives serve their 
professional identity quest well, as it forces them to be self-aware of their shortcomings 
and think about ways to satisfy new stakeholders’ intelligence needs through pragmatic 
and persuasive relationships. Membership of professional organisations is not of 
paramount importance to them as their individual professional identity is strong, and 
they experience validation in their professional networking. The disassociation from or 
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disinterest in professional organisation membership is not necessarily a negative 
reflection on professional organisations. Rather, it should be seen that SRIA’s are rather 
“lone than pack animals” and would seek out professional organisations if they think it 
could be to their benefit.  
5.6.3 Professional Identity Enactment in the Workplace 
The workplace as structure is both an enabler and disabler of professional identity 
enactment. As the participants mainly find meaningfulness in their work in their ability 
to use their skills and knowledge, the organisational identity was not a critical factor in 
their professional identity enactment. Companies with values reflecting a society-wide 
mission and responsibility positively correlated to the participants’ expression of 
meaningfulness in making a difference and protecting or serving something greater than 
themselves. These three participants’ organisational identity was relatively strong, while 
the rest did not rate this factor high when discussing how the organisational context 
influences their professional identity. 
The most prominent organisational culture factor that enabled professional identity is 
autonomy and a value of excellence to perform their role to the best of their ability.  On 
the flip side, this would also mean that there might not be sufficient validation of work 
done. To counter this ambivalence, effective leadership has proved to be critical in 
ensuring that the participants retain their focus and enthusiasm. 
Not many organisations have evolved into a matrix networked organisational structure 
and remained in the Tayloristic bureaucratic stance, leading to at least one participant 
struggling professionally.  For the others, the organisational placement of their analytic 
function within the security department had implications in terms of impact and power 
relations. It is difficult to counter the perception that the security department is a 
stepchild to the core business and made-up of “mall cops” and convince people that you 
are a highly qualified and experienced knowledge worker who can offer a force-
multiplier service. The participants offer some suggestions on which business model 
could work best to address this current workplace problem. 
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Lastly, unsuitable Human Resources practices disabled the participants’ enactment of 
their professional identity in the workplace due to incorrect recruitment practices and 
the absence of career pathing. This led to poor retention rates, job dissatisfaction and 
disengagement, but worse, it entrenched a practice that is damaging to the career group 
as a whole.  Proposals for the improvement of these practices will be made in the last 
chapter. 
5.7 Limitations 
The principle of credibility is critical when assessing a qualitative study like this, 
especially using IPA as a method. The researcher’s main motivation for using IPA was to 
give a voice to the participants. One of the study's main limitations was the impact of 
language, as the researcher and three of the participants were not first-language English 
speakers. Often, the meaning of the idioms and terminology could have been 
interpreted differently, but the researcher attempted to accept the intended meaning 
of the transcripts in the context of the questions and how the interview took place. 
Although a strength for this study is that there was a broad representation of different 
organisational contexts in which the participants worked, it was also a limitation. There 
were unique organisational contextual factors that may have influenced the 
participants' responses without the researcher being aware of these.  
Another limitation was time constraints that prevented the researcher from 
interviewing participants a second time to clarify certain issues that emerged during the 
first phase of interpretation. Some dimensions “screamed” screamed for further 
discussion, or even maybe a longitudinal approach to determine whether there was any 
growth or change in the participants' sense-making in certain aspects, like 
meaningfulness in the workplace.  
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the professional identity of individual SRIA in the private sector, 
using IPA as a qualitative method to obtain rich and granular data. The study concluded 
that the professional identity of individual security risk intelligence analysts in the 
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private sector is similar across the five countries and the different organisational 
contexts that were represented.  
The study concluded that they perceive to play an important role in securing their 
companies and society in the broader sense. Their professional identity is centred on 
their expert knowledge and ability to perform complex intellectual tasks in providing 
forewarning and insight into threats to the organisation or client's well-being and 
sustainability. They are generally people with a strong individual professional identity 
that reflects high levels of job satisfaction, pride and autonomy in their profession who 
thrive on connecting on a professional, functional level with stakeholders. Their main 
professional challenge related to the relative lack of understanding of their role in the 
private sector by the HR department and potential clients of their deliverables. Those 
who are entrepreneurially inclined and wanted to extend their impact on the 
organisation—as they feel they can make a greater contribution—are frustrated that 
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Chapter 6 
Integrated analysis  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will summarise and integrate the findings of the two empirical studies and 
literature in relation to the research objectives and questions presented in the thesis 
with the implications for praxis.  Some suggestions are made for further research. 
6.2 Discussion of findings in relation to the context of the research questions  
The findings of the research confirm Ashforth’s (2016) notion that “identity bridges all 
levels of analysis, levels of self, and a multitude of disciplines” that brought about 
“exciting and important” research results on the professional identity of security risk 
intelligence analysts in the private sector.  The three main research objectives were 
adequately investigated, and credible findings were made.  
6.2.1 Does an emerging profession exist in the security risk intelligence discipline for 
analysts on an international level? 
The participation of 75 respondents in Study 1 (16 different nationalities, working in 28 
countries with three working globally) and 10 participants from five different countries 
who participated in the second study, confirmed that there are people who self-
identified and associated themselves with the profession.   
6.2.2 What is the professional identity of the individual Security Risk Intelligence 
Analyst in the private sector? 
Although the profession is relatively new, and the participants were from diverse types 
of organisations, economic sectors and countries, the findings offer a surprisingly similar 
or shared professional identity. The results indicate that the construct of Social Identity 
Theory (SIT) of Tajfel and Turner (2004) and Turner’s Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) is 
applicable in the context of the thesis. Analysts have shown that, individually, they 
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identify themselves with a perceived group of people who perform the same 
professional functions by participating in the study.  
This means that people have wilfully decided that there exists such a profession as 
Security Risk Intelligence Analysis, even though they might not necessarily have had 
interactions with such a group or belonged to professional organisations that serve the 
group (Brooks et al., 2011). One of the contributions of this study might be that people 
realise that there is such a profession that they can identify with.  For the first time, 
individuals could externalise their identification and association with the core (this is 
me), content (I am like) and behaviours (I act like one) of the professional group 
(Ashforth et al., 2008). Therefore, their individual professional identity became the 
blueprint of the collective professional identity that will be discussed in the next section.  
There were some elements of difference, but none of them impacted the overall 
convergence of perceptions that emerged during the study. These differences could be 
ascribed to the main characteristics of professional identity: it is multifaceted, dynamic, 
have individual agency, and changes in interaction with others. The differences, 
therefore, contributed to the richness and thickness of the data, while it also opened up 
opportunities for further research. 
6.2.3 Is there a shared or collective professional identity among Security Risk 
Intelligence Analyst in the private sector? 
The findings prove that there is indeed a collective professional identity among the 
participants in the target group as the seven prerequisites (Ashmore et al., 2004) of  
“self-categorisation that is shared with a group of others” have been met as discussed 
below:   
i)   SRIA self-categorise with the profession  
Individual SRIA placed themselves in the professional group when they participated in 
the study as they perceived themselves to be similar in one way or the other with the 
group. The criteria for participation in the study were extensive and served as 
preconditions of not only participation in the study, but also a pre-emptive expression 
of belongingness to the emerging profession.  
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SRIA also feel that they offer something unique to the work ecology that no other 
profession does. Whether this is actually true or not is irrelevant as this is how they 
subjectively make sense and articulate their professional identity in their quest to find 
ways to contribute meaningfully to society.  
ii) SRIA have positive (and negative) attitudes towards the profession (evaluation) 
The shared values of integrity, honesty, and objectivity that most participants offer are 
typical of many professions and not unique to security risk intelligence analysis. The vast 
majority of the participants have a good perception of their profession and would 
recommend the job to other people with the same interests and skills. The only negative 
attitudes related to the contra points of the positive aspects. In this sense, a major 
concern might be that SRIA can become frustrated due to a notion that they can do so 
much more than what the organisation allows them to do or do not have sufficient 
resources or that HR practices impede them. This could lead to burn-out, especially 
where the intellectual inputs that the role requires, or feelings of frustrations, does not 
match personal expectations and organisational realities. 
iii) The degree of importance of group membership to the individual’s overall self-
concept 
Due to the idiosyncrasies of individual context and personal interests, the findings did 
not prove an overwhelming shared benefit from belonging to this profession. However, 
the simple majority (51%) value the intellectually stimulating nature of the work and the 
self-validation and respect they derive from executing this role. Job satisfaction is closely 
related to identifying with the organisations’ values and an organisational culture that 
allows autonomy and growth opportunities. They would primarily identify with the 
profession for personal reasons: to exploit or gain a better understanding of the subject 
matter and, more importantly, because they get validation from peers when they can 
share their advanced thinking skills and expert deliverables. Some of them might also 
associate with the profession to gain knowledge about best practice and benchmark to 
improve their own professional processes. 
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iv)  The affective sense of belonging or attachment and sense of interdependence with 
the social group  
They see themselves as a valuable partner in protecting the private sector’s interests, 
including their employees, clients, processes and products or services. However, at this 
stage, the affective sense of belonging is definitely grounded in the individual benefit 
and esoteric value they think they bring to the workplace and not in a common feeling 
of attachment to the wider group. The interdependence level is low, and there is no 
evidence of feeling ashamed when someone in the same role in another context or 
company does something wrong. They do not see it as bringing disrepute to the 
profession. The main reason for this might be that this is really an emerging profession 
and that the sense of belonging has only just manifested and is therefore still very much 
in the I/me phase.  
v)  The degree to which the individual is socially embedded with a particular collective 
identity  
One of the more interesting findings of the study is that self-identification with the 
profession does not rely on social interaction (Ashforth & Mael, 1989) and is therefore 
not an indicator of or a prerequisite for a strong professional identity. Although most of 
the survey participants belonged to professional organisations, only 14 (19%) belonged 
to a body specifically aimed at security risk intelligence analysts (AIRIP). Functional 
interaction and liaison seem to be preferred above the social interaction, networking 
and related sharing of best practices in the context of a professional organisation. 
vi)  The extent of behavioural involvement with the social group  
The study confirmed that the SRIA shared the same behaviour (what we do) with others 
in the profession. Their role and function were very clear as being “providing 
forewarning and situational awareness”. This rhetoric also strengthens their 
professional identity because it is seen as the essence of their trade, resulting in a 
mutually beneficial relationship where the more they use rhetoric, the stronger their 
professional identity becomes.  
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vii)  The content and meaning the collective identity provides to the individual in terms 
of the extent to which the individual associates self-descriptive characteristics with the 
group, the group’s ideology and group narrative or history. 
As this profession is emerging, there would be little to share in history and ideology, 
even self-descriptions. The most common refrain among the participants in both studies 
was that their role and function are not known in the organisation or among the general 
public. Therefore, it is not easy to offer a value proposition to the business beyond the 
security department. This should not pose too much of a problem with companies and 
professionals who already have well-established intelligence analysis units in their 
security departments. However, many of the participants exhibited an entrepreneurial 
spirit in which they would like to expand their value proposition to “more than just 
security”. The unfamiliarity with their function might prove to be too difficult to 
overcome, especially in more bureaucratically inclined organisations or where the 
placement of such a function can prove difficult to manage in terms of the power 
dynamics. However, this venture could be attainable in companies that are already 
moving towards a matrix-based organisation where the function could be appreciated 
and used to achieve multiple organisational objectives.  
Ironically, the fact that the participants do not share a common job title, or even a job 
description, is a shared characteristic.  This would imply that the title is not as important 
as the work and value one offers to your stakeholders. The one consequence of this 
absence of shared job titles is that they have an individualised outlook on their 
professional identity. They would rather be known by their names than by their titles, 
which might also be typical of a new breed of knowledge workers in the current 
individualistic society. 
6.3 Limitations 
The limitations of the two empirical studies were discussed in previous chapters, but the 
two overarching limitations of the thesis will be discussed here. The first overall possible 
limitation was the generalisability of the findings as the actual target population's size is 
not known. There is no way to determine whether the 75 participants in the survey, of 
which ten then participated in the interviews, is fully representative of the SRIA 
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professional community. The second possible general limitation was that the 
researcher’s subjectivity and insider experience might have influenced the validity of the 
findings. The fallible human element has been present throughout the research: from 
the development of the two research instruments, the interview process, the coding and 
identification of themes and the interpretation of the data. 
6.4 Contribution to the Security Risk Management field  
This study makes three contributions to the Security Risk Management discipline. Firstly, 
it provides an evidence base to inform industry, education and professional 
organisations on the typical profile and functions of the emergent profession of SRIA. 
Secondly, it contributes to an understanding of how the different dimensions of 
professional identity shape these professionals and their search for professional 
meaningfulness. Lastly, the study also makes four main recommendations to SRIA and 
other stakeholders to strengthen the development of the profession and the identity of 
the practitioners in this emerging field. 
6.5 Recommendations and further research  
Four broad recommendations are made to SRIA, their managers, professional bodies, 
Human Resources practitioners dealing with these professionals, and other stakeholders 
in the private security sector. 
6.5.1    Create opportunities to reflect on professional identity and meaningfulness  
All the participants in the study commented that this was the first opportunity they ever 
had to reflect on their work and the reasons they chose to remain in this profession. 
Usually, individuals and organisations blame a lack of time and opportunity as reasons 
why reflection and learning opportunities are not actively encouraged. The value of 
mindfulness or self-awareness is critical to job satisfaction and effectiveness.  In this 
regard, it would be helpful to regularly reflect on one’s professional objectives, whether 
there is a synergy between personal and organisational values and identify ways to 
maximise one’s impact on the workplace (see Appendix E for a proposed worksheet that 
could be used for professional reflection). 
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Professional organisations or analytical units in organisations could also use the 
questions posed in the survey and interviews and those in Appendix E to enable sessions 
during which analysts could externalise their professional identity and professional 
needs, thereby discovering commonalities and strengthening collective professional 
identity. Some of the resultant benefits could be that professional organisations would 
better understand why analysts become members of, or steer away from professional 
organisations, thereby ensuring that they offer the benefits that SRIA requires in a 
collective professional context. 
As this was the first study in the professional identity of SRIA in the private sector, it 
might be useful to conduct longitudinal studies to determine changes in the professional 
identity factors identified in this study. Pointers might include the demography of 
analysts and to what extent younger analysts find a professional home in the industry, 
whether the demand for SRIA has increased or decreased in the private security sector 
and to make proposals for a viable professional pipeline to ensure the strengthening and 
growth of the profession in the future. 
6.5.2   Define the unique value proposition of SRIA to stakeholders 
It is clear from the research findings that few of the stakeholders understand the 
function of SRIA and its value to the private sector.  It is crucial that prominent SRIA and 
professional organisations in the security or risk domain, like AIRIP and ASIS, advocate 
awareness of the function and its value to security and other organisations focusing on 
protective risk. These awareness campaigns can be launched across digital and physical 
channels to reach all stakeholders, including business media outlets, conferences, 
television and radio, podcasts, and all other stakeholders' communication channels.   
To support these advocacy campaigns, research can be done in a typical business school 
context regarding stakeholder analysis, Return on Investment (ROI) driver analysis, and 
the different business models in which the SRIA function creates value to organisations. 
This study identified a range of business models, including in-house experts, embedded 
consultants, matrix cross-functional expert advisers and different levels of outsourced 
variants.  
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It is further recommended that SRIA engage with their managers and HR partners to 
relook the job title and description to reflect the actual functions and responsibilities of 
SRIA in the private sector. 
6.5.3   Partner with organisational Human Resources and professional HR bodies to 
improve HR practices in Security Risk Management 
To bolster the recognition of SRIA and address the identified challenges with 
inappropriate Human Resources practices, it is prudent that individual SRIA make an 
effort to educate their hiring and HR managers on the role, functions and requirements 
of the function. On a broader, more strategic level, companies and professional bodies, 
like AIRIP and ASIS, could partner with relevant Human Resources bodies that develop a 
systematic classification of job roles and required skillsets for this emerging profession. 
The results can support business leaders and HR managers in establishing clear 
strategies for recruiting and developing the right skills needed to leverage security risk 
Intelligence analysis in the workplace. It can also help establish a common vocabulary to 
be used by HR recruiters and education providers so that supply and demand can more 
effectively meet in the job marketplace. Another benefit would be the definition of 
appropriate career pathways and retention strategies for this professional group.  
6.5.4   Make the SRIA profession future-ready by exploiting synergies in related sectors 
such as cybersecurity, data science,  business continuity management and resilience 
This study identified those skills and competencies that would be critical for SRIA to 
remain relevant in a world where threats are increasingly multidimensional, 
interconnected and manifesting in the cyber domain. Analysts would need to be trained 
in dark web exploitation, data visualisation, coding, data science, and artificial and 
augmented intelligence to create real-time response algorithms to identify 
vulnerabilities and build scenarios to conduct strategic threat futures.   
The critical thinking, analytical and communication skills of SRIA should not only be 
restricted to the security management and risk disciplines. These skills are high in 
demand, and researchers could identify and develop shared interests and transversal 
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skills in emerging technology-related fields. This might mean that the SRIA expand their 
impact to a wider field and even create new career opportunities away from the security 
risk discipline. One example is “data interpretation” or “analytics translation” which has 
created a niche for people with these skills to connect technical data scientists with the 
business needs and objectives.  
6.6 Conclusion  
The present study highlighted the importance of a well-developed and strong 
professional identity of security risk intelligence analysts in the private sector. The 
research illustrated how a weak or absent professional identity in the security context 
could inhibit individual professional growth and job satisfaction. This could lead to 
losses, harm to employees, customers or the general public and reputational damage to 
the company.  The study concluded that there are indeed practitioners across the world 
and organisational contexts who self-identify with a “security risk intelligence analyst” 
profession. Furthermore, they share a professional identity that is more based on 
individual excellence, intellectual labour, networking and pragmatic relationship 
management than a group-based broad self-concept.  
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Literature search strategy used in the study 
Parameter Narrow Broad (Key words/search terms/approach) 
Language English (US & UK) Other language that I could understand (Dutch) 
or articles that were translated from the 
original to English. 




Extent of empirical research, key variables, 
measurement,  methods of analysis, strength 
and weaknesses of existing literature, 
relationship between theories, phenomenon, 
gaps 
Subject Area Security risk analysis Security management, privatisation of 
security/intelligence, outsourcing, contractors, 
embedded analysts. 
 Intelligence analysis Intelligence, analytical tradecraft, threat 
analysis, security intelligence, protective 
intelligence, security/intelligence expertise, 
skills set, values & ethics, management of 
intelligence, attributes 
 Professional identity Occupational/work/career/vocational identity 
OR image OR perception OR commitment OR 
perspectives,  organisational identity, identity 
construction, corporate culture, identity 
management, ethics, values, identity conflicts, 
professional agency, professional perceptions, 





Organisational Studies, Sociology of 
professions, emerging professions, 
globalisation, the new world of work, 
knowledge-intensive firms, knowledge workers, 
hybrid professionalism, professional 
development, power relations 
 Identity theories Social theory, self-categorisation, self-
identification, individual identity, collective 
identity, group identity, organisational identity, 
psychology, sociology, social psychology 
Business area Private/Corporate 
security risk OR 
intelligence 
Private/Corporate security, general consulting 
firms, cross-domain international companies, 
intelligence and risk consulting 
Geographical 
area 
International Global, multinational, transnational 
Publication 
period 
Last 10 years Last 30 years 




Professional magazines, journals, websites of 
companies and  professional organisations 
 
APPENDIX B 
Typical job advertisements for security risk intelligence analysts in the private sector 
  
An international security 
risk/intelligence consultancy with offices in 
US, UK, South Africa 
 
A US based think 






























Research questions and the related survey questions 
 
 Research questions Survey Questions  
1. What is the self-perceived 
role and function of SRIA in 
the private sector? 
(S14):  In your experience, what is the main role and 
function of the SRIA in the private sector? 
(Open-ended format) 
2. Are there a shared self-
perceived 
uniqueness/esoteric “greater 
cause” to the SRIA in the 
private sector? 
(S15): In your experience, what is the unique 
contribution of SRIA to the private sector and to 
society? 
(Open-ended format) 
3. How do intelligence analysts, 
individually and collectively, 
conceptualise or define their 
professional identity? 
S16): Please rate the extent to which you agree with 
each of the following statements: 
(S16/1) Generally, the more my goals, values, and 
beliefs overlap with those of my profession, the 
happier I am. 
(S16/2) I would rather say ‘we’ than ‘they’ when 
talking about the profession I work in. 
(S16/3) I strongly define myself as a security risk 
intelligence analysis professional. 
(S16/4) I’m not interested in what others think about 
the security risk intelligence analysis profession.* 
(S16/5) I currently attend /would like to attend events 
where security risk intelligence analysis best practice is 
shared. 
(S16/6) When someone praises the security risk 
intelligence analysis profession, it feels like a personal 
compliment. 
(S16/7) If a story in the media criticized the security 
risk intelligence analysis profession, I would feel 
embarrassed, e.g. the case of Reality Winner (link) 
(S16/8) All other factors being equal, I would rather 
change my employer than my profession as a security 
risk intelligence analyst. 
(S16/9) It is more important that I conduct my work 
professionally than being a member of a specific 
“profession”. 
Likert scale: Strongly agree/Agree/Neither agree or 
disagree/disagree/strongly disagree * Reverse coding 
4. What is their perception of 
Security Risk Intelligence 
Analysis in the private 
sector? 
(S17) : Please rate the extent to which you agree with 
each of the following statements: 
(S17/1) I think highly of the Security Risk Intelligence 
Analysis profession. 
(S17/2) I consider it prestigious to belong to the 
Security Risk Intelligence Analysis profession. 
(S17/3) I consider the Security Risk Intelligence 
Analysis profession to be one of the best professions 
for people with relevant skills and education. 
(S17/4) I would not recommend this career to 
someone else.* 
 Research questions Survey Questions  
(S17/5) I see a future for myself being a Security Risk 
Intelligence Analyst in the private sector and would 
like to remain in this profession in some capacity. 
Likert scale: Strongly agree/Agree/Neither agree or 
disagree/disagree/strongly disagree* Reverse coding 
(S24)  In light of the fast-changing working 
environment, what skills do you think SRIA need to 
acquire to be relevant in the future? (Open-ended 
format) 
5. What experiences and 
conditions does SRIA 
perceive as contributing to 
or strengthening their 
professional identities?   
(S18): What benefits/opportunities do you derive from 
you being a security risk intelligence analyst? Name at 
least 2.  
(Open-ended format) 
 
6. What experiences and 
conditions does SRIA 
perceive as hindering their 
professional identity?   
(S19): In your experience, what are the biggest 
challenges you experience/d as a security risk 
intelligence analyst? (at least 2) 
(Open-ended format) 
7. How do SRIA believe they 
are perceived by others?  
7.1    What is the public’s 
viewpoint about the 
profession?  
 
(S20): Please rate the extent to which you agree with 
each of the following statements: Likert scale: Strongly 
agree/Agree/Neither agree or 
disagree/disagree/strongly disagree *Reverse coding 
(S20/1): People, in general, think highly of the security 
risk intelligence analysis profession  
(S20/2): It is considered prestigious to belong to the 
security risk intelligence analysis profession. 
(S20/3): The security risk intelligence analysis 
profession is considered to be one of the best 
professions.  
7.2    How do your colleagues 
view your work and your 
contribution to the team? 
(S20/4): Most of the stakeholders with whom I liaise 
value the contribution I, as a security risk intelligence 
analyst, make to achieve our mandate. 
7.3     How do your 
management and/or clients 
perceive you in your 
professional capacity? 
(S20/5): My management and/or clients do not have a 
good perception of the profession of the security risk 
intelligence analyst. * 
 
8. What are the most salient 
professional values that SRIA 
share? 
(S21): In your experience, what are the three most 
important/ non-negotiable professional values/ethical 
standards or codes of conduct that you practise as a 
Security Risk Intelligence Analyst? 
(Open-ended format) 
9. How do they perceive the 
future of the profession, and 
what should be done to 
ensure the profession stay 
relevant? 
(S22) In your opinion, what would help to strengthen 
the identity of the Security Risk Intelligence Analysis 




Appendix C3  
APPENDIX C4 
Social media marketing 
 
  
Screen shots of Twitter marketing of the survey 
Screen shots of marketing of survey on LinkedIn social media network 
   
Screenshot of AIRIP email to 
members (extract)
 
Screenshot of International Association for Intelligence 




SPSS Codebook for use in Mann-Whitney and Kruskal Willis tests 
 
Variable SPSS Variable 
name 
Coding instructions 
Unique response number ID  
Age Age 1= 18-24; 2= 25-34; 3= 35-44; 4= 45-54; 
5= 55-65 
6= 65+ 
Gender Gender 1= Male; 2= Female 
Years of SRIA experience Yearsexperience 1= 1-5 years; 2= 6-10 years; 3= 11-15 
years; 4= 16-20 years; 5= 21-25 years; 6= 
More than 25 years 
Previous government 
experience 
Previousgov 1 = Yes; 2 = No 
Country in which you are 
working 
Countryworking 1 = Australia;  2 = Botswana; 3 = Bulgaria; 
4 = Canada; 5 = Finland ;6 = Germany; 7 = 
Global; 8 = Greece; 9 = Kenya; 10 = 
Lebanon ;11 = Mexico; 12 = Netherlands; 
13 = Nigeria; 14 = Singapore; 15 = 
Slovenia; 16 = South Africa; 17 = 
Switzerland; 18 = Tanzania; 19 = UK; 20 = 
Ukraine; 21 = US; 22 = Venezuela 
Supervisory position Supervisor 1 = Yes; 2 = No 
Economic sector Sector 1 = Agriculture; 2 = Mining & Quarrying; 3 
= Manufacturing; 4 = Electricity, Gas, 
Steam and Air Conditioning; 5 = 
Wholesale and Retail trade; repair of 
vehicles; 6 = Transport & Storage; 7 = 
Accommodation and Food service; 8 = 
Information & Communication; 9 = 
Finance & Insurance; 10 = Professional, 
Scientific & Technical; 11 = Public Sector, 
Social Security & Defence; 12 = 
Education; 13 = Human Health & Social 
Work; 14 = Arts, Entertainment & 
Recreation; 15 = Extraterritorial 
Organisations & Bodies 
Type of organisation you’re 
working for 
Typeoforg 1 = Self-employed;  
2 = A security/intelligence/risk unit in a 
private company/multinational 
corporation whose core business is not 
security  
3 = A private security company with its 
own security risk intelligence analysis 
capacity. 
4 = A private local/national/multinational 
company that provide security risk 
intelligence consulting services to 
external clients, including the private 
sector or government agencies. This 
would, therefore, also include contractors 
Variable SPSS Variable 
name 
Coding instructions 
working in situ at Government 
departments/agencies. 
5 =  A non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) with its own security risk 
intelligence analysis capacity 
6 = Research institute/foundations/think 
tanks whose primary function is to 
provide security risk intelligence analysis 
and advice to external clients. 
7 = Independent regulatory/supervisory 
body. 
Highest qualification Qualification 1 = 1 or 2 year qualification 
2 = Bachelors degree (3/4 years) or 
equivalent 
3 = Honours degree (1yr after Bachelors) 
or equivalent 
4 = Masters degree 
5 = Doctorate degree 
Field of qualification QualField 1 = Education 
2 = Arts and humanities including 
languages 
3 = Social sciences, journalism and 
information, including Economics, 
political sciences, psychology, sociology  
4 = Business, administration and law, 
including accounting, management, 
finance etc 
5 = Natural sciences, mathematics and 
statistics 
6 = Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs) 
7 = Services including security, military, 
law enforcement 
8 = Do not want to disclose 
Membership of professional 
organisation 
Professionalorg 1 = Yes 
2 = No 
Self-categorisation: Generally, 
the more my goals, values, 
and beliefs overlap with those 
of my profession, the happier I 
am. 
SCValues 1 = Strongly agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Disagree 





1 = Strongly agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly disagree 
 
Self-categorisation: I would 
rather say ‘we’ than ‘they’ 
when talking about the 
profession I work in. 
SCSaywe 
Self-categorisation: I strongly 
define myself as a Security 




interested in what others 
SCOthers 
Variable SPSS Variable 
name 
Coding instructions 
think about the Security Risk 
Intelligence Analysis 
profession. 
Self-categorisation: I currently 
attend /would like to attend 
events where Security Risk 
Intelligence Analysis best 
practice is shared. 
SCEvents 
Self-categorisation: When 
someone praises the Security 
Risk Intelligence Analysis 
profession, it feels like a 
personal compliment. 
SCCompliment 
Self-categorisation: If a story 
in the media criticized the 
Security Risk Intelligence 
Analysis profession, I would 
feel embarrassed, e.g. the 
case of Reality Winner, a US 
intelligence analysis 
contractor who was sentenced 
to jail in June 2018 after she 
leaked information to the 
media. 
SCEmbarrassed 
Self-categorisation: All other 
factors being equal, I would 
rather change my employer 
than my profession as a 
Security risk intelligence 
analyst. 
SCChange 
Self-categorisation: It is more 
important that I conduct my 
work professionally than being 
a member of a specific 
“profession". 
SCProfessional 
The sum of the SC variables TotalSelfcat 
Mean of each case’s 
responses 
MeanTSelfcat 1 = Strongly agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Disagree 






1 = Strongly agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Disagree 
Self-perception: I think highly 




Self-perception: I consider it 
prestigious to belong to the 
Security Risk Intelligence 
Analysis profession. 
SPPrestigious 
Self-perception: I consider the 
Security Risk Intelligence 
Analysis profession to be one 
of the best professions for 
SPBest 
Variable SPSS Variable 
name 
Coding instructions 
people with relevant skills and 
education. 
5 = Strongly disagree 
 
Self-perception: I would 
recommend this career to 
someone else. 
SPRecommend 
Self-perception: I see a future 
for myself being a Security 
Risk Intelligence Analysis in 
the private sector and would 
like to remain in this 
profession in some capacity. 
SPFuture 




Others’ perception: People, in 
general, think highly of the 
Security Risk Intelligence 
Analysis profession. 
OPThinkhighly 
Others’ perception: It is 
considered prestigious to 




Others’ perception: The 
Security Risk Intelligence 
Analysis profession is 
considered to be one of the 
best professions. 
OPBest 
Others’ perception: Most of 
the stakeholders with whom I 
liaise value the contribution I, 
as a Security risk intelligence 
analyst, make to achieve our 
mandate. 
OPValue 
Others’ perception: My 
management and/or clients 
have a good perception of the 
profession of Security Risk 
Intelligence Analysis. 
OPPerception 





Operational definitions of themes for content analysis in the survey 
 
Theme Definition 
Role and function of a security risk intelligence analyst 
Specific and varied roles of a 
security risk intelligence analyst 
Any reference to one or more of the specific professional 
roles a security risk intelligence analyst fulfils. 
Focus on the anticipatory role 
of intelligence analysis 
Any reference to forewarning and intelligence function. 
Focus on the insight role of 
intelligence analysis 
Any reference to situational awareness & identification of 
threats and risks. 
Whom SRIA work with Any reference to the setting or breadth of settings SRIA 
work in or range of presenting problems addressed. 
Use of typical jargon used by 
security, risk and/or intelligence 
analysts 
Use of typical terminology and/or jargon used by 
security, risk or intelligence professionals in this role.  
The unique contribution of a security risk intelligence analyst 
What SRIA offer the client in 
terms of better decision-making 
Any reference to the interpersonal aspect of the security 
risk intelligence analyst role, including how they may help 
the client. 
The perceived contribution to 
society 
Any reference to esoteric and value-laden terminology to 
describe the contribution to society. 
Use of specific risk prevention 
terminology that benefits the 
organisation 
Any reference to the preventative aspect of the business. 
Opportunities or benefits offered by working as a Security risk intelligence analyst Career 
Career and other physical 
personal outcomes 
Any reference to one or more of the various career and 
personal opportunities working as a security risk 
intelligence analyst presents. 
Own evaluation on how they 
feel about the profession. 
Any comment on how they feel or experience being in 
this profession, the importance and/or enjoyment they 
derive from practising. 
How others view the profession 
and how it impacts their own 
self-image 
Any reference to how others view their contribution and 
how it impacts their self-image. 
Challenges experienced whilst working as a Security risk intelligence analyst  
Organisational-situated 
challenges (outward facing) 
Any comment highlighting the challenge of gaining 
recognition, understanding, resources, cooperation etc. 
in the workplace. 
Challenges that originate from 
the task and function itself 
(inward-facing) 
Any comment highlighting challenges specific to the 
security risk intelligence analysis task itself. 
Challenges with the operational 
environment 
Any comment highlighting challenges in the broader 
environmental/political context.  
Challenges in the professional 
context not previously 
mentioned 
Any comment highlighting tensions they experience 
within the professionalisation project itself. 
Strategies that could strengthen the professional identity of SRIA 
Clearer articulation of identity 
and potential contribution to 
Any comment highlighting the need for a clearer and 
more active promotion of the identity and potential 
contribution of SRIA. 
organisation, cross-functional 
bodies and society 
Improved HR practices Any comment highlighting ways in which SRIA could 
ensure that HR practices, such as job profiling, 
recruitment etc., could be improved. 
Enhance the role of professional 
bodies and the profession 
Any comment highlighting the need for a higher profile, 
greater recognition and increased networking within the 
professional bodies. 
Training, education and 
research activity 
Any comment relating to ways in which the training, 
education and researching of SRIA could improve the 
professional identity of analysts. 
Self-awareness and ethical 
behaviour 
Any comment highlighting the profession’s need for a 
more positive self-perception or potential ways of 








Gender, age and experience distribution: n=75 













Female 1 4 7 3 3 0 18 
Male 1 11 14 16 13 2 57 
Total  2 15 21 19 16 2 75 
        










> 25 years 
experience 
Total 
Female 3 2 4 6 0 3 18 
Male 10 10 10 8 8 11 57 







Field of qualification and highest qualification achieved: n=75 











Arts and humanities, 
including languages 
 3  5  8 
Business, administration 
and law, including 
accounting, management, 
finance etc. 
 1 1 3 3 8 
Do not want to disclose 1 2    3 




   3 1 4 
Natural sciences, 
mathematics and statistics 
1 2    3 
Services including security, 
military, law enforcement 
 2 1 8  11 
Social sciences, journalism 




1 3 5 20 3 32 
TOTAL 3 15 8 41 8 75 
*Note. In some countries, including the UK, Australia and South Africa, Honours degrees are one-







Economic sector and countries in which the analysts work: n=75 
Answer options Response % Frequency Countries 
Accommodation and 
Foodservice 
3% 2 USA 
Agriculture 3% 2 South Africa, USA 
Arts, Entertainment & 
Recreation 
1% 1 USA 
Education 5% 4 Greece, USA 
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air 
Conditioning 
7% 5 Germany, Netherlands, USA 
Extraterritorial Organisations & 
Bodies 
1% 1 South Africa 
Finance & Insurance 13% 10 Slovenia, South Africa, 
Switzerland, UK, USA 
Human Health & Social Work 7% 5 Kenya, Tanzania, USA, 
Venezuela 
Information & Communication 7% 5 Bulgaria, Finland, South Africa, 
USA 
Manufacturing 5% 4 Germany, USA 
Mining & Quarrying 5% 4 Botswana, Mexico 
Professional, Scientific & 
Technical 
32% 24 Germany, globally, Nigeria, 
Singapore, South Africa, UK, 
Ukraine, USA 
Public Sector, Social Security & 
Defence 
3% 2 Canada, Lebanon 
Transport & Storage 5% 4 Australia, Canada, UK, USA 
Wholesale and Retail trade; 
repair of vehicles 
3% 2 UK, USA 






Type of employer and countries in which they are employed: n=75 
Answer options Response % Frequency Countries 
A security/ intelligence/ risk unit in a private 
company/multinational corporation or 
university whose core business is not 
security. 





South Africa, Taiwan, 
UK, US, Venezuela 
A private local/national/multinational 
company that provides security risk 
intelligence consulting services to external 
cl ients, including the private sector or 
government agencies. This would, 
therefore, also include contractors working 
in situ at government 
departments/agencies. 
16% 12 Australia, Finland, 
Netherlands, South 
Africa, UK, US 
A private security company with its own 
security risk intelligence analysis capacity. 
13% 10 Nigeria, Ukraine, US 
Self-employed 12% 9 Germany, South 
Africa, US & 2X global 
A non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
with its own security risk intelligence 
analysis capacity. 
8% 6 Kenya, Lebanon, 
Switzerland, 
Tanzania, US 
Research institute/foundations/think tanks 
whose primary function is to provide 
security risk intelligence analysis and advice 
to external clients. 
3% 2 Greece and South 
Africa 
Independent regulatory/supervisory body. 1% 1 Canada 







Focus areas of analytical services and deliverables: n=75 
Answer options Response % Frequency 
Analytical practices 
Strategic analysis & Foresight 64% 48 
Analytical practices 37% 28 
Mean of respondents  51% 38 
Security management 
Security risk management 71% 53 
Security management strategy 55% 41 
Physical protection of facilities 48% 36 
Strategic security management 39% 29 
Governance and/or compliance 36% 27 
Business continuity/crisis management 3% 2 
Mean of respondents  42% 31 
Protective/security intelligence 
Travel risk 57% 43 
Personnel security incidents 51% 38 
Reputational risks 51% 38 
Executive protection 40% 30 
Insider threats 40% 30 
Loss prevention 35% 26 
Internal investigations 31% 23 
Fixated/psychological disturbed persons of interest 16% 12 
Mean of respondents  40% 30 
Geostrategic & political intelligence 
Geo-political developments 63% 47 
Terrorism & counter-terrorism 53% 40 
Extremism 49% 37 
National political developments 44% 33 
Political economy developments 35% 26 
Espionage threats 33% 25 
Socio-economic developments 33% 25 
Military threats 23% 17 
Interest and pressure groups 21% 16 
Mean of respondents  39% 30 
Crime intelligence 
General crime 59% 44 
Organised crime 49% 37 
Environmental crime/risks 41% 31 
Answer options Response % Frequency 
Corruption 31% 23 
Money laundering and fraud 21% 16 
Terrorist financing 9% 7 
Mean of respondents  35% 26 
Cyber intelligence 
Cyber threats 24% 18 
Cyber threat analysis 23% 17 







Membership of professional organisations, gender and reasons for belonging to a professional 
organisation: n=52 
Answer options Response % Frequency 
Member of a professional organisation 72% 52 
Male 71% 40 
Female 75% 12 
Age Groups 
18-24 100% 2 
25-34 60% 9 
35-44 65% 13 
45-54 78% 14 
55-64 80% 12 
65+ 100% 2 
Reasons for being a member of a professional organisation 
Networking & socialising 34% 33 
Information sharing/Staying informed/Access to opportunities 20% 19 
Benchmarking/best practice 18% 17 
Learning/professional development 18% 17 
Certification/professional recognition specifically 8% 8 
Company requires it 2% 2 
NOT member of a professional organisation 26% 19 
Male 27% 15 
Female 25% 4 
Age Groups 
18-24 0% 0 
25-34 40% 6 
35-44 35% 7 
45-54 17% 3 
55-64 20% 3 
65+ 0% 0 
Reasons for NOT belonging to a professional organisation 
No need for it 53% 10 
Lack of awareness 26% 5 








Professional organisation membership and qualification comparison 




Mean number of prof 
memberships of  all 
participants with 
qualifications 
1 or 2 year qualification 67% 2 1.3 
Bachelor’s degree (3/4 years) or 
equivalent 
53% 8 1.4 
Honours’ degree (1yr after 
Bachelors) or equivalent 
63% 5 0.9 
Master’s degree 78% 32 1.9 






Professional organisational type 1: Membership of professional organisations that provide 
networking, knowledge sharing AND professional certification opportunities n=20 
Answer options Response % Frequency 
Prof Org with certification options & knowledge sharing according to membership frequency 
Association for International Risk Intelligence Professionals (AIRIP) 26% 14 
ASIS (formerly American Society of Industrial Security ) 26% 14 
Security Institute 11% 6 
Association for certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 9% 5 
Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP) 9% 5 
Business Continuity Institute (BCI) 4% 2 
International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA) 4% 2 
International Security Management Institute (ISMI) 4% 2 
International NGO Safety and Security Association (INSSA) 2% 1 
ACM (formerly Association for Computing Machinery) 2% 1 
AOC (Association of Old Crows - a professional organization that 
advocates the technical advancement of Electronic Warfare and 
Information Operations) 
2% 1 
Chartered Insurance Institute (CII) 2% 1 
Chartered Society of Forensic Science (CSFS) 2% 1 
Disaster Recovery Institute International (DRII) 2% 1 
EC-Council  (International Council  of E-Commerce Consultants) 2% 1 
Global Business Travel Association - GBTA 2% 1 
International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists 
(IACIS) 
2% 1 
International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM)  2% 1 
International Association for Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 2% 1 
International Supply Chain Protection Organization (ISCPO) 2% 1 
ACM (formerly Association for Computing Machinery) 2% 1 
AOC (Association of Old Crows - a professional organization that 
advocates the technical advancement of Electronic Warfare and 
Information Operations) 
2% 1 
Chartered Insurance Institute (CII) 2% 1 
Chartered Society of Forensic Science (CSFS) 2% 1 








Professional organisation Type 2: Membership of professional organisations that provide 
networking, knowledge sharing with a code of conduct or professional standards, but no 
professional certification: n=23 
Answer options Response % Frequency 
Professional organisation without certification options    
OSAC (Overseas Security Advisory Council - a division of the U.S. 
Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security) 
17% 9 
Analyst Roundtable (ad hoc workshops of experts/analysts that are 
industry/professional organization/geography specific)  
15% 8 
Private Sector Intell igence Council  (PSIC) 6% 3 
AFIO (Association for Intell igence Officers) 4% 2 
AIIP (Association of Independent Information Professionals) 4% 2 
Domestic Security All iance Council  (DSAC) 4% 2 
International Association for Intell igence Education (IAFIE) 4% 2 
ISC2  International Information Systems Security Certification 
Consortium 
4% 2 
Asian Crisis Security Group (ACSG) 2% 1 
Business Resumption Planners Association (BRPA) 2% 1 
Electronic Crimes Task Force 2% 1 
PULSE: Higher Education International Health and Safety 
Professionals (Canada and US) 
2% 1 
High Technology Crime Investigation Association (HTCIA) US & 
Canada) 
2% 1 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 2% 1 
Institute of Information Technology Professionals of South Africa 
(IITPSA) 
2% 1 
Infragard (US) 2% 1 
International Protective Security Board (IPSB) 2% 1 
International Studies Association (ISA) 2% 1 
NAFSA (Started as  National Association of Foreign Student 
Advisers) now Association of International Educators 
2% 1 
National Efficiency Screening Project (NESP) 2% 1 
National Military Intell igence Association (NMIA) 2% 1 
Strategic and Competitive Intell igence Professionals (SCIP) 2% 1 







The perceived benefits of belonging to the security risk intelligence analysis profession: n=73 





code in the 
theme 
% of countries 
whose answers 
included a code 
in the theme: 
n=24 
% of economic 
sectors whose 
answers 
included a code 
in the theme: 
n=15 
Personal benefits 83% 73% 93% 
Intellectually stimulating career 51% 54% 73% 
Good self-esteem 14% 21% 53% 
Networking opportunities 13% 17% 40% 
Other (no need for security clearance, 
access to databases, etc.) 11% 13% 53% 
Flexibility and travel opportunities 10% 13% 33% 
Good salary 7% 17% 20% 
Perceived image of the profession inside 
and outside the professional group 
(validation) 
17% 29% 53% 
Valued by peers 8% 15% 40% 
Valued by management and executives 6% 20% 27% 
Valued by clients 1% 10% 13% 
Self-perceived value of them belonging to 
the profession 
32% 38% 73% 
They have an impact on the business 14% 22% 53% 
Serving others / Making a difference 11% 17% 27% 






The perceived challenges associated with being a security risk intelligence analyst profession: 
n=71 




















code in the 
theme n=15 
1. Challenges related to their task 39% 38% 80% 
1.1  Information and cognitive overload 24% 25% 60% 
1.2  Cognitive biases and challenges 8% 8% 20% 
1.3  Time pressure 7% 13% 33% 
1.4  Difficult to influence decision makers 6% 8% 13% 
1.5  Lack of feedback 1% 4% 7% 
2. Challenges stemming from organisational 
context 
80% 92% 93% 
2.1  Lack of understanding the value of security risk 
intelligence analysis 
54% 67% 80% 
2.2  Lack of resources 27% 25% 60% 
• Lack of access to information 13% 17% 33% 
• Lack of funding 14% 25% 47% 
• Lack of IT resources 4% 8% 20% 
2.3  Inadequate HR support 23% 33% 60% 
• Lack of career pathing 8% 17% 53% 
• Uninformed recruiters and poor 
recruitment practices 
14% 25% 33% 
2.4  Training challenges 11% 25% 40% 
2.5  Lack of interdepartmental cooperation and 
information sharing 
11% 8% 40% 
• With external stakeholders 3% 4% 13% 
• With internal stakeholders  8% 8% 33% 
2.6  Inadequate salary 6% 13% 20% 
2.7  Age and gender bias 3% 13% 20% 
2.8  Politicization 1% 4% 7% 
3. Challenges in the operating environment 
(rapid geopolitical changes and the role of 
artificial intelligence to assist with 
information gathering) 
14% 17% 53% 
4. Challenges in the broader profession (lack of 
networking, the profession is unknown, few 
opportunities in the industry etc.) 




The most important/non-negotiable professional values/ethical standards or codes of conduct 
that you practise as a Security risk intelligence analyst: n=71 
Themes and sub-themes  % of 
respondents 
whose answers 
included a code 
in the theme 




code in the 
theme: n=24 




code in the 
theme: n=15 
1. Personal values 80% 83% 73% 
1.1  Integrity 52% 58% 100% 
1.2  Honesty 42% 46% 73% 
1.3  Learning disposition 11% 13% 27% 
1.4  Courage 10% 13% 33% 
1.5  Lawful 8% 21% 40% 
2. Values related to how they perform their task 72% 83% 73% 
2.1  Objective 34% 50% 67% 
2.2 Discretion 28% 46% 73% 
2.3 Strive for excellence 20% 25% 53% 
2.4  Collaborate 10% 8% 20% 
2.5 Customer-centric 10% 13% 27% 
2.6  Ethical data gathering 7% 8% 20% 
3. Values related to their organisation 10% 25% 33% 
3.1  Managers support analysts’ judgements 3% 8% 13% 
3.2 Independence 3% 8% 13% 
3.3 Loyalty 3% 8% 13% 
Values related to how they interact with others 10% 17% 27% 
4.1  Respect 6% 13% 20% 





Self-identification/categorisation with the security risk intelligence analyst profession 




2:            
















1) Generally, the more my 
goals, values, and beliefs 
overlap with those of my 
profession, the happier I 
am. 









0       
(0%) 
1.65/0.79 
       
2) I would rather say ‘we’ 
than ‘they’ when talking 










0       
(0%) 
1.49/0.62 
       
3) I strongly define myself as 
a SRIA professional. 
27    
(36%) 
24     
(32%) 
15     
(20%) 
8      
(11%) 
1       
(1%) 
2.09/1.05 
       
4) I’m not interested in what 
others think about the SRIA 
profession.* 
3        
(4%) 
3        
(4%) 
13     
(17%) 





       
5) I currently attend /would 
l ike to attend events where 
SRIA best practice is shared. 
49    
(65%) 
23    
(31%) 
2        
(3%) 
1        
(1%) 
0       
(0%) 
1.4/0.61 
       
6) When someone praises 
the SRIA profession, it feels 
l ike a personal compliment. 
23    
(31%) 
22    
(29%) 
25    
(33%) 
4        
(5%) 
1       
(1%) 
2.17/0.97 
7) If a story in the media 
criticized the SRIA 
profession, I would feel 
embarrassed, e.g. the case 
of Reality Winner. 
12    
(16%) 
13    
(17%) 
26    
(35%) 
15    
(20%) 




8) All  other factors being 
equal, I would rather change 
my employer than my 
profession as a SRIA. 
 
31    
(41%) 
 
18    
(24%) 
 
12    
(16%) 
 
12    
(16%) 
 




       
9) It is more important that I 
conduct my work 
professionally than being a 
member of a specific 
“profession”. 
42    
(56%) 
 
23    
(31%) 
8      
(11%) 
2        
(3%) 
0        
(0%) 
1.6/ 0.78 
OVERALL RESULTS  43% 31% 17% 7% 2% 1.95/0.91 





 Results of Mann-Whitney (U test) and Kruskal-Wallis (H Test) nonparametric tests across demographic variables: Self-categorisation 
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 Results of Mann-Whitney (U test) and Kruskal-Wallis (H Test) nonparametric tests across demographic variables: Collective Self-perception 
Dependent 
variable 
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H=3.960                  
p =.411 





Analysis in the 
private sector 
and would like 


















































 Results of Mann-Whitney (U test) and Kruskal-Wallis (H Test) nonparametric tests across 
demographic variables: Collective perception of others 
Collective perception of others’ perceive the security risk intelligence analysis profession 
Dependent 
variable 
People in general 
think highly of the 
SRIA profession  
(OPThinkhighly) 
It is considered 
prestigious to  





considered to be 
one of the best 
professions 
(OPBest) 
Most of the 
stakeholders 
with whom I 
liaise value the 
contribution 
that I, as a 

















































































































































































































































   













Demographic information:  
Name  
 Age  
Gender  
Country of citizenship  
In which country do you work?  
Years’ experience specific in this capacity?  
Highest qualification:  
Where have you worked previously?  
Where do you work? What economic sector is that?  
On what types of threats or issues do you work? 
Are you a member of a professional organisation? Which? Why? Why not?  
 
1.  What does it mean to you personally to be a SECURITY RISK INTELLIGENCE ANALYST in 
the private sector? 
Prompts: 
• What are your responsibilities? 
• What do you do on a daily basis? 
• With whom do you work and why? 
• What is your official job title? Is this a true reflection of what you do? What would 
you prefer your job title to be? 
 
2.  When people ask what you do for a living, what do you tell them? Tell me your 
professional story? 
Prompts: 
• What or who got you into the security risk intelligence field? 
• How do you feel when you’re working?  
 
3.  Is there anything that the Security Risk Intelligence Analyst bring to the table that no-
one else does?  
Prompts: 
What makes this career different from any other career?  
 
4.  What is that something special that you bring as a Security Risk Intelligence Analyst to 
your workplace? And the broader society? 
 
5. What do you like about being a Security Risk Intelligence Analyst? Why? 
Prompts: 
• What does it offer to you personally that no other career can? 
• What benefits are there for you? 
• Why does it make you feel good?   
• Is there a future for this career?  
• Would you recommend this career to anyone else? 
• Can anybody do this job? 
 
6. What experiences and conditions impede your Security Risk Intelligence Analyst 
professional identity?   
Prompts: 
• In your experience, what are the biggest challenges you experience/d as a Security 
Risk Intelligence Analyst? 
• What do you dislike about being a Security Risk Intelligence Analyst? 
 
7. Did you ever feel you had a professional identity crisis? Can you share that with me?  
Prompts: 
• What happened? What was the reason? 
• How did you overcome/are you overcoming these challenges? 
• Did you have to change the way you see yourself professionally? 
• Change your expectations? 
• Change the way you work? 
 
8. How do other people perceive you professionally? 
Prompts: 
• Have you had experience with the public, and how do they perceive you in your 
professional role? 
• What about your colleagues? 
• Your managers? 
• Your clients? 
 
9. In your opinion, what would help to strengthen the identity of the Security Risk 
Intelligence Analysis profession for the future? 
Prompts:  
• Skills & competencies 
• Relationships 
• Education and training 
• Socialising & networking 
• Professional associations & credentials? 
• Professional conduct 
• Values 
• Understand your role/place 
• Is there a professional community? 
 
 























Professional Identity worksheet 
This sheet will help you to define your own professional identity, regardless of 
what work you do. 
 
1. Your name: 
 
2. What is your preferred job title for the work you're doing? 
 
3. What are the unique set of skills, character and attitude that you 
bring to your workplace? (see further reading) 
 
4. Do you feel satisfied and fulfilled in your workplace, and why? 
 
5. What are your 3 most important professional values? 
 
6. What are the 3 things you like most about your job? What 
gives you energy, excitement or gratitude? 
 
7. What are the 3 things that you dislike the most about your job? What 
saps your energy, what makes you irritable and what do you dread? 
 
8. How do you deal with these 3 challenges? Choose the strategy/ies you 
use when confronted with these: 
Resign from the job 
Become demotivated 
Alienate yourself from colleagues 
Marginalise (which include name-calling, rejection and 
hostility) those people you think are a threat to your 
professional identity 
Implement acts of resistance 
Make sure that you manipulate how others see you 
Craft your job by 1) changing the boundaries of your tasks 
or 2) changing the nature and extent of your interaction 
with people.* 
Do introspection and reframe your perceptions on the 
purpose of tasks or job as a whole.* 
Reinvent yourself by learning new skills to address 
competency gaps or perhaps start a new career that will make 
work meaningful to you.* 
 
9. How are you going to address the challenges by changing yourself 
and applying any of those* above? 
Further reading: 
1. Berg, JM., Dutton, JE and Wrzesniewski, A., (2008) What is Job Crafting 
and Why Does It Matter? Here 
2. Mindtools. Job Crafting: Shaping Your Job to Fit You Better. Here 
3. Take the free character strengths survey here 
Your personal professional identity statement 
(to use in introductions, interviews, LinkedIn profile etc.) 
 
Hi! I’m (your name) 
 
I work as a (your preferred job title) 
 
at (the organisation you work for) 
 
My unique value proposition to and impact in the organisation/purpose) is: 
e.g. I help my company to understand the threats and security risks to our 
business by researching, monitoring and advising business units on how to 
identify and counter or mitigate these risks to achieve their objectives while 
keeping the company and our employees safe. 
 
I believe in doing my work with (values) 
 
I can use my qualification/s in … 
 
and my experience in … to provide the best ... possible 
 
I like working with/learning/doing… (your objectives you would like to 
achieve/opportunities you have or would like to have in a new job) 
 
 
